Situation Report

13th May 2001

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More military supplies arrive for LTTE as peace initiative continues

Two weeks ago, the Sri Lanka Navy received a tip off from the Navy of a friendly neighbouring country that a large ship was unloading suspected military supplies to smaller vessels that were later heading towards the north eastern coast.

The Navy's Eastern Command Headquarters in Trincomalee reacted promptly. Two Chinese built Fast Gun Boats were tasked to proceed immediately to the area to identify the exact location and report details. The move was to be a precursor to an air and sea assault to intercept the latest military Imagesupplies the Tiger guerrillas were taking delivery.

The FGBs were forced to limp at a speed of two knots, as against their regular speed of ten, due to rough seas. They had tracked the suspect ship on the radar, some 150 miles north east of Mullaitivu. But barely an hour later, the two FGBs were caught up in the choppy waters. They lost track of the LTTE's latest operation to unload and smuggle into the country another shipload of military hardware. More proof they were continuing to prepare for war whilst talking peace with the Norwegian negotiators.

Barely a week after they succeeded in unloading a shipload of military cargo, the Navy learnt some shocking details of what it contained. This was both through foreign and local intelligence channels. Among the unloaded items are Closed Circuit Diving Equipment. These help divers to carry out under water sabotage or attacks without being detected.

When divers use face masks and oxygen cylinders to move under water, their presence could yet be detected by the bubbles that surface from the bottom. But the use of Closed Circuit Diving Equipment prevented the surfacing of bubbles and thus helps avoid detection.

The news made it clear that ports and shore based Naval establishments were top targets. Security precautions were promptly strengthened at several locations including Colombo and Trincomalee ports. Other counter measures have also gone into place.

The latest revelation will undoubtedly come as a shock to the Government. Billions of rupees had been poured in to enhance the Navy's deep sea capability. It was solely intended to prevent Tiger guerrillas from smuggling military hardware to sustain a high intensity war against the security forces. If these measures were in place, particularly after a large volume of public funds had been committed, the latest smuggling attempt could well have been thwarted.

Among the measures funded by the Government was the acquisition of large vessels for the Navy. Main among them was the Indian built INS Saryu, now re-named SLNS Sayura. This Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) was touted as one of the most successful acquisitions of the Sri Lanka Navy. It was to be the platform from which the Navy was to launch its Air Wing. Former Navy Commander, Admiral Cecil Tissera, who worked out the deal even recruited retired Air Force personnel to man the new Air Wing.

But his successor, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, dropped a bombshell at a top level conference at Navy Headquarters last Thursday. As the Chief of Staff of the Navy, or the number two man, he said he was completely unaware of details connected with the acquisition of the OPV, or more importantly, the setting up of an Air Arm. He declared that the Navy was trying to do what the Sri Lanka Air Force was now doing. Evidently Admiral Tissera had not even told his number two man of the major procurement.

His comments came during a conference of officers above the rank of Commander. The occasion was a presentation on the Air Wing and its future. The idea was to educate the officers on the various aspects. A former Air Force officer, now enlisted as an officer in the Navy, made the presentation. Elaborating on a future role for the Air Wing, he said the Navy could even undertake Long Range Maritime Reconnaisance. This was to draw a sharp retort from Vice Admiral Sandagiri who declared "I don't want to duplicate the work the Air Force is doing." He said the SLAF had acquired aircraft to carry out long range surveillance and the Navy should not seek to duplicate that role.

Question time after the presentation was to bare more shocking details. Asked whether the Indian OPV could help the Navy in its current role to counter LTTE activity in the high seas, the reply was "not right at the moment." In other words, almost an year after its acquisition, SLNS Sayura is unable to play its intended role. It is for this reason that the OPV is now doing routine runs in an area south of Colombo.

There were more questions. How far could the helicopter (an Indian built single engine Chetak, the French version of an Alouette), could fly. Ideally, a 100 miles. But the present capability was only 20 to 40 miles. It was revealed that the OPV was purchased by the Navy after it did not avail itself of an earlier Indian offer for a long term lease. For the OPV to operate in the north eastern seas, it is pointed out that a fleet of smaller vessels would be required to protect it. If that is the fate of the OPV, as repeatedly revealed in these columns, so is the case of the two over 20 year old Israeli built Fast Missile Vessels. Regular breakdowns have made the two FMVs non operational.

Hence, after ploughing in billions of rupees to provide the Navy with a blue water capability, the Government is in a dilemma. The project has turned out to be a white elephant. Who was responsible for these colossal blunders ? The question is raised in the public interest since the Government has raised funds for these procurements by heaping greater burdens and hardships on the public. Any additional efforts to help the Navy to develop deep sea capability would mean greater financial expenditure. Was it a lack of a studied approach that caused the problem or was it the lure of attractive commissions ? It would be in the Government's own interest to ascertain the truth. More so, when these developments have taken place without any transparency in the higher command of the Navy itself. That is established by the present Commander's confession he was not aware of anything. Why such secrecy.?

Whatever the reasons for the Navy's inability to deal with Tiger guerrilla threats in the deep seas, smuggling of weaponry by the LTTE has continued unabated in the recent months. That is during a period when Norway has been playing the role of a facilitator to bring the Government and the LTTE to the negotiating table. That is also during a period when the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire for four months since Christmas Eve last year..

Detailed proof of this has come after intelligence officials interrogated eight Tiger guerrillas who were rescued from the high seas during a confrontation on April 22 (Situation Report - April 22). They were rescued after a four hour long, pre dawn confrontation between Naval craft and Sea Tiger boats. This was after the Navy intercepted Sea Tiger boats escorting military cargo unloaded from ships to smaller barges in the high seas off Mullaitivu. This was the second deep sea confrontation in a week.

It has now been revealed that the bulk of the military cargo unloaded into barges had been landed in the coast. The confrontation had been only with cadres in boats providing security to the barges containing military cargo..

Each barge had been manned by 14 to 18 cadres and was equipped with eight outboard motors, each with a 250 horsepower capacity. Eight such barges had unloaded the cargo. Each convoy had taken one and half hours to move cargo to the shore from the deep sea.

The cargo had included large stocks of ammunition, artillery and mortar shells. Some were for use in 122 mm, 130 mm and 152 mm guns. The mortar shells have been for 81 mm and 120 mm launchers. The captured LTTE cadres had also spoken of unloading two large power generator like equipment. They had been securely wrapped and covered in canvas. Were they engines for boats or light helicopters ? The questions were raised in intelligence circles.

The captured guerrillas had also given details of Sea Tiger training and other plans they proposed to engage in. 

Interestingly, maritime surveillance was to be the subject of a top level discussion by the National Security Council on Friday. The Sri Lanka Navy backed by the Sri Lanka Air Force were to make a presentation on the subject at a late night meeting at the President's House. It was, however, called off since President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, who was to have presided, was otherwise busy. She had been commited to a string of engagements from morning.

It was during the National Security Council meeting on May 4 that President Kumaratunga sounded out views of security forces top brass and other top defence officials about a possible halt to fighting during a given time frame. She received a unanimous mandate from those present. It is only thereafter that she spoke to Norwegian Special Envoy, Erik Solheim, on the subject of cessation of hostilities. It is now known that Mr. Solheim in turn raised the matter with LTTE's chief negotiator, Anton Balasingham, during talks in London last week.

A letter from Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar to Norwegian Foreign Minister, Thorbjorn Jagland, was to cause some confusion over the Norwegian peace initiatives. The letter, released by the Foreign Ministry, (unusually not on a Ministry letterhead), declared among other matters that "_ the parties had decided to take measures to alleviate any hardships and dangers to civilians affected by the ongoing conflict, and contribute to building understanding and a foundation on which negotiations can take place."

The Foreign Ministry said "These measures are to be embodied in a document, which will contain humanitarian measures, which have been the subject of much discussion between the representatives of the Norwegian Government and the parties. The letter outlines the matters on which agreement has been reached. 

"In view of the fruitful work done by all concerned towards getting the process of, direct political negotiations moving, Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka, requests the Norwegian Government to renew urgently the most commendable efforts that have already been made by its representatives to get the peace process moving," the statement added. Mr Kadirgamar was quoted as asking the Norwegian Government to "take such initiatives as might be required _"

Within hours of the letter becoming public, both the LTTE and the Norwegian Government issued denials. The LTTE said in a statement "we wish to deny emphatically that any agreement has been reached so far on any issues." The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Colombo said "there is no overall agreement between the parties in the Sri Lankan conflict, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated in response to media reports from Sri Lanka."

The Sunday Times has learnt that the confusion was the result of concerns entertained by the Norwegian authorities over the conduct of "Operation Agni Khiela" (Rod of Fire) by the security forces whilst the Norwegian facilitated peace process was under way. According to highly placed diplomatic sources, the Norwegian authorities felt that the military offensive made their facilitatory role difficult.

It was to alleviate any possible misunderstanding that Mr. Kadirgamar wrote to Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. Jagland. That was why he expressly declared that the "indefatigable endeavours" of Mr. Solheim and Norwegian Ambassador in Sri Lanka, Jon Westborg, have earned "the deep appreciation of the Government of Sri Lanka_."

But Government sources admitted the choice of words in the letter were not the best and left room for some confusion. One point was a request to the Norwegian Government to take "such new initiatives_" The word "new" was not intended, these sources said. With a tripartite dialogue over letter now over, Mr. Solehim is due in Sri Lanka shortly to pursue his shuttle diplomacy.

Whilst the Government awaits his return, a top level study is being made to ascertain the circumstances that led to the failure of "Operation Agni Khiela" where a rod of fire had burnt the Government's image somewhat, both politically and militarily.

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