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HSZ row: Story behind the story

Troops on a drill in a High Security Zone in the Jaffna peninsula. Pix by Athula Devapriya

It was a case of the Sri Lanka Army getting caught in the crossfire of the peace offensive between the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

They shot off a set of proposals to the LTTE to resolve the increasingly contentious issue of re-settling displaced persons in the High Security Zones of the Jaffna peninsula. The Tiger guerrillas, who want a fuller withdrawal, retaliated by accusing the Army of "imposing unacceptable and unrealistic conditions" to disrupt the peace process.

The accusation was over an issue to restore normalcy. Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, Major General Sarath Fonseka, signed and sent to LTTE's "Northern Commander, Colonel Theepan," a five page document titled "De-escalation Plan." It was accompanied by three different sets of annexure. One was a three-page document titled "Summary of de-escalation proposals in relation to re-settlement in HSZs. "It spoke of how to eliminate threats, identify the threats, and listed the re-settlement process in HSZs and his own observations on 25 different types of threats. The other two were maps marked with areas the Army offered to return - one west of Keerimalai and the other at Kovilkandy (near Ariyalai and Thanankilappu areas)

The proposals were intended to fulfil an assurance given at the second meeting of the Sub Committee on De-escalation and Normalisation (SDN). After this meeting in the "no man's" land between Security Forces and LTTE positions at the Muhamalai check-point on December 14, the Norwegian Embassy declared Gen. Fonseka "will deliver a proposal" for plans for re-settlement of displaced persons in the High Security Zone in the Jaffna peninsula. The deadline was December 21.

That task should really have fallen on Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando. He is the head of the Sri Lanka delegation to the SDN. His official position gave him not only the authority to lead the team of military officials for matters on de-escalation but also to express the views of the United Front Government. Instead, he not only did not offer views on the official UNF position but also stopped Maj. Gen. Fonseka, the Security Forces Commander for Jaffna, from expressing his own views. After those embarrassing moments came the commitment that Maj. Gen. Fonseka would forward proposals in writing.

UNF leaders admonished Defence Secretary Fernando for his "undiplomatic" conduct at the SDN meeting and the resultant embarrassment caused to a senior Army officer, the highest ranking in the Jaffna peninsula. That embarrassment was to later extend from just one officer to the entire Army. That was after he carried out the task that was cast on him - to formulate proposals.

If one was to have followed accepted norms or procedures, these proposals, even if Maj. Gen. Fonseka as Security Forces Commander for Jaffna drafted them, should have been forwarded to the LTTE by Defence Secretary Fernando, the Chairman of the Sri Lanka Government side. That should have been his responsibility as the team leader. Thereafter, the matter could have easily been discussed between Maj. Gen. Fonseka and "Colonel" Theepan. That move would have made clear that though the proposals were from the Army, it had in fact received the concurrence of the Chairman of the Government team (and thus the UNF Government) before transmission to the LTTE. After all, they were deemed to be only proposals and not concrete decisions. Why then were these proposals made to appear as coming directly from the Army?

As Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, Maj. Gen. Fonseka, like any other senior officer, is not customarily authorised to correspond outside the Army's chain of command. It is regarded as against both procedure and discipline. In other words, any outside official communication will have to be routed through the Commander of the Army. Whether this was done or not is unclear.

But The Sunday Times learns that Maj. Gen. Fonseka's signed five-page document titled "De-escalation Plan" is addressed to the Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando with copies to the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force. It is a copy of this document that has been forwarded to the LTTE "Northern Commander, Colonel Theepan."

Major General Sarath Fonseka has specifically stated “this report/proposals will have to be studied and approved by higher authorities.” Yet, there was no official endorsement from Defence Secretary Fernando in the form of a letter to the LTTE.

On Saturday, December 21, the proposals were to be handed over to Norwegian Ambassador Jon Westborg. However, he was reported to be away in Oslo. Hence it went to Gen. Trond Furuhovde, head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) with a request that it be forwarded to the LTTE office in Kilinochchi. The letter was carried in a Sri Lanka Air Force flight to Jaffna and handed over on Monday, December 23 since flights are not operated on Sundays.

According to authoritative sources, Gen. Trond is said to have verified the contents of the document both with Defence Secretary Fernando and Maj. Gen. Fonseka. Although what clarifications he sought are not clear, one source said, it related to an annexure in the document dealing with de-escalation issues and corresponding re-settlement matters. This is said to deal with some touchy areas. This, however, could not be confirmed. These sources said that both Mr. Fernando and Maj. Gen. Fonseka endorsed the need for the proposals to be transmitted in the original format in which it had been handed over to the SLMM.

According to reports from Wanni, the LTTE leadership is learnt to have discussed the proposals and later consulted their Chief Negotiator, Anton Balasingham, in London. It had been agreed that a response in the form of a statement should not be issued on Christmas day. Hence, it was released on December 26.

The Sunday Times learns that in his "proposals" Maj. Gen. Fonseka has made nine specific recommendations "to ensure security is not compromised" in the High Security Zone. See box story on this page. Besides a preamble, Maj. Gen. Fonseka's de-escalation plan deals with the need for security, factors affecting re-settlement, de-escalation proposals in relation to re-settlement in HSZs and an implementation plan.

Warning of a "big political success" to the LTTE and any other interested party in re-settling civilians in the HSZ, Maj. Gen. Fonseka says in his preamble that "it can have a direct impact on political situation in Jaffna which may most probably go in favour of the LTTE under the present political situation." He adds, "while appreciating this situation it should also be borne in mind that when talking in terms of political situation, political criticism in the south of Sri Lanka also cannot be ignored. Therefore any adjustment or variations in Security Zones should not create a political turmoil in the south and should be considered as critical."

Dealing with the need for security, he notes "As Security Forces at present does not have 100 per cent superiority over the LTTE military capability, it is not advisable to take risks unless SF capabilities are developed to be able to remain 100 per cent superiority (sic) over LTTE thus any short term drawbacks can be overcome and regain initiative to avoid disasters."

The High Security Zones in the Jaffna peninsula encompasses some 18 per cent of a land area of over 880 square kilometres or more than 160 square kilometres. See map of HSZ on page 1.

The Sub Committee on De-escalation and Normalisation was one of two bodies formed following talks in Thailand and Norway. The LTTE now says this Sub Committee has been "rendered irrelevant" by the "Army's new conditions for de-escalation" - an indication that it would not take part in the next SDN meeting fixed for January 20 until the contentious issue is resolved. It has also cast doubts on the workings of the other Sub Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Work (SIHRN) due to what is called "SLA's reluctance to permit the re-settlement of civilians" in the HSZ.

In this backdrop, reports from Wanni say, the Tiger guerrilla delegation to the next round of Thailand peace talks beginning January 5, will only focus on the twin issues of re-settlement and rehabilitation. Until these matters are sorted out the LTTE will not focus on any other issues, according to these reports.

The importance of the issues over the HSZ is underscored by the remarks of LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, in his "Maveerar" (Great Heroes) Week address on November 27. He said "Though there is peace in the Tamil homeland, conditions of normalcy have not been restored. Under the cover of 'high security zones,' the Sinhala armed forces are occupying residential areas and social, economic and cultural centres. Forty thousand troops are occupying Jaffna peninsula, which is a tiny geographical region with a dense populace.

"The military occupation is suffocating the civilian masses and causing tensions. Jaffna, which is the cultural hinterland of the Tamil people, has turned into an open prison. The occupying forces are using the civilians as their protective shields. As several villages, houses and roads are entrapped by occupation several thousands of internally displaced are unable to return to their residences. Unless this problem is resolved there, there is no possibility of normalcy and social peace to be restored in Jaffna."

As one western diplomat summed up succinctly "one side has to blink sooner or later" for the process to go ahead. Whether it will be the UNF Government or the LTTE remains to be seen.

But UNF leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe, is confident the peace process is on track and the thorny issues could be resolved as and when they crop up.

Army chief rejects LTTE charges

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) last Friday rejected the Army's proposals that the relaxation of High Security Zones (HSZ) in the Jaffna peninsula should be conditional on disarming of Tiger cadres, the de-commissioning of their long range weapons like artillery and mortars.

Pointing out that the "disarming of the LTTE cadres and de-commissioning of their weapons are non-negotiable issues at this stage," a three-page statement on Thursday said they were "critical issues linked to the safety and security of the Tamil people." It declared that the "Sri Lankan Army is opposed to the peace process and is adopting a hard-line position in full awareness of the negative impact this will have on efforts to resolve the conflict in Sri Lanka."

Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle, refuted the LTTE charge in a statement issued yesterday. He asserted that the Army fully supported the peace process. He defended the Army's proposals on the grounds that safeguarding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka was their responsibility. (His statement appears elsewhere in this edition).

As exclusively revealed in The Sunday Times (Situation Report) last week, the disarming of LTTE cadres and de-commissioning their weapons were among pre conditions, the Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, Major General Sarath Fonseka, spelt out in proposals sent to LTTE's "Northern Commander, Colonel Theepan" through the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). See main story on this page for details.

In a separate statement, also issued on Thursday, the head of the SLMM, General (rtd.) Trond Furuhovde, declared that simply dismantling High Security Zones (in Jaffna) for re-settlement and handing over land for cultivation will decrease both security and combat potential of the Government forces. Pointing out that "people want normalisation and security, but one must not undermine the other," he said, "representatives of the LTTE have stated that maintaining their military strength is vital if they are to be successful in their negotiations."

Gen. Trond emphasised that "what applies to the LTTE in this context should apply for the Government." He declared that "the balance of forces is the basis of the Ceasefire Agreement and dismantling that balance is disturbing the ceasefire. An unrealistic normalisation programme in the name of progress and development should not be allowed to come into force at the expense of security, as this could undermine the building of permanent peace.

The statement, however, drew an angry response from LTTE Chief Negotiator, Anton Balasingham. In a letter to Gen. Furuhovde, he strongly criticised the SLMM's "comments and value judgements."

The SLMM chief's two page statement, an year end assessment, identified what were termed as "positive developments of Year 2002," dealt with "extremists, criminal organisations and other threats, the importance of information, the HSZ and what he called realism and the new Sri Lanka."

Dealing with the importance of information, Gen. Trond noted "the responsibility of the media is much more than in times of war. But it is not enough to accuse. Accusations must be supported by facts and arguments. The role of the media includes in-depth reporting and explanations, good judgement and healthy criticism on the course of events."

In making these remarks, Gen. Trond has undoubtedly underscored the need to keep the public of Sri Lanka informed with in-depth reports on the peace process and matters related to it. That indeed is a welcome remark that augurs well for transparency on vital issues. Such issues include matters relating to the Army's proposals on the High Security Zone. They have not only been rejected by the LTTE but drawn a pointed accusation that the Army has a "diabolical motive of disrupting the current peace effort" - a very serious charge indeed. That places the Army in bad light with those involved in the peace process, those yearning for peace including the international community. To many it posed a serious question - unable to defeat the LTTE in nearly 20 years of war, why was the Army now trying to scuttle the peace process, if in fact they were? Barring the revelations in The Sunday Times last week, details of the proposals were scarce.

In formulating his proposals, which evidently had the approval of the Government before transmission to "LTTE Northern Commander Colonel Theepan," what did Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, do to offend the LTTE and earn the accusation that the Army was all out to wreck the peace process?. Only a fuller revelation of his proposals will help the Sri Lankan public, or for that matter, even the international community learn the facts and make their own judgement.

The Sunday Times learns that in order to "ensure security is not compromised in the High Security Zones, "Maj. Gen. Fonseka made seven specific proposals. They are:

1. Resettlement of civilians should be arranged in such a way that Security Forces should not compromise their security.

2. Security to be relaxed only in stages corresponding with de-escalation by the LTTE - disarming of cadres and de-commissioning of LTTE long-range weapons.

3. Effective and accurate system of activities to be formulated between LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka with SLMM co-ordination. This is to ensure re-settlement of troops does not hamper security or expose the lay out of defence installations to civilians.

4. Security of command and logistics elements to be ensured. Vulnerable and sensitive defences, air and sea communication agencies should not be sacrificed.

5. Security of IDPs (internally displaced persons) to be considered important since they may be vulnerable to terrorist activities, mines/IEDs (improvised explosive devices) present in the HSZ.

6. Vulnerability of Government infrastructure facilities.

7.Security of law enforcement agencies to be considered for smooth functioning of Government authority.

Maj. Gen. Fonseka, The Sunday Times learns, has also proposed guidelines to create greater understanding between the Army and the LTTE and called upon the setting up of a neutral body to supervise de-escalation.

Among matters he wants examined in ensuring understanding between the Army and the LTTE are: Expansion of the Monitoring Mission by additional numbers and enhancing the mandate to cover more security issues. Since the LTTE, he says, is indirectly interfering with the deployment of security forces, Maj. Gen. Fonseka wants SLMM assistance to minimise what he calls the security threat. He feels that the mandate granted to the SLMM should be amended to give more authority/power.

A neutral body to supervise de-escalation, with sufficient number of staff, Maj. Gen. Fonseka feels, is essential to make a formidable force to monitor the implementation of the de-escalation process. He feels this body should be in a position to act as mediators within the respective theatres during the implementation of the de-escalation process. Such a body should work in close liaison with the Government, LTTE and the Norwegian facilitators. He also feels that the SLMM may perform this task better.

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