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The logic and parameters of 'Parallel Negotiations'
By Malinda Seneviratne
About a year ago, Anton Balasingham expressed the necessity of redefining the agenda for talks: “Instead of pursuing guidelines, milestones and roadmaps for an imaginary solution, the talks should address crucial issues related to the harsh existential realities of the ground situation.” He is right. Pursuit of the imaginary is the prerogative of the idealist. The reality is the most sensible place to begin.

What are the "existential realities of the ground situation"? Balasingham controls almost two-thirds of the Northern Province and about a third of the Eastern Province. The "harsh realities" of this ground reality is that these areas are essentially high security zones not even accessible to the SLMM. These areas are mono-ethnics courtesy ethnic cleansing Balasingham-style. The people living in these areas live in conditions worse than those of some of the "basket-cases" in Africa. Politically, there is blanket censorship of dissenting voices to the point of assassination and North Korea style glorification of "the great leader", meaning despot, tyrant, dictator, what have you. There is child abuse in the form of forced conscription and labour. In effect, the people in these areas have been denied their right to self-determination by Balasingham.

Granting withheld rights
The ISGA is the institution that Balasingham demands to administer both these areas and those under government control with impunity. What is the ISGA? The acronym stands for Interim Self-Governing Authority. Self-governance is always granted to those who have the right to self-governance. According to H.L. de Silva, self-determination is a right enjoyed by all peoples living within a specified territory who are entitled to freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development. If such matters are decided by general agreement, he continues, and are not imposed by an alien authority but freely accepted, this state of affairs may properly be described as "self rule".

This definition of self-determination presupposes a clear territorial demarcation in the first instance. Secondly, it recognises the rights of all people living within this territory irrespective of their language or other status. It also assumes by the act of "granting" that someone was previously withholding these rights. It is not to talk of a particular linguistic group's minority rights but of all the citizenry, whether in the North and East or the entire island.

This is the flawed argument of the entire self-determination/federalist lobby. It is the lie that has helped line their pockets for almost quarter of a century. The ISGA proposal in fact proceeded from the Oslo Declaration in December 2002 whereby the then government and Balasingham agreed "to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of Tamil speaking peoples based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka". At that point, Ranil Wickremesinghe agreed to grant internal self-determination, accepted the North and East as areas of historical habitation of Tamil-speaking peoples, and agreed to pursue a federal constitution to replace the unitary one.

Problematic issues
The problem of the Oslo Declaration, according to H.L. de Silva is that the specification of a single ethnic group, contemplated as the holders of the right or the group of persons entitled to exercise the right of self-determination, assumes the right of a sub-national group to self-determination as well and the consideration of their rights and aspirations alone. Thus, the Oslo Declaration not only equates minority rights to peoples' self-determination rights, but denies the rights of the Sinhalese and by default recognises the Tamil-speaking Muslims confined to the North and East as having rights equal to those to be enjoyed by the Tamil-speaking Dravidian. Needless to say, self-determination as per the Oslo Declaration is in direct contradiction to its universalist conception. This recognition of the rights of one "self" entails the denial the rights of a competing "self".

Wickremesinghe may or may not have understood the flawed principle governing the Oslo Declaration, which he signed without approval of the parliament, president or the people. The April 2 election was a referendum of his pursuance of peace along the federal road. The people had spoken.

When the ISGA proposals were first published, Lakshman Kadirgamar said, "This is a defining moment. If an agreement were signed granting an interim administration (to Balasingham), it would go 90% towards legitimising a separate state." The JVP-PA coalition in its policy statement issued on the day it was formed, rejected the LTTE's proposals because "it goes beyond the resolution of the problems of the Tamils and other minority communities and creates the basis for a separate state".

All this, before the election. We have on one side a defeated political entity which supported the ISGA and on the other side, the Alliance plus the Jathika Hela Urumaya, rejecting it. Accepting Balasingham's ground rules for negotiations is tantamount to an about turn to the stand taken by the president, Kadirgamar, the SLFP, and the UPFA.

Battles to be fought
Ranil Wickremesinghe no longer loses any sleep on this issue. Chandrika has to run the government. Going by her pre-election statements, she would have to negotiate from a position diametrically opposed to the LTTE's pre-conditions for negotiations. She is pressurised, internationally, to negotiate. The political reality is that she cannot leave the issue in abeyance.

Balasingham has not convinced anyone, and certainly not the likes of Chandrika Kumaratunga and Lakshman Kadirgamar (not to mention of course the JVP and the JHU), that the ISGA is not a landmark, a set of guidelines, or a roadmap towards a real (i.e. not imaginary) solution. Having rejected "guidelines" a year ago he is now insisting on his guidelines, true to form.

That is his prerogative. At the same time, nothing should bar Chandrika from insisting on her guidelines. Instead of merely rejecting a proposal, she has to bring in a counter-proposal. The initiation and outcome of such an exercise, with approval of parliament, will not only shield her from the partisan "international donor community", but it will give her a credible platform at the next election, parliamentary or presidential.

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