Ground realities and the raison d’etre for rights-based intervention

By J.S. Tissainayagam

The international community appears intent on chastising the security forces, government-affiliated paramilitary groups and the LTTE for gross human rights violations in Sri Lanka, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and abductions. Human rights organisations' efforts for months, in building a case against Sri Lanka in the UN, was crowned by the IIGEP (headed by Justice P. N. Baghawati) taking to task the Presidential Commission of Inquiry and its lack of will in completing work on select cases as it was mandated to do. In view of all this, rights bodies are lobbying for a permanent UN human rights monitoring mission on the island.

Meanwhile, the EU is threatening to move in the UN, a resolution against Sri Lanka's human rights record. Though no final decision has been taken on whether a human rights monitoring mission will be on the ground soon, contrary to the rather naïve belief that it is exclusively human rights and their abuse which prompt the international community to take steps to intervene in the internal affairs of 'sovereign' country, it is actually not so.

Though it is everyone's fervent wish the monitors will put a stop to this atrocious culture of violence, the move to set up an international body is politically backed by the Co-chairs of the Peace Process, of which the EU is an important member, and India. They believe the time has come to upgrade their involvement in the processes and institutions of governance in the country. Trends in international politics in the Indian Ocean seem to have brought the western democracies and India together in, at least, a limited endeavour to act in concert on Sri Lanka.

The CFA sought to achieve a similar objective by inducting the SLMM, but the inherent weakness of the document prevented the body from doing much, though it served as a conduit for information and as a purveyor of opinion on issues connected with the military and protection aspects of the ceasefire. Its inability to prevent the LTTE from rearming itself - which was a legitimate issue if the parity of status between the government and the rebels was to be maintained - led to the decline of the SLMM's authority.

Under the CFA, even while the LTTE and the then government (UNF) were talking, a proposal was made to prepare a human rights road map with the expert assistance of Ian Martin. Though there was preliminary work, talks collapsed before anything substantial came of it. It is interesting to note the road map did not speak about an international human rights monitor, but on mandating the National Human Rights Commission and strengthening it with appropriate international input in terms of advice and training.

Whatever might be the outcome of the UN Human Rights Council deliberations, the fact is that the international community, working in tandem with India wants greater international involvement in Sri Lanka and human rights are a good excuse for taking the initial steps towards that object.

While the move to step up an international involvement is one set of realities, a second set of realities is what is happening in the East. There are six important elements: (1) Truncating the Northeast Province through the intervention of the Supreme Court; (2) Changing the demography of the East with the objective of transforming a majority Tamil-speaking region into a Sinhala majority area; (3) Using counterinsurgency tactics to fragment Tamil representation (promoting Karuna and Eastern Tamil identity and then undermining it); (4) Encouraging militant Islamic consciousness through government patronage of Minister Athaullah and his cohorts that discredits the more moderate SLMC; (5) Winning the hearts and minds of the East by promoting economic development, while ignoring the political and security considerations of the eastern civilian population; (6) Legitimising these and the military campaign to clear the East of the LTTE by holding local polls to be followed by provincial elections.

The third set of realities is the government's long-term interests in overrunning the Wanni. Though this column quoted "reliable sources" from the South last week that the move to capture Silavatturai was to consolidate and then proceed north along the north-western coast towards Pooneryn-Sangupiddy before turning on the Wanni, it is not so. But other elements that form the plan to break into the Wanni remain. The move to Sinhalise the area between northern Trincomalee and Weli Oya to serve as a secure conduit for transporting logistics and troops (referred to in last week's column) are among them and very much in place.

Despite such desires though, the government realises achieving this would take immense amounts of troops, money and material. It knows that the LTTE, fighting a defensive war from entrenched positions in the Wanni, would find it easier than the aggressors, and an expedition now could be a military debacle and a political disaster. But this does not preclude the fact that it does have long term interests in entering the Wanni for the 'final settlement' of the conflict in Sri Lanka.

If these are the realities that are emerging, the LTTE would have to work within its constraints. With the Opposition in the South clamouring for elections, one of the important decisions would be, which of the national parties the Tigers could trust. While President Mahinda Rajapaksa unleashed a war that has killed over 5000 persons in the past two years and displaced many hundreds of thousands, the newly-formed National Congress too is, understandably, working within the constraints of extreme Sinhala nationalism brewed by the SLFP-JVP-JHU combine.

Recently, UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe told a public rally that the CFA needed to be amended. However, the LTTE is on record that any future talks have to be based on the CFA. What is more, in the event an international human rights monitoring mission is established, there is no doubt that the UNP-dominated National Congress would use it (and other international involvement) to draw the international safety net tighter around the rebels.

As far as the East goes, both Wickremesinghe and Rajapaksa share the same ideals though the former might be more sophisticated in his methods. The UNP's hand in the Karuna rebellion cannot be gainsaid, while the credit of exploiting this reality to capture LTTE-held territories goes to Rajapaksa.These appear the dominant elements that would drive politics and war in the months to come. All these have many negatives for the Tigers, as well as opportunities. Overcoming them would not only require military prowess but astute political thinking.