Testing time for Lanka on world stage

By Neville de Silva

The international reaction to the government’s decision to scrap the ceasefire agreement (CFA) was understandable as it was to be expected. Even countries that have banned the LTTE in their own territory have been critical of the abrogation of the CFA, apparently on the premise that keeping the door open to negotiation even if no talks have been forthcoming is preferable to shutting it completely Late last week a question on the Sri Lankan situation was raised in the House of Commons during Foreign Office question time. Minister Kim Howells’ reply indicated the general perception of those from Japan through to Europe and the US who see the withdrawal from the CFA as a retrograde step.

The important question is, what will follow if the Rajapaksa administration does not come up with package proposals for a political settlement based on power sharing that should satisfy minority concerns but not the LTTE’s extravagant demands? That there has been an inordinate delay in setting out proposals needs to be accepted if one considers the several time frames which government leaders themselves had mentioned at various times. It is also necessary to understand the constraints under which the Rajapaksa government has had to manoeuvre given that it depends heavily on the political support and the parliamentary strength of the JVP and JHU to carry on. Since the abrogation of the CFA which the JVP would like to claim and does so loudly enough, as a victory for itself, it has been blowing hot over any attempt to change the constitutional framework and disassemble the unitary structure of the Sri Lankan polity. The JHU has not been far behind in articulating its own brand of ultra nationalism or what some might call its jingoism. The problem for the government is that the intricacies of Sri Lankan politics and its various nuances are not readily understood by the world outside or do not want to understand the complicated and convoluted politics that drives the nation.

The international community, to use not only a weathered term but a rather loose one, would like to see the problems of others in terms of black and white ignoring the shades of grey in between, except when it concerns their own problems or those of immediate concern to them. The issue for the Sri Lanka government is how it should present itself to the world and how it should try to explain to, if not meet, the concerns of those outside who matter to us. Observers of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy approaches would have noticed a strategy shift in recent months. There seems to be a perceptible move away from what one might call our traditional ‘friends’ who have been with us for historical or other reasons, to cultivate new ones or those with whom we have not engaged as closely as with our traditional allies.

In the days when non-alignment was our accepted and declared credo we tried to stay clear of the Cold War protagonists and chart a course that the non-aligned community generally pursued. But the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and the end of East-West confrontation, the growing globalisation of trade and capital and the undoubted superiority of western military and diplomatic power made us adjust, as many non-aligned countries did, to the new realities and the new imperatives. That adjustment, however, came at a price. Sri Lanka’s readiness, or rather its driving need to engage with the west for investment, tourism, technical and other assistance and even political support, came at a price. That price was the need to concern ourselves with good governance, human rights, rule of law and other ingredients that the west, forgetting its own past (last year that Britain commemorated the abolition of the slave trade in which it was a major participant) thought it has given the world. We were made to virtually believe that some of these facets of human conduct were actually conceived and manufactured in the west when in fact the world’s major religions-and all of them originated in geographic Asia- had preached human rights ages before the west claimed the monopoly.

This and the need to secure weaponry and political support outside our earlier circle of allies, has caused this conscious foreign policy shift. Besides our traditional and strong relationship with China and our neighbour Pakistan, Sri Lanka appears to be cultivating stronger ties with Russia and some parts of the former Soviet bloc which have not been integrated into NATO and the European Union, and with Iran and some Gulf states. What are viewed as burgeoning relationships - from our standpoint at least-could well mean that we have another price to pay in addition to the costs the west will try to impose on us for abrogating the CFA Besides the usual pressure brought to bear on Sri Lanka through international non governmental groups, multilateral organisations and regional groupings such as the European Union, one could expect new pressures in the coming months.

Though Norway, which is obviously peeved that its handiwork has been deposited in the rubbish bin, is not in the EU it has enough friends in it who would be ready to twist Sri Lanka’s arm. One of the major instruments the EU, with egging by Oslo from the wings, is the forthcoming trade deals, particularly GSP-Plus. At the moment we have duty free entry for many local products, particularly manufactured garments. This trade concession allows us to compete with bigger players such as India and China. At least 30 % of our garment exports go to Europe and around 38% to the US. The continuation of these trade concessions would be dependent on several factors not the least of which is good governance which includes human rights issues and the rule of law. Sri Lanka needs to be wary about how the EU is taking the scrapping of the CFA and the resultant developments in the country. The EU and the European Commission will naturally be keeping a weather eye open for development in Sri Lanka especially how we perform on the human rights front which could be a key factor in the GPS-Plus decision. Also, later this year would be the US elections and a victory for the Democrats could cause some concerns for Sri Lanka if the White House is influenced by a democratic-majority Congress in some of the decision-making.

It is a testing time for Colombo and how the game is played out on the international stage will also depend on how government handles human rights matters at home while pursuing military offensives and how well it is able to present its case to the world outside. This is particularly so with regard to western capitals and India and South Africa.

There seems to be some mistaken notion that government needs to cultivate the Sri Lankan diaspora, especially in the west. While it would be useful to link hands with the diaspora, one must not confuse the wood for the trees. The priority for those mannig our diplomatic missions and other influential Sri Lankans living abroad is not to try to boost Sri Lankan community newspapers or other media outlets or to preach to the converted. The policy makers and decision makers are not among the Sri Lankans abroad though in a few cases they could be influential. No, the priority for the government is to present a cogent, well argued case to those who matter in the respective countries, not to weld together homogenous Sri Lankan communities abroad which have been tried in many places before many a time. Such efforts have been consigned to the attic of forgotten things.

The efforts of post-July 1983 (a much bigger task than that which faces today’s rulers) taught some of us who were involved in the rebuilding of our battered image how difficult and time consuming that task was. The most important lesson was that one should know where to target such efforts and not make superficial gestures that might satisfy politicians and please the diaspora but does little to help the country’s image. A critical fact is when to admit mistakes and when to defend decisions.