The death of CFA: War-for-peace strategy not the way forward

The bugle has struck. The last post has sounded and the people, some with jubilation and others with anxiety witnessed the burial of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) on January 2. The CFA was on life support for some period and when the last rites were performed, nobody got a jolt. But the abrogation immediately touched off a flurry of international criticism. It is common knowledge, that the parties to the agreement stood by it only for a short period and afterwards did not demonstrate an unswerving commitment to it. The LTTE has been held responsible for nearly 4,000 ceasefire violations and the government for one tenth of it. However during the first few years of its six-year existence, killings, abductions and human rights abuses were few and far between as compared to the period preceding the CFA. The intensification of such violations was rampant only during the last two years.

The run-up to the CFA was characterized by a military stalemate. This period was marked by a shocking disrespect for human rights and civilised behaviour. The provocative affinities of the belligerents raved on. The then government spurned the policy of "talks on talks" and embraced a new strategy called "war for peace". The logic behind this approach was to strike hard and weaken the enemy and coax him to the negotiating table. The strategy proved disastrous as the LTTE during this period struck back with renewed vengeance and ferocity. The LTTE offensive to recapture Jaffna nearly succeeded when they overran the all-important Elephant Pass Army Base. President Kumaratunga, unable to contain the LTTE advance, beseeched military support from India, Pakistan and China, which fortunately, was made available swiftly. International pressure exerted, mainly by India, on the LTTE averted the fall of Jaffna. In July 2001 the LTTE attacked the Katunayake airbase and the Bandaranaike International Airport, destroying or damaging several fighter planes and civilian aircraft. The entire country was suddenly blanketed with a feeling of despair and despondency. The Government painfully realized that the "war for peace" approach is fraught with military, economic and political failure. The strategy only resulted in a surging, militaristic war economy but the economic and social inequities heightened, inflicting much hardship on the people.

The UNF was always mindful of the unpredictable behaviour of the LTTE which might at any time turn its back on the peace accord for reasons of expediency. The UNF's "International Safety Net" strategy was to create a veritable force to checkmate the capricious behaviour of the LTTE. Up to 2001, the only recognized international actor wielding pressure and influence was India. President Kumaratunga, to some extent, veered away from this Indo-centric involvement and sought the assistance of Norway to act as a peace facilitator. After the signing of the CFA and several rounds of peace talks, the UNF roped in three new players - co-chairs -- to oversee the peace process -- the United States, Japan and the European Union. The single most strategic achievement of the CFA was the creation of the powerful International Safety Net. Later on, the LTTE leader described it as the Sword of Damocles. He was hell-bent on extricating himself from this safety net and for that purpose worked zealously for the defeat of the UNF at the Presidential election.

It is true that by January 2008, the CFA had become a dead letter. Yet the CFA signified that there was still a ray of hope, however distant it may be. It offered a platform for the two sides to resume negotiations. At least it earned some respectability to the government. The CFA was the glue that bound the International support to the peace process. The links that formed the "peace chain" were the international players. That support is no longer available. Once the links are broken then obviously the chain cannot be intact. In times of adversity, Sri Lanka cannot count on international support any longer. When Elephant Pass was under siege, India, Pakistan and China came to our rescue unconditionally. One wonders whether the same wholehearted support will ever be made available if such a situation surfaces again! International isolation is too costly a price for the annulment of the CFA.

During its six-year continuum, the weaknesses as well as the strengths of the CFA, became clearly evident. The CFA provided for the LTTE cadres to enter the Government controlled areas for the promotion of peaceful political activities. The LTTE grossly abused this provision. Often they made use of this opportunity to kill opponents, informants and Sri Lanka's military intelligence cadres. Although this provision resulted in adverse consequences, the objective of it must be appreciated. Given the opportunity to engage in democratic political activities, the LTTE was expected to gradually metamorphose into a democratic political force. After all, JVP underwent this transformation and joined the mainstream of politics of the country. This was a reluctant change but nevertheless a change indeed! Although the JVP killed a number of candidates contesting the provincial council elections, later on it readily participated in such elections. The thinking was that similar metamorphosis was possible in the case of LTTE too!

The LTTE also made use of the CFA to augment its strength with child and adult recruits and illicit procurement of militaryware. The Sri Lanka Army too was engaged in the recruitment of soldiers (certainly not child soldiers!) and the purchase of militaryware. These were not certainly practices that kept either to the letter or spirit of the agreement.

There has not been an elaborate built-in consensus on human rights in the CFA. The absence of such an agreement proved quite costly later. However, the advantages of the CFA far outweigh the disadvantages. It prevented hostility between the Government and the LTTE, and released the people from the clutches of militarism, and consequently the incidence of deaths destruction and casualties was minimal.

The overwhelming support of the international community for the CFA, convinced the LTTE that in spite of its professed invincibility, it would never be allowed a military victory. The signing of the CFA created an environment conducive to proceed with the Government's economic reform agenda immediately. The CFA laid a firm foundation for long-term sustainable high quality economic growth while the International Safety Net effectively exerted pressure on the LTTE. This steadfast international support was the lethal blow that paralysed the LTTE and the annulment of the agreement has let the LTTE off the hook.

The CFA formally ended on the January 16 and with that the search for any kind of solution has gone stone cold and the bloodiest spasms of violence have begun. The euphoria created by the predicted Government victory before the end of the year - a prediction made by the Prime Minister, Defence Secretary and the Army Commander -- has fuelled the war machine and invigorated the belligerent psyche.

But one should not forget that a similar euphoric mood prevailed when the forces under the leadership of Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte marched into Jaffna Peninsula and hoisted the lion flag in the Jaffna town. The jubilation unfortunately did not last long and hot on the heels of this victory came the worst military defeat to the armed forces when the LTTE recaptured the army base at Elephant Pass, the gate way to Jaffna peninsula.

This happened in May 2000 and even after eight long years we have not been successful in recapturing Elephant Pass from the clutches of the LTTE! Those who beat the war drums and foolishly talk of a quick victory without being sensitive to the carnage and huge loss of life, should pay heed to these historical facts. That is why it is hard to go overboard in praise of the "War for peace strategy". The popping of champagne corks prematurely is a dangerous game.

With the dawn of the New Year, all signs are that violence is increasing exponentially. To break the logjam that stymie the peace process, the way forward must be charted cautiously and dispassionately considering the intricate issues on their own merits. The "war for peace" strategy never holds the answer to this vexing question and certainly does not warrant a second thought and therefore should be abandoned outright. There is no other pathway, other than a negotiated settlement. To create the right climate some form of agreement should be reached between the belligerents.

If the CFA is a hackneyed phrase, let us coin a new name and after all semantics have little to do with earthbound pragmatism. May be that the Government and LTTE could redraft a new agreement drawing on the lessons learnt. In drafting a new agreement, the close link between the imperatives of conflict resolution and the human rights should be recognized.

A forceful mechanism to guarantee human rights should be in place, along with a ceasefire agreement. After such an agreement, the consensus to be arrived at the APC, could form the basis to resume talks. The main opposition UNP has all along expressed its willingness to participate at the APC once the constituent parties of the UPFA arrive at a consensus. Such an understanding between the two major parties could effectively isolate the extremist elements within the Sinhala and Tamil polity and promote the tenets of pragmatic and equitable ethnic accommodation.

This is the only way forward as any nation built on secular principles cannot encourage ethnic and religions extremism. This will ensure the forging of a broad based national consensus on ethnic conflict resolution.

The death of CFA: War-for-peace strategy not the way forward - Point of view