Sunday Times 2

Sajith Premadasa has been making news again in the aftermath of the North Western and Central Provincial Council elections being portrayed as the panacea for the electoral defeats suffered by the UNP. 

The blame for these defeats has been laid on UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe and the formula for victory is simple “Replace Ranil Wickremesinghe — Appoint Karu Jayasuriya or Sajith Premadasa and all will be well — the UNP will be back in power”.

For many urban middle class voters, tired of watching defeat after defeat, this mantra appears powerful. From independence to universal franchise and free education, we have got accustomed to sorting out problems without too much struggle. Anyone offering a simple solution to a chronic problem is considered a messiah. How opportunistic our people are?

Sajith Premadasa visiting a church in Malwatte, Negombo to make a donation under his Kithunu Dahamata Saviyak Programme

So we hear an increasing number of people sitting in clubs, beer in hand, advocating “change of leadership and amending the UNP Constitution” as the only solution to the UNP problems. It looks as if such a change is imminent. But before the UNP jumps in eyes closed into a ‘Sajith = Victory’, well it would be wise for the party hierarchy, their supporters and voters to take a step back and ensure that the solution will not be worse than the problem they seek to resolve.

Sajith is the son of Ranasinghe Premadasa, a former president of Sri Lanka. Ranasinghe Premadasa entered politics as a Municipal Councillor and rose within the party to be President in 1988. Sajith received his education at S. Thomas’ Prep School and Royal College before being enrolled in the Mill Hill School, a private school in Britain for his O’ Levels. He joined the London School of Economics for undergraduate studies thus spending the greater part of his teens and twenties rubbing shoulders with elite British youth as opposed to the rural and urban youth of government schools and universities of Sri Lanka.

A wild life enthusiast, on his return, he chose the Hambantota District as his base and contested the General Elections of 2001 and became an MP. Since 2004 he has been an MP in Opposition. He is the UNP’s Hambantota District leader. Thus his claim to party leadership is based less on any great personal achievement or service to the party and more on a birthright as the son of a former leader who would carry forward the family heritage by implementing Premadasa policies designed to uplift the down trodden masses thus making the UNP a people’s party able to reach out to the grassroots. There is a strong conviction among the Ranil-Bashing English speaking folk sitting in Golf, Rowing, Swimming, Eighty and Sinha1ese Sports Clubs that Ranil is not acceptable to the rural masses whereas Sajith with his movements — Tharuna Saviya, Jana Suwaya, Sasunata Aruna is in touch with the people and can assure victory.

Based on these assumptions and backed by a strong anti-Ranil campaign by a section of businessmen, the UNP seems to be on the verge of changing the party constitution.

But how correct are these assumptions? Have Sajith’s claims been validated against available facts and figures and is the party just groping around like a blind man in a dark room unable to distinguish between fact and fiction.

What speaks of victory and defeat at an election is the number of votes received assuming that the elections are free and fair. Much has been said of the computer jilmart and vote rigging, but Sajith has never questioned these and based his claim on electoral losses of the UNP. We would, therefore, analyse the results of the elections to check the validity of his claims. The Hambantota District has been chosen for this exercise for it is in this district that Sajith’s popularity as a leader has been assessed by the voters.

In 1982, J.R. Jayewardene polled 45.9%. In 1988, Ranasinghe Premadasa polled 49% at the Presidential Election. Thus until the election of Ranasinghe Premadasa, the UNP had a comfortable voter base in what was considered a district home to the Sinhala Buddhist political leaders such as the Rajapaksas. In 1988 the Hambantota District ranked low in the poverty index and was a backward rural district with a high rate of unemployment. It was the stronghold of the JVP.

Premadasa policies which were targeted to addressing these needs, i.e. the Janasaviya programme, 200 garment factories and Gam Udawa programmes, were implemented in this area to offer relief to the people; However, despite Premadasa’s poverty alleviation policies, the UNP in the 1994 Presidential Election received only 35% of the votes — a drop of 14%. This is a clear drop which shows that the Premadasa policies are not the vote getter that they were anticipated to be.

One should recall that the UNP lost its hold on power in the election that followed the implementation of the Premadasa Policies and ask whether the Premadasa name has the ‘magic’ it claims to have. The tag line Dooshana Beesshana which formed the main theme of the campaign by the SLFP against the UNP Government in 1994 highlighted the corruption of the Premadasa regime and the fear psychosis of the counter-terrorism movement in the South.

What then is the basis of Sajith’s claim that he possesses the magic formula to win elections when figures show exactly the opposite?

In 2001, when Ranil became Prime Minister, the UNP received 40% of the votes. Sajith entered Parliament in this election. Since then the Hambantota district has been led for the UNP by Sajith. At the 2005 Presidential Election, Ranil contesting against Mahinda Rajapaksa whose home base is Hambantota and who was backed by the JVP received 35% of the votes. This was more than the 31% received in 2010 by Sarath Fonseka the Army Commander who was supported by the JVP. This too clearly indicates the fallacy that Ranil is the least acceptable leader to Sinhala masses. The year 2010, almost ten years after Sajith became an MP for the District implementing his programmes, he managed to obtain only 29% of the votes for the party and himself at the General Election — a drop of 6% from what Ranil got in 2005.

The figures clearly indicate the following:

1. Premadasa policies alone have not been an election winner. In fact the corruption of the Premadasa regime, its inability to establish a just and people friendly government was the reason for the electoral defeat of 1994.

2. Sajith has been unable to even retain for the UNP the votes collected by Ranil in the 2005 election, clearly indicating his lack of appeal to the masses.

Sajith’s claim for leadership is based on the assumption that he has received 90% of the preferential vote. At the General Election, preferential votes do not win elections for the party. If Sajith is unable to even retain the 35% votes received by Ranil, of what use is his preferential vote to the party to return to power? There may be excuses for these figures given by Sajith’s supporters but since they give no quarter to Ranil and blame him as the leader, Sajith should also not hide behind excuses.

From the foregoing it is clear that Sajith cannot claim right to leadership based on any personal contribution to the party or electoral successes scored by him.

Then comes the question whether he has the requisite qualities to become a leader. The first would be commitment to the cause. In this case the UNP. But Sajith has displayed a remarkable lack of commitment to the party. He has worked as a loner promoting the family heritage — the Premadasa policies. His goal is not stated as developing a nation or building a party but implementing or restoring the Premadasa era. If he was loyal to the party, he would have laid aside claim to leadership and worked for the party’s victory. On the contrary, he waits eagerly for a party defeat to show remarkable opportunism to call for the leadership to be given to him. He does not want any party senior or longer-standing members like Ravi Karunanayake. In his book it should come to him or to Karu Jayasuriya whose then exit from the party started the rot. Even a school boy knows that unity is the key to victory. For over three years Sajith has caused disunity by keeping this issue on the boil.
Sajith has shown that he is not a team player and is unable to get together a team of supporters who have delivered the goods — as party office bearers or in their electorates. A key example is Thalatha Athukorala who was a chairperson of Lak Vanitha for over three years and did little or nothing for the party’s women’s programmes.

And what of loyalty? To party and leader. Why does he engage in public display of disunity? Can he accept a vote which made him the deputy leader and reject the same electoral body electing Ranil as the leader? What of gratitude to Ranil the only elitist MP who did not join Gamini and Lalith in the impeachment against Premadasa? Ranil stood by the party and the leader and fought to save both. It may be time that Sajith took a lesson in basic decency from Ranil.

The question also comes to mind as to why the programmes implemented have to be copyrighted to the Premadasas. Since it was implemented by the UNP, who gave Sajith exclusive rights to these? And what of the Premadasa Policies? How attractive or relevant are they today? The Janasaviya Programme is replaced today by Samurdhi which is far more sophisticated and developed. Therefore Janasaviya will not offer anything new to the people. The 200 garment factory programme is no longer relevant as Sri Lanka has lost out on garment exports with the abolishing of the quota system and its inability to compete with China, India, Bangladesh etc. Gam Udawa is also replaced by the Gama Neguma programme. In addition there is in place Gemidiriya as well as the community development programmes of Deyata Kirula. Premadasa Policies were noteworthy during his time but now especially after the tsunami the development work done by the NGOs as well as the Rajapaksa regime’s community development programmes make the policies of the Premadasa regime seem like child’s play.

It should also be noted that there are nearly one million people working abroad unlike in 1988. Sri Lanka is a middle income country today and poor people opt to go abroad to earn a livelihood. The forces also have been an avenue of employment for youth and as statistics show the unemployment and poverty levels are declining. Therefore, the Premadasa welfare programmes are obsolete and irrelevant today and will be more deadwood in the coming years. Sajith in his development programmes has nothing new to offer. He practises the same old patronage programmes which are inferior to those implemented by every minister or MP using state resources — English, computing, bridal dressing, micro finance etc. The bottom line is that Sajith has nothing unique to offer the people. Premadasa Senior has been dead for 20 years. The youth of 18 and above who form a large portion of the voters would have no recollection or appreciation of him.

If Sajith is to claim the Premadasa heritage he has to accept the positive and the negative. What of the corruptions of his father’s time in which a key figure was one of his chief supporters. What of the rebirth of the LTTE as a result of arms supplied by Premadasa senior. Will the label ‘traitor’s son’ be stuck on him and alienate him and the party from the masses. Premadasa Senior was also responsible for dividing the party, for party strongmen Gamini and Lalith left the UNP due to Premadasa.
Governance today is not a matter of principle – but of marketing. It is about communication wizards creating perceptions in the people’s minds and therein lies the danger, for the UNPers are being told daily that Sajith is the answer to the UNP’s problems. Sri Lankans may have literacy but many are poor on analytical skills and this weakness is amply demonstrated in relation to the UNP crisis. It is a sad reflection of our times that no media organisation is able to analyse and present the facts and a stampede in the UNP being initiated by Premadasa would most likely result in a large number of casualties. The UNP would certainly be going from the frying pan to the fire.