Sunday Times 2
The Tamil Nadu factor
The end of the armed conflict in Sri Lanka in 2009 has opened a new chapter for the island to pursue its distinct historical identity from the subcontinent. To maximise its strategic location in the Indian Ocean and its economic assets as a trade and service emporium at the centre of the global trade and shipping routes, a policy to engage India is required. Improving relations with Tamil Nadu, due to its historical import and geographical proximity to Sri Lanka, is thus unavoidable.
This is why the current debate in the media in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu presenting a “mirror image” of the “other” as the “perennial villain”, leads to a sense of dismay. This article is offered as a contribution towards better understanding of the Tamil Nadu connection.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa meeting Tamil Nadu MPs in New Delhi in 2010
Since the pre-historic breaking away of the island from the main subcontinent, “push” and “pull” tendencies came into being as witnessed by historical incursions and counter-attacks, linked destinies under colonial rule and assertion of independence thereafter. Hence, the analogy depicting the historic relationship between the island and the subcontinent as a conflict between the pressures of “integration” and “separation”. Within the explanations of this relationship, Urmilla Phadnis points to the “infrastructural” linkages of ethnicity, social and cultural affinities deriving from the fact that all the waves of migration into Sri Lanka came from the subcontinent. Other academics find more useful to refer to the “process” of separate identity such as Senake Bandaranayake, “the strong internal dynamics that characterise its island civilisation and its existence as a clearly demarcated and independent geo-political and geo-cultural entity during a period of nearly two and a half millennia …”
Both these explanations underscore the centrality of the Tamil Nadu factor as an example of the “fused linkage” identified by John Rosenau, being the case where by virtue of geographic location, “certain outputs and inputs” continuously reinforce each other and are thus best viewed as forming a reciprocal relationship difficult to analyse separately. However, it is more useful to investigate the “process” to enable a clearer definition of the different phases within the bilateral relationship. Thus, Sankaran Krishna in his monograph analysing India’s role in Sri Lanka’s armed conflict, suggests that non-intervention is more the norm and that the period of direct intervention in the 1980s arose under special circumstances.
Prior to independence, it is said that Jawaharlal Nehru’s thinking was that Sri Lanka was too small to stand by itself as a political and economic unit and there had been discussion on some form of association for the island with India. However, historical developments have proved the contrary, given the success of island nations in similar geographical situations like Hong Kong and Singapore which, over time, overcame political irritants and developed economic synergies with the neighbouring subcontinent.
It is well known that the Tamil Nadu factor has figured in all the major problems faced by the early Sri Lankan leaders in defining the country’s relations with India, ranging from citizenship for the indentured labour brought in during colonial times to fears of illegal immigration, smuggling and the spread of communism. The early bilateral agreements with India touched on Tamil Nadu’s interests, indentured labour, maritime boundary and Kachchativu. Tamil Nadu’s sympathy for the Sri Lanka Tamil cause in the 1980s following waves of riots, which sent thousands of refugees across the Palk Strait, played into the Centre’s strategic thinking and led to the conclusion of the Indo-Lanka Agreement of 1987. At that time, the presence and lobbying of Sri Lankan militants and Tamil politicians in Tamil Nadu came to represent a key determinant in moving India into the interventionist phase in its Sri Lanka policy.
In 2014, the situation is quite different. Military force brought the armed conflict to an end in 2009 in an environment of bilateral security understanding. In the aftermath, quiet bilateral intelligence cooperation has become a pre-requisite to averting attempts for the regrouping of LTTE cadres in Tamil Nadu whether aiming for a resurgence of insurgency in Sri Lanka or for infiltrating into India at the behest of foreign governments. Manohari Velamati in her study on the Sri Lanka Diaspora concludes that “LTTE Tamil diaspora may look to the West for gaining political support and funds, but if at all regrouping of LTTE has to take place that has to happen only in India.”
LTTE resurgence
Warning signs of resurgence of training cells have appeared in Tamil Nadu. From Indian news reports, it appears that Sri Lankan refugees in camps are being targeted by criminals offering boat passage to asylum receiving countries like Australia. Is it not time for Sri Lanka to move to an active diplomacy, to propose negotiations for the safe return home of these refugees and to close this sorry chapter in the bilateral relations? At the political level, with the setting up of the Northern Provincial Council there is now an opportunity for the return of the Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu but this must be premised on their expressed choice, which was the basis of the Indian Tamil negotiations. Will India be ready to offer some form of permanent residence status to those of the refugees who would prefer to pursue their lives in Tamil Nadu?
If the two sides do not actively seek common understandings, cross border transactions will continue to mount as irritants to which only defensive reactions have been possible. Thanks to the media which makes small incidents into news breakers, the efforts of a minuscular group of activists in Tamil Nadu in launching protests against Sri Lankan visitors and institutions, have succeeded in creating tensions in the relationship which can only be advantageous to those in the Tamil diaspora still dreaming of an LTTE revival.
The protests are targeting the heart of the friendship with Tamil Nadu, the people to people links, academic interactions, the huge pilgrimage traffic travelling through Chennai, the visitors to its thriving medical and educational institutions. As a result of these protests and demarches, the people of Tamil Nadu, generally more concerned with parochial issues like water and power shortages, food prices and access to employment, are becoming more sympathetic to the Sri Lankan Tamil cause, all but forgetting the Rajiv Gandhi assassination and the anti-LTTE turmoil of the time. Similar misunderstandings have arisen in the island as to the apparent hostility of former Chief Minister Jayalalithaa in respect of Sri Lanka. The initiatives of the Tamil Nadu Government on Sri Lanka issues whosoever be the leader at the time, should be seen for what they are — forays in the realm of domestic politics and efforts by the State to assert its voice in foreign affairs with the Centre, which holds the Constitutional prerogative.
Can Sri Lanka find a way to overcome the historical threat perception from Tamil Nadu? Asymmetries of geography cannot be wished away, yet what are the intrinsic linkages between the 60 million Tamils in Tamil Nadu and the Tamils in Sri Lanka? There is a recurring view in academic studies that the Tamils of Tamil Nadu and the Jaffna Tamils are distinct ethnic groups, for reasons of the “geographical divide, different histories and insignificant interaction over the centuries”.
Jane Russell notes further that the caste system which prevailed in Jaffna was quite distinct from the pyramidal system which operated in South India, which she attributes to the “modifying influence of the Theravada Buddhist rubric”. Consequently, she suggests that the two main communities in Sri Lanka may have more in common than hitherto thought: “syncretism between the two communities was quite overt. Cross fertilisation between Sinhala and Tamil languages in Sri Lanka could be clearly traced…” Russell’s notion of commonality of interests between the two main communities in Sri Lanka suggests that a basis exists conducive to the nation-building process in the island in the post-conflict era.
Can economics lead the way? Not much research has been done on this perspective while Sinha Ratnatunga 1988 et al. argue that ” neither location nor ethnicity were the main factors, but the economic interests of certain segments of the population that drove the connectivity between Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu since the earliest times”. The earliest links can be traced to the mercantile communities said to have emerged from around the 10th century as evidenced by the inscriptions detailing their gifts to religious institutions, both Buddhist and Hindu. Significantly, these mercantile communities had at their disposal, “groups given to martial pursuits much like today’s mercenaries, used not only by the mercantile communities for their own protection but also placed at the disposal of local rulers” since the success of their business activities required, as K. Indrapala notes, “a high degree of political stability”. He speculates that from the end of the 12th century political upheavals may have driven these communities away from the Sinhalese kingdoms towards the northern kingdom, which depended on overseas trade. Neville Jayaweera makes an interesting observation in this respect: “over the centuries these Vellakkara warriors who were first hired by King Manavamma for his own security, metamorphosed into the LTTE platoons”.
Trade deals
How can the Tamil Nadu relationship be influenced in positive directions from personality-driven exchanges to the pursuit of mutually beneficial economic synergies? Following India’s economic liberalisation in the 1990s and the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement, a robust foundation exists for forward thinkers on both sides to develop economic links including the addressing of NTBs. To do so, a priority is to build a lobby for Sri Lanka in the business and economic sectors of Tamil Nadu.
Disaggregated trade statistics vis-a-vis Tamil Nadu are difficult to gather but overall there is no doubt that the economic gains within the bilateral economic relationship are very much higher to Tamil Nadu than to any other state. Vehicles, motorcycles, buses, trucks and trailors come to Sri Lanka from Tamil Nadu factories as well as textiles and farm products. India’s imports from Sri Lanka include animal feed and spices which add value to Tamil Nadu products. Yet it has been difficult for our officials to reach out to business leaders in the state beyond the customary courtesies, due to the environment of intimidation by the pro-Eelam lobby. So a start may have to be made by the Sri Lanka side. Would it be possible to use the platform of the annual South Asia Economic summit to organise a special session on cross-border transactions bringing together business leaders from Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka? The traditionally warm hospitality in Colombo may help to dispel the current fears across the waters. From the Indian side, interest has been shown in exploiting Sri Lanka’s resources such as power and water, both of which are in acute demand in South India. Could the Sri Lanka side think of what is in our mutual interest, such as proposals building on Tamil Nadu’s strengths in education, automobile and IT services?
An area of importance within the bilateral relationship touching on Tamil Nadu interests is covered in Raju and Keethaponcalan’s 2006 study on maritime issues. Two issues have current resonance, the Sethusamudram project, which under the present BJP government is not likely to go ahead in its original proposed form and the continuing saga of the fishermen caught trespassing in each other’s waters. On both these issues, could understandings be reached based on the sustainable management of the Palk Strait? Surely, it is in the interests of both countries to ensure, for example, that bottom trawling does not kill off all the marine life in the Palk Strait and joint measures could be agreed between officials concerned with aquatic resources, on fleet size, volumes of catch, no-fishing during breeding seasons etc.
Tamil films
The film industry in Tamil Nadu is an area of particular interest given the known influence of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in the revival and prosperity of that industry. As late as 2010, large bill boards in Chennai advertising the latest films were carrying cameo images of the late LTTE leader Prabhakaran. Others have written about the glorification of the martyrdom cult within Tamil militancy and why the impact of films like the Channel 4 videos on the youth of the state should not be underestimated. In the universities of Tamil Nadu, heroic images of the LTTE rebellion are still played out and continue to influence on Tamil websites to which an alternative narrative has yet to be presented.
The controversy over the film Kaththi and the targeting of Lyca Productions bears witness to the level of emotional sensitivity within the industry. Whatever is done through official channels will only be regarded as “propaganda” but a public diplomacy web-based initiative involving creative directors and producers in the private sector may have more success. With the return of the Yal Devi and the reopening of the India-Sri Lanka train link in the near future, a huge boost will be given to restoring connectivity. The challenge, as in the Northern Indian states, will be to leverage the economic opportunities within the security requirements.
(Sarala Fernando retired from the Sri Lanka Overseas Service in 2007. This article draws from her Ph.D thesis.)