Sunday Times 2
Sri Lanka’s foreign policy – What’s next?
At the end of the Rajapaksa regime Sri Lanka had virtually lost its credibility and the lustre of its non-aligned foreign policy and became marginalised among the community of nations, particularly within the Western hemisphere. Hence the challenge before the new government headed by Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe is to regain the lost credibility through effective and skillful manipulation of the state machinery. This is no difficult task for the new government if it is keen on making radical changes to the policy approach followed by the Rajapaksa regime.
In the conduct of foreign relations, what matters most is ‘policy approaches’. Scholarly research on Sri Lanka’s foreign policy indicates that the country has made losses and gains depending on the policy approaches. This is a hard fact, if we take the balance sheet of any post-Independence regime. Thus, the answer to the question ‘what’s next for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy’ lies, to a lesser or greater extent, in the scholarly writings on foreign policy. In this connection, may I be permitted to deviate from the subject matter for a moment enabling me to underscore points that come to light from my research on Sri Lanka’s foreign policy?
In essence, my book on Sri Lanka’s foreign policy argues that that the foreign policy of Sri Lanka under successive governments until 1982 had been governed more by economic interests rather than political interests. The basis of this argument is that Sri Lanka being a small state is solely dependent on international trade, aid and investments and therefore it should avoid playing high profile roles in international affairs. This is because they proved to be disastrous to our national interest including national security and economic development. A comparative study of the Bandaranaike regime (1970-77) and the Jayewardene regime (1970-82), with a background study from 1948 to 1970, makes it abundantly clear that the policy approaches of each government matter a lot either in ruining or refreshing Sri Lanka’s image. In the same research, Jayewardene was categorised as following a Pragmatist Approach and belonging to the Conservative School of Thought. To the contrary, Ms. Bandaranaike was identified as following a Theoretical Approach and belonging to the Radical School of Thought. While Jayewardene termed his foreign policy Strict Non-Alignment, Ms. Bandaranike termed her foreign policy just “Non-Alignment”. What I emphasised in my research study – “Sri Lanka and Non-Alignment – A Study of Foreign Policy from 1970-to 1982″ (Image Lanka Publishers, 1997 -available at Sarasavi Book Shops), — a book examined and highly recommended by two eminent British scholars, Prof. Miacheal Leifer of London School of Economics and Prof. Peter Lyon of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London with similar commendation by Prof. K.M. de silva — is that Sri Lanka instead of playing high profile roles in international affairs , should maintain low key profile and stick to the cardinal principle of non-alignment i.e. “Friendship with all and enmity with none” as enunciated by founding fathers of Independence – D. S. Senanayake and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike.
Now let me now focus on the subject matter. I do not intend to blame anyone for ruining the foreign policy except saying that cynical thinking of certain elites engaged in the game of international affairs cost dearly to the state coffers. One of the blunders made by the Rajapaksa regime is antagonising our traditional friends — Britain and the United States – labelling them as “conspirators”. In my research study, I point out how Jayewardene handled an unpleasant situation created by his predecessor Ms. Bandaranaike at the end of her regime in 1977. In countering the negative effects of foreign policy of his predecessor, he sent his handpicked delegates to major Western capitals on image-building missions. The objective was to brief these nations about the drastic changes the new government was making in policy approaches.
At the end of the Rajapaksa regime, a similar situation existed. Rajapaksa repeatedly claimed that there was a “western conspiracy” against his government. But it became counterproductive. Even the voters felt that it was a red herring to cover up the blunders. In fact, Sri Lanka’s heads of missions in many key capitals were manned either by “unqualified” cronies or the Rajapaksa kith and kin, who were ignorant of the ABC of diplomacy. The resultant outcome was that Rajapaksa at the end of his regime was left with no option but to hire PR firms to promote Sri Lankan image in the US. The other foreign policy blunder was that he went in search of African friends not with the intention of promoting economic interests but with the intention of buying their votes at the UN Human Rights Council. Except the foreign trips and perks enjoyed by the most “unworthy” among the Ministers of External Affairs at tax payers’ money, there was very little gain in this exercise. Taking plane loads of entourages at each and every UN sessions and on other overseas visits was a drain on Sri Lanka’s coffers.
Why I recall those negative impacts of foreign policy is to warn the new government not to make the same mistake. It must cut down unnecessary expenses and utilize the country’s meagre resources in a manner that will bring benefits to the people.
It is no secret that we are mainly dependent on the West with much of our exports, aid and investment relations being directed at the West including the United States. Although Rajapaksa received foreign loans, they were tied up with heavy interest rates and the country is being mortgaged for several generations. In overcoming such problems, the most prudent way is to rely on the West as we did in the past. Of cardinal importance at this juncture is to regain the lost faith and friendship of Western nations. The ways and means of achieving this goal is entirely dependent on our diplomatic strategies. It is no difficult task for the new government to make its own strategies since it is resourceful with brilliant professionals and scholars who mastered the diplomacy and the subject of foreign policy.
The simple answer to the question posed above is that Sri Lanka should take a new direction with overall energies concentrating in winning the Western world as a high priority while keeping the balance with other nations with special focus on Asian neighbors. I mean, the Indian factor is crucial. Revitalisation and rejuvenation of the official bureaucracy is mandatory. An overall cleansing and refurbishment of the Ministry and its foreign missions is an absolute necessity. Above all, key diplomatic positions should be held by people who possess best academic and professional credentials. In short, the challenging task ahead for the new External Affairs Minister — Mangala Samaraweera — is to engage in a bold mission to “regain Sri Lanka” by following the win-win approach instead of the futile win-lose approach followed by the Rajapaksa regime.
(The writer is formerly Senior Professor of International Relations, University of Colombo and Counsel of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka and author of “Sri Lanka and Non-Alignment – A Study of Foreign Policy from 1970-to 1982″)