Sunday Times 2
An elephant in the room: A fresh look at Indo-Lanka relations
It is good to see that the new Government taking the positive first steps, giving emphasis to India relations as the nearest regional power and restoring ties with the US and the EU, the biggest export markets rendered vulnerable since some time to human rights concerns. The President’s manifesto was unusually specific on certain areas of Sri Lanka’s foreign relations, as for example: “Our India policy will take into due consideration the diversity of India. I would act to have closer relations with an attitude that would be neither anti-Indian nor dependent.”
However, let’s not fool ourselves about the difficulty of dealing with the regional superpower. The problem that confronts is akin to the difficulty of making the pearl shine with an elephant in the room. Geography and history have shown the constant interaction of push and pull factors, the island’s ceaseless pursuit of independence from the regional behemoth. It is also a fact that the island’s Ministry of External Affairs has been so politicised in recent times that staff morale is at a historic low while its counterpart in Delhi is at its height of influence in policy making. This will stack the odds in India’s favour during any negotiations, unlike in the early days when the capability of our negotiators was admired.
Studies on India-Sri Lanka relations underline the early adherence to non-alignment and suggest that it was the close family ties — the friendship between the Gandhis and the Bandaranaikes — that created a comfort zone in bilateral relations. India concerned itself only with the fate of the Indian Tamils until the 1980s when it began to speak on behalf of all the Tamils in the island during the “decade of confrontation” (Gooneratne 2000).
Yet since the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the liberalisation of the Indian economy, it is economics that have come to the fore, as witnessed by the huge Indian investments flowing into the island, not only in their own identity but also as well known Sri Lankan companies that have been bought over by Indian competitors or being managed by them. It is a natural phenomenon of cross border integration in a rapidly globalising world reflected in similar geographical situations elsewhere, Singapore- Malaysia or Hong Kong-China.
The question is whether our think tanks have given close attention to this phenomenon or reflected on the safeguards to adopt in our national interest. It has been argued by free-market advocates that these processes are inevitable and that CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement) must naturally follow the ISLFTA, (Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement) but clearly our professionals — from doctors, lawyers, engineers, architects to academics — have concerns over a level playing field, which is why CEPA has been stalled so long. With return visits of President Sirisena and Prime Minister Modi scheduled in the coming months, the new Government will come under pressure to sign the CEPA, so let us hope that there is no hasty decision taken just for the sake of pleasing our visitor, and that adequate consultation have been made on this side with sectoral parties that would be affected.
Since the success of a leader’s visit may be judged by the agreements concluded during the visit, it may be preferable to give priority to signing instead an agreement on the return of Sri Lankan refugees in India, acceptable to both sides, which can to be fast-tracked into the 100-day programme. From the bilateral relations angle, the Government has scored by being the first to raise this issue during Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera’s visit to Delhi, thereby firmly registering its commitment to international protection standards involving the right of return. Yet, from available information, only around 6,000 persons have applied and been approved for return by the Sri Lanka mission in Chennai. This is only a handful considering the totality, estimates of numbers range from 60,000 to 120,000. Sri Lanka side needs to consider carefully how best resources should be deployed to the Chennai mission to handle the huge work-load that would follow in the case of any agreement being signed.
For the new programme to be successful and encompass the bulk of the refugees, basic understandings remain to be reached on some fundamental issues. Here there is an advantage of recourse to past experience, that is the lessons learned from the historic settlement of the Indian Tamil question. From the detailed account left by W.T. Jayasinghe it could be seen how positions would be placed on the table, then recanted, then again reversed until the common urgency to settle this problem drove compromise to succeed.
For instance, the early historic negotiations were premised on voluntary choice which means that this time around India too must be generous enough to offer some form of permanent residence to those who decide to remain behind. That this process, however well intentioned, will be fraught with difficulty is known from the unhappy tales of those Indian Tamils who returned to India.
How will the returnees adopt to the situation in Sri Lanka without the considerable subsidies now made available in the Indian refugee camps? Rice is virtually free in the Indian refugee camps as also bus transport, school enrolment and quotas for admission to university are among the many generous concessions given to these refugees. It could be hoped that the NGO led by the Chandrahasan family would continue to look after the transition needs of the returnees in Sri Lanka as they have done these many years in Tamil Nadu. How this resettlement will affect voting constituencies is another matter over which there is no way to foresee the level of conflict that might be created among local politicians. But these difficulties should not be a barrier to seeing justice done especially when the UNP is the major player in the present Government and has the chance to right the wrongs of 1983 when hundreds of thousands of Tamils sought refuge in Tamil Nadu and thereby set off a chain of events which brought India’s intervention.
Another area on which one should proceed carefully is the problem of Indians daily fishing in Sri Lankan waters. The Indian side constantly mentions that in 2008 Sri Lanka agreed that Indian fishermen could fish in Sri Lankan waters, except for areas declared security zones. This was a time when the war was still on and perhaps the Sri Lankan representative gave that concession to keep the Indian side happy, and ensure their continued support to the war effort. Some of the mechanisms adopted, like working groups and talks between fishermen on the two sides, may have been to meet current situations. The Indian side keeps mentioning the talks between the fishermen groups on the two sides. This is only helpful to the Indian side and not the Sri Lankan side, because fishermen groups don’t know government positions, and you just postpone the solution by just keeping talking.
Instead could understandings be reached based on the sustainable management of the Palk Strait? Surely, it is in the interests of both countries to ensure for example that bottom trawling does not kill off all the marine life in the Palk Strait and joint measures could be agreed between officials concerned with aquatic resources, on fleet size, volumes of catch, no-fishing during breeding seasons etc.
What is needed is some serious negotiations between the two sides, to get some framework of negotiations settled on the above issues. Countries should not be unduly swayed by the atmospherics of visits. What is signed lasts very much longer, when the atmospherics have faded.
(The writers are retired Foreign Service Ambassadors )