Sunday Times 2
From hard power to soft power
View(s):The transition from the heady victory of 2009, having defeated the “worst terrorist group” in the world, to building a sustainable peace has not been easy for Sri Lanka. The Rajapaksa government is reproached for “triumphalism” and the positive humanitarian achievements, the rescue and re-settlement of hundreds of thousands of IDP’s, near 100% completion of demining by the Army, the rebuilding of roads, bridges and essential infrastructure in the affected areas, the re-training and release to society of former LTTE combatants have been eclipsed in the recent pressure for “accountability” on alleged “war crimes”.
To integrate “hard power” with “soft power” to achieve “smart power” is the present challenge. In hindsight, could Sri Lanka have benefitted from the example of the Nigerian military victory in the Biafra mutiny, when all attempts at negotiations had failed? According to the Nigerian High Commissioner, the Supreme Army Commander at the time declared that there were no victors and no vanquished as this was just a fight between brothers; the Nigerian army was given neither decorations nor promotions and the Biafran soldiers were reinstated in their rank and positions; people were asked to come back to their old homes and property; a law was brought into effect that it became a crime to blame anyone for what happened; the Nigerian government moved quickly for devolution of power to the States. While General Gowon’s statesmanship at the time helped the process of reconciliation, given the present violence in Nigeria, one wonders whether enlightened political leadership is the only key to peace and stability.
On “accountability”, looking at the experience of other militaries in conflict, bringing a few individuals responsible for serious violations before the law has not damaged the strength and professionalism of the forces. The United States military has dealt with huge public controversies from My Lai to Abu Graib by bringing those accused to justice. After Abu Graib, the Secretary of Defence was hauled before Congress and faced tough questioning as part of the commitment to accountability. On human rights fora, the US has had to face questions on a range of issues from Guantanamo to rendition and water-boarding and their responses have been couched within the domestic legal framework. On the issue of torture, new guidelines have been issued from the top. However certain safeguards have been taken for the protection of forces on overseas operations. The US in 2000 unexpectedly signed the International Criminal Court Statute but subsequently informed the UN Secretary General that they no longer intend to become States Parties and as such have no legal obligations arising from the previous signature. The US also withdrew from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1986 after the Court ruled against it in the matter of war reparations owed to Nicaragua.
Israel, which is constantly under international scrutiny for violations in the occupied territories, has strong internal legal structures in place within the military, able to put together a credible counter-narrative. After the Goldstone UN Mission report on human rights violations in Gaza, Israel made such a credible response to the charges that Judge Goldstone had to acknowledge that subsequent Israeli military investigations had confirmed some of the report’s findings but also indicated that, “civilians were not intentionally targeted as a matter of policy” by Israel. The Israeli government then asked for the Goldstone report to be withdrawn.
Up to now, the focus of the Sri Lanka armed forces has been to incorporate a strong IHL training component into their regular training. This may not be enough. When armed forces are on combat operations a strong full-time internal legal capacity is required to advise on IHL parameters, even on the permissibility of certain psychological operations. Such a professional capacity should be able to service in-house both the demands to prosecute and to defend the accused. They could suggest key changes on new guidelines to avert recurrence. Legal officers could also scan visa requests and coordinate with the Foreign Ministry to ensure military personnel are not targeted abroad.
The problem is that with the available technology today, especially in the developed countries, it is no longer possible to hide the truth about covert operations. Moreover, at the level of the soldier, there is a tendency to take “trophy” photographs with mobile telephones, which have a price for certain lobbies who could even go so far as to doctor these images for their own purposes. It was these photographs that led to the Abu Graib incident being revealed to the world. There was no alternative but to arrest the accused and put them on trial followed by key changes in the rules concerning taking of prisoners and their treatment.
In Sri Lanka, three key “tipping points” will be remembered on the role of the military. In the 1970′s the Kataragama Premawathi Mannapperi murder case and the 1990′s Krishanthy Kumaraswamy case in Jaffna, the military personnel implicated were arrested, subsequently tried and convicted. The more recent Rathupaswela incident led to clearer rules of engagement on the use of the military in the area of civilian policing which was brought under a separate Ministry of Law and Order. Now there are the two reports from the Paranagama Commission and the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) referring to “war crimes” which the government has agreed to refer to a domestic court of inquiry. There are legal precedents for setting up such a court and for seeking foreign advice. However, what should be made clear at every step is that despite individual aberrations, there has never been a policy of deliberately targeting civilians. Various reports and opinions from the international community present in Sri Lanka at the time, substantiate this position.
On the military’s role in “nation building” there is a view that once combat operations are concluded, matters relating to rehabilitation and reconciliation should involve civil society. At the height of the US military’s engagement in overseas “nation building” activities, the Pentagon’s share of Official Development Assistance had expanded from 3.5% in 1996 to approximately 22% in 2005 while in contrast USAID’s share had shrunk from 65% to 40% in the same period. The criticism of the perceived resource asymmetry and the charge that such activities had not improved the US image abroad came from the private sector and civil society which argued, justifiably, that the military is impinging on “their territory” and that too using public funds.
Civil society is able to harness the lobbying power of the huge network of international NGOs that gather at the Human Rights Council (HRC) sessions in Geneva. Such is their influence in the HRC that some governments make discrete use of Gongo’s (government organized NGOs) to put forward their views, since official presentations are treated as “propaganda”. Independent think-tanks can also present developments in the country in a manner likely to influence the international community. The Marga Institute/CHA work entitled “The Third Narrative” comes to mind which took aim at some of the more outrageous claims of the Darussman and Petrie Reports and enabled a more balanced OHCHR report and its characterization as a “human rights inquiry”.
It would be tragic if the current government’s “good governance” mandate should be eroded by the choice to work with just a few individuals who seek to expose individual cases of corruption at the top with little concern for the institutions they are demoralizing, inter-alia the judiciary, the police and Sri Lankan Airlines. OHCHR technical cooperation should be sought only after domestic policy is agreed on how to strengthen national institutions with the advice also of recognized local experts. Since civil society exists to criticize the government, winning their cooperation is no easy task. But the tsunami experience showed how the government including the military, worked together successfully with local NGOs and experts to bring about recovery after national disaster.
(The writer is a retired member of the Sri Lanka Foreign Service)