Sunday Times 2
Crisis diplomacy
Negotiations are at the heart of diplomacy and the agreements they create are the main instruments by which countries foster bilateral relations and promote friendship between each other. As the two oldest state formations in South Asia, bolstered by common racial, religious and social linkages, the bilateral relationship with our nearest neighbor India must be Sri Lanka’s strongest and most cordial. In the early days after independence, bilateral problems such as citizenship for the indentured labour from South India, establishing the international maritime boundary and the status of Kachchitivu were all settled by negotiations. Even today, these agreements, reached by the Foreign Ministry with the input of concerned Ministries and with the full support of political leaders, are hailed as protecting Sri Lanka’s national interests and creating a good neighbourly relationship. One well known explanation is that in the early days after independence, foreign affairs and defence came under the Prime Minister enabling close coordination and agreed strategy protective of national interests which prevailed throughout the protracted negotiation process. Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike in particular was interested in foreign affairs and worked closely with her officials in a relationship of mutual confidence – a stand which stood Sri Lanka well even in historic multilateral negotiations like the Law of the Sea.
So why are things so different now? Why is the Prime Minister berating Foreign Ministry officials and suggesting that foreign affairs could be handled at the political level? The common explanation is that once a separate Foreign Ministry was created in 1978 under the new constitution, it became one among the plethora of ministries competing for a voice in the decision-making process. In this atmosphere the way was opened for vital negotiations like the India-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 to be finalised in secret outside regular official channels. In hindsight, even in India, there are many who question the objectives and manner in which the 1987 Agreement was concluded. Despite the furore in Sri Lanka over the secrecy of those negotiations at the time, the unfortunate trend had been set for foreign negotiations to be conducted without taking into account the legal opinion and institutional memory of the Foreign Ministry. Such an opinion was visible even during the Mahinda Rajapaksa government which went so far as to appoint a Monitoring MP to the Foreign Ministry who now stands accused of corruption and reckless defiance of government rules and regulations. In this background, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe’s recent action to create a Global Affairs Committee comprising party stalwarts, has come into criticism from perceptive observers of foreign policy making.
Academic research by Lloyd Rudolph, (who, with his wife Susanne has worked extensively on Indian affairs) suggests yet another reason which may account for why in recent times political leaders are claiming they are better able to negotiate good agreements than at the official level. Lloyd Rudolph defined several phases or modes in diplomacy, such as normal, crisis and strategic diplomacy. According to this theory, diplomacy is “most likely to be stable and informed when it is at the bilateral level and normal, when professionals tend to be in charge and deliberative coordination and discussion among colleagues is given a chance. When crises occur, the action tends to move up… to the Presidential level… when members of the President’s coterie… seize control.. what matters to them are the President’s political agenda and electoral prospects.”
Crisis diplomacy then is the order of the day. Yet, friends of India can hardly be happy with the current state of the bilateral relationship where strains have multiplied on account of the two proposed new agreements with India, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (ETCA), (the successor to the failed Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and the proposed Indian ambulance service, which have run into unending controversy. Not only have several professional organizations voiced their concern, they have taken to the streets in public demonstrations and even banners are seen raised at Colombo university calling for protests against “Indian imperialism”. Such is the level of political polarisation that the usually amiable Indian Ambassador recently took the unusual step of publicly questioning the stand of former President Rajapaksa and Foreign Minister Pieris. Prime Minister Wickremesinghe may have won over the Indian leaders by his statement to parliament of his determination to sign the framework agreement despite all the public challenges, but this has not helped to soften domestic opposition to ETCA. Such defiance will only create more suspicion, stiffen the opposition and muddy the waters of the bilateral relationship.
The need of the day is to cool down the politics and return to “normal” diplomacy. Public scepticism of politicians being at its highest, it is time for the experts and business leaders to come forward to salvage this agreement. Why not try to explain why the new agreement is needed, over and above what is available under the Board Of Investment regime? Should not the concerned professional organizations related to IT and ship building be mobilized to support the agreement – presuming the initial request for such Indian investment and employees has been originated from the Sri Lanka side? What if any are the areas that India will open to Sri Lankans? Given the negative experience of the ISLFTA on non tariff barriers, it is natural that the Sri Lankan business community will be extra cautious with regard to the new agreements.
The government has commissioned a study from the Institute of Policy Studies, but these findings appear not to have been shared with business leaders and professional organizations. Public diplomacy calls for “listening” to others and “building relationships”. So a start in this direction would be to take on board the suggestions made in the statements issued by the professional organizations, the incorporation of which will strengthen the ECTA and safeguard national interests. Sri Lankan experts, officials and business leaders must coordinate closely in the drafting process so that solid arguments could be presented to the Indian negotiating side, referring for example to the well known examples of failures on the ISLFTA which have affected our exporters. This is where the experience and institutional memory of the traditional negotiators like the Foreign Ministry, the Commerce Department and the Attorney General’s Department will be most useful, if they are given a chance. There is an established practice of preparing positions well ahead, taking full account of all the local objections. However, if they are to negotiate from a position of strength and not weakness, the Sri Lanka delegation must have the support of the political leaders, instead of having the ground cut under their feet.
It is unfortunate that the ambulance service project has also been caught up in the controversy over ETCA. But here the resolution of problems may not be so difficult. The Sri Lanka side can appoint a team of counterpart officials from the Ministry of Health to work concurrently with the Indian NGO and acquire the experience required to run the service efficiently after one year when it will devolve to local ownership. The practice of counterpart officials is consistent with earlier practice like when Swiss Relief officials were embedded in the Ministry of Finance to observe the utilization of the Swiss funds which came through the Treasury under the cash-for housing project after the tsunami. There are existing public-private partnerships in the health sector which work well, like the cancer screening centre funded by Rotary and manned by government doctors and nurses on Elvitigala Mawatha performing a very useful service to the public, as early detection is the key to bringing down national rates of cancer mortality.
(The writer is a retired Foreign Service Ambassador.)