The Situation Report

21st March 1999

Now, an artillery war

By Iqbal Athas

If the three month long stalemate in the ongoing separatist war ended with the March 4 launch of 'Operation Rana Gosa' (Battle Cry), Tiger guerrillas retaliated with a devastating attack on the Army's 212 Brigade Headquarters in Mannar last Wednesday.

Taking cover from positions a few kilometres away, they showered 120 mm and 122 mm artillery on the camp at Thallady. During four and half hours, over 80 rounds fell, a few even in the Mannar town.

The attack, senior military officials say, also saw the LTTE for the first time fire Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRL). They suspect the weapon is among military hardware LTTE has recently acquired and smuggled into the country through the east coast. The attack, intercept of transmissions had revealed, was carried out by leader of the heavy weapons wing, Banu and his men.

The mortar fire began at 6.15 p.m. when dusk was enveloping the area and continued till around 10.45 p.m. The firing came from two locations north east of Thallady-Viduthaltheevu, 11 kilometres away and Pappamodai, nearly seven kilometres away. When it ended, 11 soldiers and three civilians were killed. Fifteen soldiers and four civilians were injured.

The attack was totally different from almost every recent confrontation where small arms fire and RPGs were among other weaponry used. There was close confrontation. This time, however, there was no direct confrontation and hence no guerrilla casualties.

Yet, the rain of mortars caused severe damage running into millions of rupees. Stocks of artillery shells of assorted sizes, still on trucks and waiting to be unloaded, blew up in balls of flames. That drew flashes like lightening in the night sky. That caused secondary explosions to fuel dumps. Stores stocked with rations blew up. So were nine 'Iron Horses' (Gun Towing Vehicles-GTVs) and four light vehicles.

Many an act of bravery and valour is demonstrated by soldiers, the real heroes of the ongoing war, during times of adversity in the battlefront. The attack on the 212 Brigade Headquarters was not different.

After the first mortar fell ahead of the parked truck, a Sergeant Major took it upon himself to drive away one loaded truck after another. He had barely finished moving the second vehicle when mortars began landing on the other trucks.

The shower of mortars at Thallady, highly placed military officials in Colombo said, came despite Military Intelligence warnings to the 212 Brigade of a Tiger guerrilla build up in the Mannar area. In early February, this year, the 212 Brigade had also learnt through radio transmission intercepts that 25 to 30 Tiger guerrillas had been deployed to reconnoitre the area on the instructions of LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran.

If that caused concern, exacerbating it were fears of how the LTTE became aware of the exact location where the mortar laden trucks became known to the LTTE. This is particularly in view of the fact that the larger volume of the mortar barrage fell on the areas where the trucks were parked. How did the LTTE become aware of this ?

At least in this instance, the media which becomes the whipping boy in such situations by ill informed sections of the defence establishment, will be free of any blame. They are debarred from the battle areas except on arranged tours by state agencies and the military. Moreover, the nine month long censorship (imposed on June 5, last year), has left the media, both local and foreign, to depend largely on sketchy press releases put out by the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence.

Only a few stray shots had fallen in the Mannar town, some five kilometres away from Thallady, damaging a few shops. The next day, (Thursday), shops remained closed and the town was deserted.

Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Srilal Weerasooriya, will this week appoint a Military Court of Inquiry to probe Wednesday's incident. He is now awaiting a report from Major General Shantha Kottegoda, General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Army's 21 Division.

After three days of 'Operation Rana Gosa', launched on March 4, security forces re-captured 535 square kilometres of land on the western flank of A-9, the Kandy-Jaffna highway. Whilst troops were consolidating their positions in the newly captured area, a hearts and minds operation has been launched to win over the civilian population. Last Tuesday, March 16, the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence, executed a conducted tour to the newly captured areas for selected local media and Colombo based foreign correspondents.

As they travelled from Vavuniya in a bus to Iranai Iluppaikulam, security forces were busy with 'Operation Bunker Buster.' In the pre-dawn offensive, commando teams and small groups of soldiers broke out from their defensive positions east and west of Paranthan to attack LTTE positions.

The thrust of 'Operation Rana Gosa', which has politically outweighed military considerations, is likely to be continued. This is part of Government plans to re-capture more land area and develop civilian centres as part of preparations for impending elections, both local and national.

These developments in the Wanni came as City residents braced themselves to cope with the new wave of bomb explosions. If bomb explosions hit trains, buses and power transformers, intelligence warnings last week spoke about attempts to trigger off bombs in cinema halls. However, these warnings said the plans were to do so when the cinema halls were empty.

This week saw a bomb being diffused on the rail track at Kelaniya. Some experts on bomb disposal claim that this bomb, without even a timer, was an amateurish job. They are of the view that it could not have been the work of the LTTE. If that assumption is correct, a bigger question arose as to who was responsible for this Crisco empty biscuit tin bomb. Fears of bomb explosions also saw an early adjournment of Supreme Court sittings last Thursday-a clear indication that the LTTE was getting away by creating a fear psychosis by launching a string of IRA style minor scale bomb explosions in the recent weeks.

But a more significant LTTE related incident came on Tuesday evening when guerrillas made an abortive attempt to kill a Policeman who has cracked many LTTE-related cases in the city. The incident laid bare the fact that the LTTE had pursued the man for almost three years. It also laid bare the vulnerability of the City's security system that made infiltration easy.

At 5.15 p.m., acting Chief Inspector, Mohamed Nilabdeen, head of the Counter Subversion Unit at the Mount Lavinia Police Station, was busy typing a report when he received a telephone call from home. A family member was sick and he had to rush out. He was unaware that an LTTE hit team was waiting outside to kill him.

With CI Nilabdeen in the front seat, his driver Constable Chandana drove out of the Police Station to cut across the Galle Road. That would have brought the Peugeot 303 in front of a bus halt, right in front of the Seylan Bank. But a white Hi-ace van was in that lane. So the car travelled alongside when a woman darted across and blew herself.

The distance prevented the full impact of the explosion hitting CI Nilabdeen. He was wounded. His driver who had stopped the car, opened his door and pulled him out.

There were unconfirmed reports that the attackers hurled a grenade when they found they could not get their target. Either as a result of this or due to the suicide bomber exploding herself, Anees, the driver of a Bajaj three wheeler died on the spot.

It was just then that Reserve Police Constable Premasiri saw a young man running away from the scene. He gave chase and grappled with him. But the man had bitten a cyanide capsule and was dead. It became clear that the suicide bomber had an accomplice. Besides them, a woman at the bus halt and a passerby, an employee of a garment factory were killed.

Subsequent investigations led the Police to a safe house in Hendala where they found explosives, ammunition, cyanide capsules, photographs and cash. The chance arrest of a pharmacist employed in a drug store in Colombo on August 19, last year, bared the fact that CI Nilabdeen had been a target for more than three years. The pharmacist, who was found to be an LTTE member, told officers of the Counter Subversion Unit in Trincomalee, who made the arrest, that CI Nilabdeen had been under surveillance since 1996. He had said that they watched his movements closely and observed him visiting the Devatagaha Mosque for Jumma prayers every Friday. The Police Officer had then been attached to the Crime Detective Bureau (CDB) and had travelled in a blue coloured Isuzu Trooper.

The suicide bomber has been identified as Mathi Adivai Queen Mary alias Mary Quida, from Vankalai in Mannar. She stayed at No 17, Sea Beach Road, Pettah, in the house of Ramasamy Arumugam, a labourer. His wife, Sebamalai, hailed from Venkalai.

This is what Police investigations have revealed so far.

In November, 1998, Sebamalai went to Mannar to see her parents. There her cousin sister (Annama) made a request for her to accommodate her daughter in their Pettah house. Annama had said the daughter planned to do computer studies. Sebamalai has never seen the daughter. She declined the request saying there was not enough room in the house.

In December, last year, Soosanayakan Anthony (Sebamalai's mother) came to Colombo to see his sister. With him Mary Quida arrived. Sebamalai went to the Pettah Police Station and got her registered. She was not accompanied by Mary Quida since registration procedures had been relaxed. The requirement that the person seeking registration should be physically present at the Police Station was not being enforced. Mary Quida began attending Computer and English classes at a tutory at Gintupitiya.

A month ago, Mary Quida, had said she was going to Chilaw. She had taken all her belongings and left but re-appeared the next day. Police suspect she did not go to Chilaw but visited the safe house in Hendala.

Early this month, a male friend visited the Arumugam household. Mary introduced him as Jeevan from Silavathurai. Last Tuesday she left home at 1.30 p.m. after telling Sebamalai she would return for a late dinner. She had blown herself in a bid to kill CI Nilabdeen that night.

Jeevan has now been identified as Peethambaram Jeevendran alias Seelan, a man who arrived in the City to travel abroad.

Umapathi, a friend of Jeevan, had paid Rs 70,000 to Shankar, who ran a ticketing agency (and also played the role of a Police informant earning attractive cash payments). This was at the end of 1998. Jeevan stayed in a lodge at Wattala.

There Jeevan befriended Raju, a man who was running a video parlour in Hendala and became a business partner. Later, he broke off and went to live with Shankar at his house in Thimbirigasyaya Road, Hendala.

By late November, last year, Jeevan moved to the house of one Mohandas Ramamoorthy at 100/14 Veliamuna Road, Hendalawatte-the place which later turned out to be the safe house. Ramamoorthy was a dealer in Nuwara Eliya vegetables and his wife, Kadiravelu Sushani ran a type setting firm in Armour Street.

On March 10, a girl visited the house at Veliamuna Road and Jeevan introduced her as his cousin. It turned out that she was none other than Mary Quida. Frequently she arrived there and there were meetings where Jeevan had also taken part. Last Tuesday, Jeevan left at 9.30 a.m. in the company of Mary Quida. She wore a black skirt, a white blouse and was carrying an umbrella and a black purse.

At the scene of the incident opposite the Mount Lavinia Police Station, investigators found the umbrella and the purse. But Mary Quida was wearing a red colour dress. Where did she change clothes ? Police suspect that the change of clothes which included her donning a suicide jacket took place at a hideout closer to the scene of the incident. Travelling with the kit from a place like Wattala or another area would have sometimes led to detection. The investigations now under way will bare more details.

But the incident, like the string of bomb explosions and attacks on power transformers, showed how the LTTE had infiltrated the tight security cordon in the City and suburbs. That is not all. They also had access to explosives, arms, ammunition and suicide jackets to carry out attacks.

This week also saw the Sri Lanka Navy claiming a big success in the high seas.

In the 'Jungle Telegraph' column on this page on March 7, there was a report which raised questions on whether the LTTE succeeded in unloading a consignment of military hardware in the high seas off Mullaitivu early this month. The report said this was after a fishing vessel in the eastern waters spotted a ship unloading packages to small boats during the night. A crane, they said, had been used for the task. The report added: 'The vessel radioed the Eastern Naval Command in Trincomalee. They said they were fired upon by armed men on board the ship.

'Fast Attack Craft moved into the area. It was followed by Sri Lanka Air Force aircraft scouring the eastern seas. There were negative reports from both.'

Now, in a new turn of events, the Navy Headquarters said that 'SLN deployment on information provided by multiday vessel since March 3, 1999, in the high seas of Bay of Bengal (off Mullaitivu and Point Pedro) has forced the LTTE vessel 'Mariamma' to abandon her intentions of transferring cargo at sea or approaching the Mullaitivu coast, and it is presumed, has compelled her to turn back to her port of origination: either in Bay of Bengal or Andaman seas. The available information indicates that the value of 'Mariamma' with its warlike cargo is in the region of 10 million US $.'

Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, has also sent in a detailed report to the Ministry of Defence on Navy's role in preventing LTTE acquiring a large haul of military hardware.

Indian newspaper reports, however, had a different account. The Hindustan Times of March 16 said:

'An Indian Navy operation, launched at the Sri Lankan Government's request to nab gunrunners near the Andaman and Nicobar islands last Thursday, ended in a fiasco. The operatives, who are said to have close links with LTTE, escaped after sinking their trawler.

'The failure of the operation, which has been detailed in a report to Defence Minister George Fernandes, raises serious questions about the manner in which it was handled by the Naval brass.

'The area of operation falls under the tri-services Fortran Command at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

'The command at the time was headed by Vice Admiral Harinder Singh, who today took over as the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Operations).

'Highly placed sources in the External Affairs Ministry said the Sri Lankan Government had on March 6 requested the Indian Government to help intercept a 500-tonnes trawler, MV Mariamma, which was believed to have supplied arms and ammunition to the LTTE off the northern part of the island republic. The ship was heading back to the Andaman seas en route to South East Asia after dropping supplies off the Jaffna coast.

'As soon as the green signal from the Government was obtained, naval reconnaissance aircraft of the Eastern Naval Command were despatched from Arakonam, (near Chennai) and Chennai airports to track down the ship.

'Sources say the ship was tracked by the aircraft some 230 km east of northern Sri Lanka. It is understood that Navy ships based in Indian Island territories were told to be on standby as the high-speed trawler was expected to cross the Andaman seas through the 10 degree channel that separate the Andaman and the Nicobar Islands, or through Indira point, the southernmost tip of India.

'An Indian Navy corvette and a Coast Guard ship armed to the teeth were assigned the task of tailing the trawler and then intercepting it. According to Defence Ministry sources, the task was to arrest the operatives on board, seize the trawler and then hand them back to the Sri Lankan authorities.

'Apparently, the Indian Government had launched this operation on the request of Sri Lankan authorities as a goodwill gesture.

'Last Thursday afternoon, the Indian Navy ships closed in on the trawler. However, inexplicably, it was decided that MV Mariamma would be intercepted in the night. But that night, the Indian ships found that the trawler was sinking 200 km off-the Andaman coast. Search operations revealed that there was no person or weapons on board.

'It is understood that the operatives on board the trawler escaped on a 'gemini' boat after dumping the arms overboardî.

A similar report in the Hindu of March 16 said 'Despite a timely tip off by the Sri Lanka Government, the Navy, in a recent incident, failed to nab gun runners having links with the LTTE ?'

Did 'Mariamma' go down after the LTTE succeeded in unloading the military cargo ? This is the billion dollar question since fishing boats first located its presence in the early part of March. A section of the intelligence community argued that the cargo had been unloaded. It is not clear whether they based this on information from sources or were making a surmise. The heightened Sea Tiger activity in the Palk Straits in the recent months and the attack on the Thallady camp indicates that the LTTE are increasing focus on the western Wanni. This area has been hitherto relatively of lesser operational importance compared to the Mankulam-Mullaitivu sector of the eastern Wanni. Perhaps this shift of focus has been due to LTTE apprehension that with the recent Government territorial gains on both flanks of the A-9 axis to Mankulam, that the Army would undertake operations on a broad front. This could open to the Government a three-axis option to advance to the Jaffna peninsula - a situation which the LTTE with limited access to manpower resources, would find it difficult to counter.

In such circumstances, a logical option for the LTTE would be to deny the armed forces the advantage of concentrating resources. To keep them dispersed, the LTTE should spread their operations on a wide scale. Not just on the battlefront but more importantly in the populated areas where the Government is compelled to maximise security to maintain its political clout.

What better than to launch into strategy of small scale bombing of selective targets. Bombing which will not create carnage at a level to draw international condemnation but which nevertheless will panic the Government to maximise other measures. A page off the IRA strategy of bombing of London.

To counter such a strategy, the Government is forced to implement counter measures, which will impinge on the freedom and liberties of the public. With only a little over an year to go for parliamentary and presidential elections, any harsh counter measures will not be to the liking of the Government. Neither can they afford not to increase vigilance. The LTTE would no doubt hope that this would place the Government in a Catch 22 situation and detract the concentrated effort of the Armed Forces on the battlefront. This would buy the LTTE some time. With elections not too far off in both India and Sri Lanka what the LTTE would most like for now is perhaps time.

Taraki's Column

Editorial/Opinion Contents