Give a hand or hands off!

PREM SHANKAR JHA

The gains of the LTTE against the Sri Lankan Army have confronted the Indian government with the most difficult foreign policy choice in the country's 52-year history. This is whether to help the Sri Lankan government turn back the LTTE tide or to keep its hands off and allow events to take their own course in that country.

So far, the Indian government's response has been an essay in confusion. It has reaffirmed its support for the unity of Sri Lanka but publicly and categorically ruled out any kind of military help whatever, a decision recently endorsed by an all-party meeting called by the prime minister. It has also ruled out supplying weapons and offered only humanitarian assistance. Newspapers in Colombo have been reporting that India is prepared to offer logistical support, censored should the need arise.

But the Indian High Commission in Colombo is denying even this. However, India has felt no compunction in telling Colombo that it would look with disfavour on any attempt to bring parties from outside the region into the conflict. censored it has offered its services as a mediator to find a negotiated peace between Colombo and Prabhakaran.

The absurdity of this position has not struck either Atal Behari Vajpayee or Jaswant Singh. If India will not help Sri Lanka and if Sri Lanka does not get any help from outside, why should the LTTE, agree to negotiate a peace which falls short of the Eelam for which it has fought for the last 20 years? It also does not seem to have struck New Delhi that the position it has taken implicitly favours the LTTE, an organisation even the US has branded as terrorist; that planned and carried out the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and whose leaders have arrest warrants out for them in India. Lastly, while New Delhi's desire to be accepted as the regional power is not new, it does not seem to have crossed Singh's mind that power can't be divorced from responsibility. If it ignores Sri Lanka's call for help in a cause just and vital to India's own interest, it will forfeit all claim to regional power status. New Delhi's confusion, not only over its interests but also over the values it ought to espouse, raises serious questions about the capacity of the Indian political system to throw up governments that are capable of facing the challenges before a modern nation state.

The LTTE's 'Operation Unceasing Wave III', , did not start on April 27 but five months earlier in November. In that month itself, the SLA at Elephant Pass suffered reverses that forced it to cede control of some territory to the LTTE. What is more important, censored if not with the Indian media then surely with foreign office analysts and intelligence agencies. Why then were no contingency plans drawn up to cope with a possible crisis in Sri Lanka.

More to the point, why did New Delhi not carry out a simulation exercise to ascertain the effect of an LTTE victory on India-not only in Tamil Nadu but also in Kashmir, Assam, the northeastern states and Punjab? This is not the only occasion when not just the government but the entire Indian state has been found wanting. The Kargil intrusion revealed that its intelligence apparatus had simply ceased to exist in the whole of PoK and that accountability in the Indian army had all but vanished behind a cloud of fudged reports. The hijacking of IC 814 in December revealed that the machinery for dealing with such a contingency, which had been functioning well till 1993-94, had been allowed to fall into disrepair.

The death of millions of cattle-the wealth of the poor of Gujarat-reflects the extent to which every level of the state was able to ignore the consequences of a drought that began eight months earlier. And Sri Lanka shows how even an eventuality that could mean the difference between life and death to the Indian state had not even crossed the government's mind for five whole months. All this has happened not before but after the government set up its much-advertised National Security Council. The conclusion is inescapable: behind an ever more elaborate facade of modern institutions, India has failed to evolve into a modern nation-state. censored

Outlook-India

Call of Lanka drowned by selfish Indian rhetoric

By Sidharth Bhatia

It doesn't take long to create a national consensus these days. The establishment puts out a line, the media with its herd mentality, picks it up and lo and behold, we have a manufactured opinion, which in turn influences and shapes policy.

There are occasional dissenting voices that disturb this cosy arrangement, but they are just for form and are drowned out by the chorus.

Something similar is happening at the moment vis-a-vis India's position on the grim events in Sri Lanka. As soon as it became known that the Sri Lankan Government had requested Indian assistance in its war against the LTTE in the Northern provinces, a consensual view emerged in India: That, given the bitter past experience of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1987-90, India should stay away from another country's problems. Retired Army officials, especially those who have first-hand memories of that misadventure hammered home the point that the Sri Lankan Government had not kept its promises then and could not be trusted to do so now. Political opponents of the late Rajiv Gandhi, who had themselves given short shrift to the IPKF were also prompt in reminding the nation of the error of judgement in sending Indian troops to fight Sri Lanka's war.

Joining this bandwagon, for his own narrow interests, is the redoubtable Vaiko, a small time provincial politician who has no qualms about pleading the case of the LTTE, never mind if its supremo V. Prabhakaran, is wanted in this country for plotting the assassination of a former Prime Minister. Adding his voice to the crescendo is the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu M Karunanidhi who feels that an Eelam for Tamils is not such a bad idea. And instead of asking its allies to keep their mouths shut while a considered decision that will be in the overall national interest is taken, the Government allows itself to be swept away by this rhetoric. And what can the Government do, after all, in the face of this national consensus?

But even though this fig leaf may suit the Government for the moment and it may have tacitly encouraged these views while it makes up its mind, letting them shape Government policy in this instance will be a serious mistake. If ever there was a time to step in, militarily, if necessary, to ensure long-term peace in the region, this is it. The LTTE's recent successes and the Sri Lankan call for assistance have given India the perfect excuse to curb and cripple the growing influence of this organisation and at the same time safeguard the territorial integrity of a friend and neighbour.

Sri Lanka has not been on top of the Indian mind for a long time. After 1990, when the IPKF returned home, battered and bruised, to a distinctly cold reception, successive governments chose to ignore the island. Rajiv Gandhi's brutal killing by a LTTE suicide bomber made India ever more wary of meddling in its neighbour's affairs. Simultaneously, the situation in Sri Lanka appeared to actually improve after a while and the new Government of Chandrika Kumaratunga announced initiatives to find a political solution to the country's problems. India's mind was more focused on other foreign policy objectives including trying to cope with the post-Cold War world and managing the economic liberalisation programme. The successes of the Sri Lankan Government in winning back Jaffna from the LTTE and putting the organisation on the defensive also lulled Indian policy makers into thinking that all was well in that country.

In the post-Pokhran phase, Indian attention has been almost totally occupied with trying to isolate Pakistan and building new relations with the US. All initiatives are benchmarked against these objectives as India reshapes its entire foreign policy architecture. Though there have been some localised efforts to improve bilateral relations with the neighbours, for the most part they have been ignored, indeed even treated with condescension. The decision, on India's part, to ask for a deferment of the SAARC summit in Nepal last November was a typical example of overriding the smaller neighbours to fulfil our own foreign policy objectives.

Of all of India s neighbours, Sri Lanka has been a good friend in recent years and has worked to ensure that there are no irritants between the two sides. Now this small, beleaguered country is in trouble and wants India's help. A wide cross-section of Sri Lankan policy-makers and influential public figures have asked for it. It can be argued that this may be a case of crying wolf and the situation is not that bad as is being made out; it is also possible that a military intervention could once again trap Indian troops. An equally strong argument against India sending its soldiers is the perfidy of Sri Lankan politicians as well as the LTTE the last time round which ended the IPKF saga with such ignominy. Above all is the highly emotive factor of helping the Sri Lankan Government against our Tamil brethren. All of these will have to be factored in by the Indian Government in its decision-making process.

But there are strong counter-arguments for intervening in Sri Lanka and these are based on Indian, rather than only Sri Lankan interests. First, the LTTE is by no means the sole upholder of Tamil interests. Indeed, it has often treated Tamils brutally too. There are several other moderate Tamil groups in Sri Lanka that India has dealt with in the past and they are no less representative of moderate Tamils in that country. Any action against the LTTE is therefore not necessarily inimical to Tamil interests whatever the votaries of Eelam will have us believe.

Second, after continuously campaigning against terrorism, India cannot afford to be seen to be weak against the LTTE. The LTTE is rightly a banned organisation in India. In keeping with our own campaign, we have to ensure it is eliminated if it persists in its violent activities.

Third, a resurgent LTTE controlling the Northern and perhaps in future, the Eastern, provinces of Sri Lanka could pose serious danger to India's southern flank. The spectre of ethnic nationalism in the region, and the possibility of yet another armed player in the Palk Straits is frightening. For some unfathomable reason, the Indian Navy has eased up on its vigilance in the region in recent months and if this vacuum is filled by the LTTE's flotilla, it could lead to an explosive situation.

Most of all, backing off from showing a strong presence will be inconsistent with India's own objectives of becoming a major player in the immediate region and even beyond. The country's stated ambitions of developing a blue-water navy, the draft nuclear doctrine or even the Indian determination not to allow anyone else in the region to emerge as a counter-weight, all point to our own notions of becoming a regional super power. This was the thought that prompted Rajiv Gandhi to take the decisive step of sending Indian troops to Sri Lanka a move that cool re-appraisal will show to be a bold and brilliant one and it is in the same spirit that the present Government must take the next step.

Allowing any other country to enter this region will set off a dangerous precedent. It is not as if there are no voices within the Government that are not considering such a move.

Certainly the Indian armed forces are concerned about the strategic implications of what is happening in Sri Lanka and the foreign policy establishment is not fully convinced over this consensus . Yet, the Government has so far chosen to be ambivalent and perhaps understandably so.

But if the situation worsens, which by all accounts it could, then the Indian Government will have to take firm and bold steps. The timing, quality and quantum of assistance will of course have to be decided after due consideration of all the facts before the decision-makers. But not showing decisiveness when the time comes will cost this Government, and more than that, this country, very dear in the long run.

Forgotten terror at Kalyanapura

By Dexter Filkins

Kalyanapura: Sri Lanka

As Tamil separatists continue their battles they are beginning to cleanse their land of the people who were once their neighbours. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, are stepping up attacks against censored

The Tigers are bombing schools, wrecking Buddhist temples and shooting civilians in a campaign to force thousands of ethnic Sinhalese from their homes. The attacks are directed at Sri Lanka's majority Buddhist Sinhalese living in areas dominated by mostly Hindu Tamils. The attacks, overshadowed by the recent military engagements on the northern tip of this island nation off the coast of India, portend a grim round of ethnic expulsions.

"They want us to leave, but we have nowhere to go," said Kadirathage Ran Keranhamy, a Sinhalese rice farmer whose 21-year-old son was kidnapped Saturday by Tiger guerrillas. "We are brothers. Why are they doing this to us?" Keranhamy lives here in Kalyanapura, one of a cluster of Sinhalese villages in the sprawling tropical flatlands of northeastern Sri Lanka. The villages, populated by more than 10,000 Sinhalese, are an island in a sea of Tamils. Kalyanapura is part of the region earmarked by the Tigers for a future nation.

As guerrillas have rolled over government forces on the Jaffna peninsula, the attacks on these Sinhalese villages about 80 miles to the south have grown in frequency and ferocity. Tiger guerrillas are stepping up their activities as hundreds of Sri Lankan troops are moving out of this region to help their besieged comrades.

"We just censored have enough troops to protect the villages," said Maj. Gen. A.K. Jayawardhana, the provincial governor.

In Kalyanapura, a hamlet of simple brick houses and about 600 people, the Tigers come at night. They set fire to rice crops and sweep homes with searchlights and gunfire. Last month, guerrillas blew up a school in a neighboring village. On occasion, the guerrillas abduct the Sinhalese men and boys who work the rice paddies; more than 30 have disappeared in the area since 1995. None have returned, and few bodies have been found. An additional 15 people have died in shellings and shootings.

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The Sinhalese villages are the victims of the tangled myths of Sri Lanka's history and the bloody realities of its civil war. In the 17 years since the conflict began, more than 60,000 people have been killed.

The imagined Tiger nation includes the entire Eastern province, where the village of Kalyanapura sits. According to estimates, Eastern province is less than half Tamil, but the Tigers want it all.

Some of the Sinhalese who live in Eastern province were settled as part of government-sponsored land giveaways—a major grievance of the Tamils. But many of the province's Sinhalese villages, including Kalyanapura, have been settled for generations.

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Those kingdoms stretched northward all the way to Kalyanapura.

Sitting under the shade of a jackfruit tree, Keranhamy, the rice farmer, recalled the day last week when the Tiger guerrillas kidnapped his son. Keranhamy and his son were husking rice they had harvested from their 3-acre paddy when four men appeared just before sundown. Unlike the villagers, who mainly wear sarongs, the four men wore trousers and carried guns.

Keranhamy's son, Vimal, ran. Keranhamy, a 50-year-old farmer who looks older than his years, was too slow. The guerrillas tore a piece of his sarong to bind his hands. Keranhamy pleaded with the Tigers in his native Sinhala tongue, but the guerrillas didn't understand.

"I spoke to them nicely, I told them we were brothers, and they hit me," said Keranhamy, nursing an eye blackened by a rifle butt.

As the guerrillas began to blindfold him, he heard gunfire. Keranhamy doesn't know who fired the shots, but they gave him the break he needed: He dashed off into the paddies and dived into the mud. "I never thought I would escape," he said.

Other Tigers were spotted by villagers that evening. Vimal and three other villagers are still missing. The body of one resident was found the next morning in a paddy field.

The disappearance of Vimal is not the first time that Sri Lanka's civil war has brought tragedy to the family. Tiger guerrillas killed Keranhamy's in-laws in 1990. After that, he took his family away. But they returned after 10 months because Kalyanapura is their home. After Vimal's diasappearance, the Keranhamys sent their 12-year-old daughter, Sujiva, to live with relatives in another district.

Four days after the disappearance, Vimal's mother did not have much to say. In a long drive through the Sri Lankan countryside, Vimalawathi stared out of the car window and silently wept.

The tragedy of the Keranhamy family was relieved slightly by an unexpected gesture of goodwill. Among those abducted Saturday was Pinhamy Dissanayake, a Sinhalese villager. The guerrillas also tried to take Dissanayake's sons, Jayawardana, 15, and Sunil, 13.

R. Rashid, a 33-year-old Muslim labourer, asked the Tigers to spare the boys. Muslims, a minority community in Sri Lanka, have recently been spared the mistreatment inflicted on the Sinhalese. The guerrillas told Rashid that they would keep the boys.

According to several villagers, Rashid faced down the guerrillas, grabbed the boys by the scruffs of their necks and led them away. Stunned, the Tiger guerrillas did not shoot.

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Rashid, a quiet man who earns a few dollars a week harvesting rice, said the blood drained from his body when he confronted the guerrillas. Recalling the episode, he tried to explain what gave him the courage to step forward to save the boys. "I had pity for the boys," Rashid said. "I have children too."

Los Angeles Times

Tamil gang warfare in the streets of Toronto

Ethnic Tamil street gangs and crime syndicates in Ontario and Quebec are involved in an expanding range of illegal activity, from home invasions and drugs to migrant smuggling and arms trafficking, according to an RCMP intelligence report.

The police brief, which compares the emergence of Tamil crime to the early days of Asian gangs, says an estimated 155,000 Sri Lankan Tamils live in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver and "as these communities have grown, Tamil criminal elements have also taken root."

Much of the crime involves street gangs, whose members are believed to have had military training. There has also been an escalation to more sophisticated crime such as casino and bank fraud, says the report by the RCMP Criminal Intelligence Directorate.

"Tamil criminal groups are involved in a variety of criminal activities including extortion, home invasion, thefts, sales of contraband cigarettes, the importation and trafficking of brown heroin, trafficking of other drugs, arms trafficking, fraud, production and sale of counterfeit passports, illegal migrant smuggling and attempted murders, bank and casino frauds and money laundering."

The more recent briefing report says there have been "more than 40" Tamil gang shootings in Toronto in the past two years and five unsolved homicides. Fearful of the gangs, many Tamils refuse to testify in court or complain to police, it says.

A central focus of Tamil organized crime is immigration fraud, the report says, noting that Tamil criminals have an "international reputation" for producing false documents and migrant smuggling.

To pay back the smugglers, migrants "may be extorted, subject to home invasions, forced into gang activity, used to import heroin or otherwise exploited. The smugglers sell their services to anyone regardless of ethnic group," it says.

Tens of thousands of Sri Lankans fled to Canada in the past two decades due to an ongoing insurgency by the LTTE guerrillas. Recent reports published by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the U.S. State Department say the rebels are supported by a global network of front organizations, which includes the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils and the World Tamil Movement in Toronto.

- National Post