Point of view

"Undemocratic" political order

By Jude Fernando

During the past two centuries, secessionist movements emerged in multiethnic nation states that failed to create a 'federal type' of political system, permitting different groups of citizens to exercise their cultural, economic and political rights. Even the world's most powerful armies have recorded more failures than successes in militarily suppressing these movements, which have culminated in new nation states emerging or prolonged civil strife. Sri Lanka is not an exception to this historical process. 

What is unique about the crisis in Sri Lanka is that there still is some space to prevent the division of the country and to reduce the human costs of the war. In this regard, the consensus reached between the UNP and PA, and the government's call for the LTTE to participate in unconditional negotiations are indeed important steps. 

What are the reasons for the government's political and military failures? It lies in the fact that the government security forces function according to partisan political and economic logic rather than strict military logic. However, the reasons for the continuing strength of the LTTE lies not so much in its military gains over the government forces, but in ways in which it exploits the government's political failures, its approach to the war and peace strategies.

The assumptions upon which the government's proposals and implementation strategies are based are naïve and unrealistic. The government's claim that the LTTE and the Tamil community are entirely opposed to each other is unfounded. Its argument that the war is against the LTTE and not against the Tamil community, is unlikely to be accepted by the Tamil community at large. Such a differentiation between the LTTE and the Tamil civilians is, at best, a 'political construct' used to justify the war and reasons for the government's failure to introduce a reasonable political settlement. 

The LTTE's present military gains would not have been possible without the support of the civilians. Such civilian support is not simply a matter of fear, but based on deep ideological conviction that peace is impossible within the existing political system. It is possible that the Tamil community, including those who are unhappy with the LTTE might think that a military defeat of the LTTE would place the government in a much weaker position to implement a satisfactory political solution that is short of Eelam. The Tamils might even prefer to live under the dictatorship of the LTTE in Eelam than be ruled under the government forces whom they consider as a 'Sinhala army'. 

Even if we assume that the majority Tamils are against the LTTE, there is nothing much that they and the government can do to defeat it militarily. 

The LTTE is well aware that prolonged military efforts by the government will destabilize the country both economically and politically and will strengthen both Tamil and Sinhala separatist forces. 

Prolonged military occupation is bound to create human rights violations by the military, particularly within the context of a guerrilla war. The military control of the north has also released manpower and the resources for the LTTE to conduct its war against the security forces in other areas. 

Up to now, no foreign country has provided any substantial assistance to Sri Lanka as expected by the government. The apathy of the international community is not only because there is hardly any economic and political benefit from providing military assistance to Sri Lanka but also because they have lost faith in government's commitment for a political settlement that would comply with the international norms on democratic rights of minorities. 

That Eelam in Sri Lanka would strengthen the separatists forces in Tamil Nadu, therefore India will come to the assistance of the Sri Lankan government, is another ambiguous and unsubstantiated claim. After Indian independence there has been greater integration and interdependency between the politics of the Tamil Nadu State and the central government in India. Whereas in Sri Lanka, the actions of the political parties since independence have strengthened both Tamil and separatist forces and Sinhala nationalist forces that have undermined interdependence between the two communities.

At best the present political order in Sri Lanka is not a democracy but a constitutional theocracy.

The forces of neo-liberal economy have in fact further strengthened the interdependence between Tamil Nadu and the Indian central government. In Sri Lanka however, the popular representation of the LTTE as the main obstacle for economic development has strengthened Sinhala enthno-religious nationalism in ways detrimental to a negotiated political settlement. 

Ironically, the demand for 'Swaraj' was first put forward in Sri Lanka by the Jaffna Youth Congress based on a Ceylonese identity and was rejected by the Sinhala Youth Congress in Colombo, as well as certain Tamil politicians. In 1924, the Kandyan Sinhalese demanded political autonomy from the rest of the country. Premalal Kumarasiri during the 1940's warned against the inclusion of the lion symbol in the national flag as it would lead the Tamils to breakaway from the country. Late Professor Newton Gunasinghe repeatedly warned against the Sinhalaisation of national institutions such as the military. Such repeated warnings were indeed recognized by the politicians, but the pragmatic solutions they proposed were not implemented in the light of their short-term political interests and lack of political will. The LTTE's propaganda machinery has effectively used these historic failures of the Sinhala dominated political parties in order to mobilize support for its quest for Eelam. 

One important outcome of Eelam nationalism is that it had strengthened and politicized the Sinhalese nationalist identity and has led to the formulation of Sinhala nationalist political parties. There is nothing wrong in forming political parties such as the Sihala Urumaya in order to protect the interests of the Sinhalese, if the TULF and Muslim Congress can exist in order to protect the rights of the Tamils and Muslims, respectively. The problem arises when such parties equate national identity of the country with that of the Sinhala identity. Ideologically, both he LTTE and the Urumaya are two sides of the same coin and appear to be helping each others' causes. Both these groups are exclusivist in terms of their demands. They are financially supported by the rich middle classes of their respective communities and nourished by the mainstream political parties. 

The continuing arrests, detentions and harassment of the Tamils appear to be exploited by the LTTE in its propaganda campaign and seem to further alienate Tamils from the government. Take for example the arrest of 58 students from the Morotuwa campus. These were the students who are least likely to join the LTTE. As long as the government delays a political settlement it will be forced to adopt desperate measures that will intensify security, causing much discomfort to the Tamil community. This will in turn would be welcomed by the LTTE. 

The government can do little to prevent the flow of international financial assistance to the LTTE. Those expatriates who provide financial assistance to the LTTE are comfortable with the thousands of Tamil children being killed in the war, while their children are happily ensconced abroad. Their motto seems to be 'Eelam at any cost'. 

Under these conditions, the LTTE is unlikely to agree even to the government's call for unconditional negotiations. The option available to the government is to propose a comprehensive federal system and to destabilize the LTTE politically. Such a system should permit both Tamils and the Sinhalese to enjoy nationhood within a united Sri Lanka. The basic political structure of the country should be made into a 'union of states' similar to that of the United States of America and India. The country's constitution should be secular, guaranteeing the separation between the state and religion. Perhaps we need to introduce a new national flag that does not give priority to any single ethnic group. 

Finally, none of these measures are likely to be successful without the intervention of a third party, particularly India. 

A blending of classical, folk and hi-tech 

Shakespeare competition

By Kolitha Gunaratne (Research Scholar in post-colonial Media Studies from London)

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