Full support for peace process- Kadir

By Faraza Farook

A: The new Government is continuing the peace process that we began some years ago. Therefore, we are clearly committed to the peace process. We will support it as best as possible. The role of the PA has not yet been clearly defined. We too would like to bring the war to an end on the basis of a negotiated political settlement which is satisfactory to the entire country.

Q:Would this support extend to the proposed interim administration in the North and East?

A: We do not yet know in detail what the Government has in mind. At the moment, as far as I can see, the question is how to get the peace process going, how to bring the LTTE to the table and related logistical matters. So we will have to reserve our opinion on the substantive issues until such time as they are clearly identified, and then we will have to formulate our positions.

Q: Have you had any talks with the UNF Government on re-starting the peace process, on the matters you mentioned?

A: The current position is that the Prime Minister has had broad discussions with the President with regard to the peace process. He has invited me to help in restarting the peace process. The President is very willing that I should assist the Prime Minister as best as I can. It is still early days. I will make whatever input is required. One must remember that the PA Government has gone down this road before. We have learnt some lessons and we have drawn some conclusions. There is a great deal we can say to the Government, and the Prime Minister's approach is to ask for assistance of that nature.

Q: As regards participation in the dialogue with the Norwegians, what is your role in that process?

A: I have been involved in this process very closely for many years with the Norwegians. Let me say a few words on that. It was during our time that the Norwegians were brought on board as facilitators. First, for about a year and a half, I was engaged in discreet discussions with the Norwegians. Then the President formally announced that the Norwegians had been invited to act as facilitators. That was on 28th December 1999 during her interview with the BBC in London where she was recovering from the eye injury that she sustained in the bomb attack on her. Thereafter, the Norwegian involvement has been public knowledge. Through most of the year 2000, the peace process had come to a halt because the LTTE was waging its military campaign to overrun the Wanni which took it to the gates of Jaffna in May 2000. And there was the distraction of the election campaign of October 2000. Last year I worked very closely with the Norwegians on a proposed agreement for humanitarian relief in the Wanni and no sabotage and assassinations in the South. 

The experience gained in that exercise will be made available to the new Government. The Prime Minister has requested the Norwegian Government to keep in touch with President Kumaratunga's nominee, who is myself, and to keep me informed about ongoing developments in the peace process, in the same way that the PA Government had requested the Norwegian Government to keep the present Prime Minister informed of developments when he was Leader of the Opposition. Against that background when the Norwegian Government delegation came to Colombo, they paid a call on me, a separate call, and when they called on the President I was also present. That is the process of continuity on which we are presently concentrating.

Q: What went wrong then with your Government's initiative in resuming peace talks with the LTTE?

A: When the President was elected to her first term in 1994, she started talks with the LTTE very quickly, as you know. There was in fact a mutually agreed cessation of hostilities for about six or seven months. Even foreign monitors were brought down-one each from Canada, Netherlands and Norway. But they were unable to function. Those talks were mainly exploratory in nature. The idea was to create a climate conducive to the holding of substantive discussions. The President's principal objective in starting talks with the LTTE was to get to grips with the substantive issues. But when the President raised those questions in her letters to the LTTE leader, and asked the LTTE to enter into discussions on those issues, it became evident that they were not ready or were unwilling to discuss matters of substance. The talks broke down. The LTTE bombed two ships in the Trincomalee harbour on 19th April 1995 and the war was resumed. Jaffna was retaken. Thereafter we made attempts to draft a new Constitution. That took a long time and did not reach fruition. The year 2000 was one of hardly any progress on the peace front for the reasons I have given earlier. 

From the beginning of last year the process picked up quite intensively after Mr. Prabhakaran met the Norwegians on 1st November 2000 and after his speech of 27th November, 2000 when he twice said that he would enter into talks without preconditions. Then he declared a unilateral ceasefire which we were not able to respond to because we agreed with the Norwegian view, based on their global experience, that in our situation even a small step taken mutually is better than a unilateral step which takes the other side by surprise. 

But in fact there was an unofficial ceasefire in the first quarter of last year. In that quarter a lot of work was done on the humanitarian measures/ no sabotage memorandum of understanding or agreement. What went wrong, in my opinion, was that the LTTE raised a demand which had hitherto not been raised. That was the demand for de-proscription. With that the proposed memorandum or agreement which was very close to conclusion last April could not be concluded.

Q: You were ready but they were unwilling to commence peace talks. What is the reason for them now to agree? Will they say no again? What do you think?

A: It appears that the post-September 11 change in the global security situation may have some bearing on the LTTE's thinking. They may feel that the international climate is no longer conducive to the prolongation of the war.

Q: The armed forces have been unable to win the battle against the LTTE. A lot of blame is pinned on political interference, the lack of commitments from the Commander-in-Chief and massive corruption in the armed forces from top to bottom. Your comments on this?

A: On the question of political interference I must say that is not a fair comment at all because the Commander-in-Chief took all major decisions regarding the conduct of the war in close consultation with the National Security Council. The Commander-in-Chief chairs the National Security Council and all the Service Commanders were members of the Council. So was I. I must say that the conduct of the war was very much in the hands of the Service Commanders. On the question of corruption, I do not have any evidence. I cannot give you facts and figures. As a lawyer I am by disposition hesitant to make judgements without evidence. But I agree that there is a widely held perception, and President Kumaratunga herself has often said so, that corruption is rampant in the armed forces. If that be so it is a most regrettable state of affairs.

Q: What was done about it at that time? I mean, if she was aware of it or had notice about it.?

A: I think nothing, really, was done about it. Action should have been taken. The PA Government failed to do so. The people have delivered their verdict on the PA Government. Corruption is the scourge of our country. It is a plague on our country. The ramifications of corruption run deep in our society. I do not know what we can do about it. If the new Government can summon up the political will and courage to launch, and sustain to conviction, a few spectacular prosecutions against high level offenders, it would have a salutary deterrent effect that might help to haul us out of the mire into which we have fallen. If the new Government also fails to do so, I dread to contemplate the future of the country.

Q: Prabhakaran has blamed you by name as being responsible for branding them world wide as a terrorist organisation. They must be hating you.

A: I noticed that Mr. Prabhakaran's speech last November contained a complaint against the international community for having branded his organisation as a terrorist organisation whereas he claims that it is a national liberation movement. He refers to President Kumaratunga and me, but he uses the words "particularly Mr. Kadirgamar". I think this is an over reaction because I should not be given such a high degree of "credit" for the state of affairs of which he complains. What has happened in recent times is that there has been a general movement internationally against terrorism, against terrorist acts. Two important UN Conventions were adopted in 1998 and 1999 and national laws on terrorism have been enacted in some western countries. A single person could not have produced the state of affairs of which Mr. Prabhakaran complains. That is definitely an over statement. But I certainly argued the case for our country in public forums. That was my duty, and I did my duty. As to whether he hates me or not, I suppose he probably does! I understand from competent analysts of his speeches that when he makes a hostile reference to a person by name, it is akin to the pronouncement of a death sentence. So be it. 

Q: He is showing all that hatred towards you - do you see it that way?

A: So it would appear. He sees me as having been in the forefront of the campaign of which he complains. That, of course, is a very serious matter for my own security.

Q: Some people here want you to return your vehicles and have your security withdrawn. The Foreign Ministry wants you to return your cars and even your furniture. What is the position regarding that?

A: The position is that the Prime Minister himself has expressly directed, without any solicitation on my part, that I am to remain in occupation of the official residence which I occupied as a Minister and that all my security arrangements are to remain intact. When I was a Minister my security arrangements were complex. In order to carry out effective security measures, especially on the road, a fair number of vehicles were required for the purpose of working out strategies to thwart suicide bombers. 

I do not think I should say more than that. The lives of the brave soldiers who share my risks should not be needlessly put in jeopardy. The Prime Minister understands this. 

He understands the severity of the threat to my life. I want to say that these vehicles are not for my pleasure or fun. I am not allowed more than three or four outings a week. 

Over the last seven years I have attended only one wedding and two funerals, and no private social functions at all. Even my public functions are severely curtailed. In some quarters, this situation appears either not to be understood or deliberately ignored. But from the large number of messages I have received from members of the public, many unknown to me, expressing concern for my safety I can see that the public at large seems to understand the situation. 

Q: So basically, you will not be returning the vehicles ?

A: On my own initiative, soon after I ceased to hold office, I returned to the Foreign Ministry a number of vehicles which the security personnel decided could be dispersed with. There is now a "basic irreducible minimum" according to the security personnel. These vehicles cannot be returned because they are an indispensable part of the security arrangements which the Prime Minister clearly wishes should not be disturbed.

Q: Are you optimistic about the success of the peace process?

A: I am optimistic that the peace process will start, that the LTTE will commence talks. I hope very much that the cessation of hostilities which is not yet mutually agreed - it is a situation where both parties have separately declared a cessation of hostilities will be the subject of a formal agreement including monitoring by foreign monitors. Then my hope is that the agreement will continue without a break down. The longer it continues the better will be the prospects for an irreversible process of negotiation. But on the major substantive issues, I am not sure what the outcome will be. 

Some distance down the road the country will have to face up to the big questions about the structure of the State, the merger of the North and the East, the place of the armed services in these areas, and many other questions on which strong views are held by different segments of our society. 

That is why I say that if the cessation of hostilities holds then we could reach a state of affairs where some of these problems might become easier to resolve. One final word, the Government must be alert, circumspect and sensitive to public concerns about security. Going too far too soon has its dangers.