Reconstruction
aid from Oslo
The hopes and expecta- tions of the govern ment are that the
talks in Oslo would bring in substantial aid for the reconstruction
of the North and the East. How much of aid will the country get and
on what conditions? These aid talks are different to previous aid
parleys. It is especially focused on aid for reconstruction. Therefore
the aid would no doubt rest on the donor perception of the durability
of the peace. Donors have said many a time that they require evidence
of a durable peace to dole out any significant amounts of aid. The
presence of the LTTE at the talks is no doubt the means of obtaining
assurances that a peace settlement is possible and that there would
be no return to terrorism. A peace settlement would require an acceptable
constitutional arrangement within a unitary state and a democratic
framework. Otherwise the large majority of people in the country,
who must agree to the arrangement, will not accept the settlement.
The donors
are fully aware of this and have a right to insist on assurances
from the LTTE that these fundamental conditions are met. A basic
constitutional framework acceptable to all is vital to ensure that
a durable peace can be achieved. The Oslo talks may not come to
much in terms of aid unless such assurances convince the donors.
There is of
course another possible scenario. The government and LTTE could
give certain assurances to the donor community. They may accept
these as adequate evidence of the peace process leading to a durable
settlement. The Norwegians articulated such a position after the
first round of talks. If this approach were accepted it would be
a new position among the donors. Even if this were to happen, it
is most likely that the aid donors would commit only some part of
the funds and await more evidence of a durable peace to release
their full commitment of aid funds.
There are two
pertinent issues that require to be clarified. First, there are
misgivings about the aid the Oslo conference expects to obtain.
There is an unfounded fear that a large amount of aid to the North
and East would tip the process of economic development in favour
of this area and against the other areas of the country. Let us
be quite clear that the aid is specifically for reconstruction of
the devastated areas. There can be no doubt that the scale of destruction
in the North and East over two decades requires massive amounts
of funds. Such financial resources cannot be mobilised locally especially
in the current dire economic context. That such reconstruction is
absolutely necessary can hardly be denied. Assistance for economic
development in other areas of the country would be on another basis.
There should be no fears that the aid commitments would seriously
erode aid commitments for the country in general.
These fears
must be tempered with the realisation that the reconstruction of
the North would have beneficial ripple effects on the economy of
the country as a whole. One of the immediate effects of the aid
flows would be to improve the balance of payments position. The
reconstruction would lead to an increased demand of materials produced
in other parts of the country. There would also be increased employment
opportunities throughout the country. Therefore the reconstruction
of the North would be of benefit to the entire country. Further
such reconstruction would be a means of ensuring the durability
and sustainability of peaceful conditions. An issue relevant to
the discussion is the utilisation of aid.
Over many decades
the country has experienced a low level of aid utilisation. While
successive governments celebrate obtaining large aid commitments,
the country has in fact been able to utilise only a small fraction
of the aid commitments. The exception was the utilisation of the
aid for the Accelerated Mahaweli project. Therefore in as far as
parts of the country are concerned they could have benefited much
more from aid flows had the institutional capacity and administration
of projects been efficient.
There are two
implications arising from this experience. One is the need for government
machinery to be improved to achieve a much higher level of aid utilisation.
The other is the need to have effective machinery for the utilisation
of aid for reconstruction. Otherwise the aid from Oslo would have
little effect either on the reconstruction or on the economy as
a whole.
One possible
problem is that conflicts between the LTTE and the government may
seriously jeopardise the effective and timely use of aid. Foreign
assistance on a large scale is absolutely necessary to reconstruct
the North and East.
We hope the
earlier pronouncements of governments that such assistance would
be given would materialise in Oslo. In fairness to the donors they
would need strong evidence that a durable peace is in sight. We
also hope that the donors would insist that the LTTE accept a reasonable
and just solution within a democratic unitary constitution.
Those fearful
of thinking that the aid commitments for the North would affect
the rest of the country are indeed taking a narrow and myopic view
of the economy.
The reconstruction
of the North would have definite beneficial impacts on the rest
of the country. The capacity to utilise the aid obtained in Oslo
is as important as the aid that would be promised.
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