Securing
judicial independence from one another
This week's public revolt by members of the minor judiciary
against Chief Justice Sarath Nanda Silva and members of the Judicial
Services Commission (JSC), underscores the continuing troubled nature
of the institution of the judiciary in this country. The judges have
protested to the Supreme Court over what they allege was a calculated
attempt by the Chief Justice to thwart the holding of the 60th Annual
General Meeting of the Judicial Services Association in the country.
While it is
not the intention of this columnist to comment on the merits of
the pending fundamental petitions filed by the President and Secretary
of the Judicial Services Association of Sri Lanka (JSASL), it is,
however, highly relevant to focus on general issues that have arisen
regarding the institution of the judiciary both here and elsewhere
as a result of these applications.
The President
and the Secretary of the JSASL allege that their rights to equality,
freedom of speech, assembly, association and the freedom by them
or in association with others, to enjoy and promote their own culture
and use their own language have been violated by particular actions
of the Chief Justice (and the other members of the Judicial Services
Commission).
These include
the failure of the JSC to convene the annual conference in the name
of the JSC and failure to take steps to grant duty leave, subsistence
and travelling allowance to judges in order to enable them to attend
the conference. In addition, the JSC is accused of organising a
rival seminar to coincide with the annual conference, granting duty
leave for the participants of the rival seminar, making it compulsory
for all members to attend the hastily arranged rival seminar and
effectively preventing judges from attending the annual conference
of the JSASL.
The petitioners
specifically allege malice on the part of the Chief Justice in all
these actions. They claim that the reason for such was that the
JSASL (under the aegis of its present office bearers), had passed
a resolution at a committee meeting on 26.1.2002, condemning the
act of the Chief Justice in employing the services of an underworld
criminal as the caretaker of the Judges Institute, which the JSASL
considered to have been a blow to the reputation and esteem of the
judicial officers of the country.
Hearing into
the petitions is pending before a three member bench of the Supreme
Court. Three intervenient petitions have meanwhile been filed by
three other members of the executive committee of the JSAL opposing
the rights petitions.
So, the question
becomes relevant; what are judges to do when the institution of
the judiciary comes under attack within that institution itself
as opposed to external influences? This is a debate that revolves
around a somewhat ignored facet of the independence of the judiciary;
the importance of being independent from one another. This is particularly
so where the appellate judiciary is concerned with reference to
the minor judiciary and is a principle that would be equally relevant
whether it concerns the official functions of minor judges or the
holding of their annual meetings which is a vital part of the nature
of their office.
The former
was notably in issue recently when directions were given by the
Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago prohibiting a particular judge
of the High Court from sitting on the Bench. These directions were
challenged before the Court of Appeal and finally the Privy Council,
with reference to the specific constitutional context of that country.
The Privy Council, upholding a decision of the majority of the Court
of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago, concluded that the Chief Justice
had no power to suspend or remove the judge from office except through
the procedure provided by the Constitution. (Rees v Crane [1994]
2 AC 173).
It was ruled
that the Chief Justice's power to organise the procedure and sittings
of the courts did not run so far as to exclude a particular judge
from participation in the roster without affording him his constitutional
and statutory protections and a fair hearing. Such actions were
not within the Chief Justice's legal competence.
The judges'
protest also puts into focus, in the second instance, particular
remarks made by United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence
of the Judiciary, Dato Param Coomaraswamy, during a 1996 law conference
in Colombo.
Coomaraswamy's
point regarding the independence of the judiciary was that the right
to an independent justice system is not that of the judges or lawyers.
It is not a legal slogan to enhance the images of judges or lawyers.
Instead, it is a right of all consumers of justice. And is indeed,
a right, protective of all other human rights.
Proceeding
from this fundamental premise, Coomaraswamy went on to hold out
a new standard for judges, traditionally isolated in their Olympian
splendour from public debate and opinion.
His thinking
was that judges should not fold their arms and sit in their chambers,
expecting others to do their bidding in respect of fundamental questions
concerning the independence of the judiciary.
In this respect,
he cited recent happenings in countries around the world where judges
have come out openly on issues concerning the institution of the
judiciary. In the South Asian sub-continent, both India and Pakistan
have been noted by discussions initiated, in certain instances,
by judges themselves on streamlining the manner of judicial appointments.
Some of these discussions have been taken before the courts, resulting
(in India at least) in the formal constitutional protection given
to judges in respect of their appointments, being further clarified
and strengthened from interference by the executive.
In the United
Kingdom, following executive criticism of the judiciary over decisions
on applications for judicial review, the House of Lords, at that
time, discussed a motion on judicial independence. Prominent English
judges, both sitting and retired, participated in the five hour
debate which exhaustively discussed the relationship between the
judiciary, the legislature and the executive.
These debates,
in fact, formed part of a larger push for greater formal insulation
of the institution of the judiciary from executive interference
even though the British judiciary had traditionally distinguished
itself by a jealous preservation of its independence and integrity.
Australia similarly,
has seen minor judges sitting on the Accident Compensation Tribunal
suing the State government for compensation for loss of office when
the government legislated them out of office by repealing the entire
legislation creating the tribunal, arguing that when they accepted
the appointment, they were assured of their security of tenure.
In Canada, provincial judges have appeared as litigants in cases
concerning security of tenure and independence of the judges of
the lower courts. The principle therefore that judges should avail
themselves of the constitutional protections afforded to citizens
in general is well established.
Regardless,
the petitions of the office bearers of the JSASL (and the intervenient
petitions) will undoubtedly re focus attention on the institution
of the judiciary in Sri Lanka, already under a considerable cloud
in the eyes of the public. The news item in a daily paper this week
announcing the hearing of the petitions under the heading "Judges
vs Judges in case against CJ" is particularly pungent in this
regard. The drama, it appears, is yet not over.
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