HSZ
issue: who caused the blunder?
The
United National Front (UNF) Government this week embarked on emergency
damage control over the increasingly contentious issue of the High
Security Zones (HSZ) in the Jaffna peninsula - a controversy generated
entirely due to a bureaucratic bungle and lack of foresight.
Balasinghams
statement on Tamilnet
Detailed
discussion on core issues cannot be undertaken when hundreds
of thousands of Tamil people remain unable to return to their
homes, says Anton Balasingham, LTTE Chief Negotiator, in an
interview with Tamilnet website on December 29.
Here
is the text: "The resettlement of displaced Tamil people
and the normalisation of conditions in their areas of residence
will be the main issues to be taken up at the negotiations
in Thailand between the Liberation Tigers and the Sri Lankan
government, the LTTE's chief negotiator, Mr. Anton Balasingham,
said Sunday.
"Speaking
to Tamilnet Sunday, Mr. Balasingham said that the Sri Lanka
Army's (SLA) refusal to vacate the homes of hundreds of thousands
of people in defiance of the cease-fire agreement and subsequent
commitments made by the Colombo government had rendered the
Sub-Committee on De-escalation and Normalisation (SDN) defunct.
"The
SLA position was thereby also an impediment to the functioning
of the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation
Needs (SIHRN), he said.
"As
such, the issues of resettlement, de-escalation and normalisation
would be taken up at the direct talks between the government
and the LTTE, Mr. Balasingham told TamilNet.
"The
severe existential problems of the Tamil people remain outstanding",
Mr. Balasingham said.
"The
peace process has proceeded smoothly and much progress has
been made," he pointed out. "The agreements reached
by both parties on immediate humanitarian issues are however
yet to be implemented.
"Detailed
discussion on core issues cannot be undertaken when hundreds
of thousands of Tamil people remain unable to return to their
homes," Mr. Balasingham said, adding "the resettlement
and rehabilitation of the displaced (people) are the urgent
cardinal issue of the day."
"As
such, the Sri Lanka Army's hard-line attitude towards the
difficulties faced by the Tamil people, which has regrettably
been supported by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission is unacceptable,"
he said further.
"The
SLA said last week that it would not permit resettlement of
hundreds of thousands of people whose homes now come within
its High Security Zones unless the LTTE agreed to the "disarming
of (its) cadres and decommission of (its) long range weapons."
"When
asked about press reports he had discussed these matters with
the head of the SLMM, Maj. Gen. Furuhovde, Mr. Balasingham
said he had not spoken to the SLMM. Sri Lanka's state-owned
Sunday Observer claimed this week that Mr. Balasingham had
on Friday "personally telephoned (Furuhovde) from London
and assured him."
"The
fourth round of direct talks between the LTTE and the Sri
Lankan government are to be held in Bangkok from January 6
to 9.
"Queried
about press reports that the SLMM is arranging a meeting of
the SDN, comprising senior officers of the SLA and LTTE commanders,
at Muhamalai before the talks in Thailand, Mr. Balasingham
responded negatively, saying, "such a meeting may not
materialize".
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It was LTTE's
"Eastern Commander," Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias
Karuna, who sounded a warning at the December 14 meeting of the
SDN (Sub Committee on De-escalation and Normalisation) that his
leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, wanted the HSZ vacated for re-settlement
of civilians without delay. He threatened that the LTTE would not
take part in future SDN meetings.
With an assurance
made that Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka,
would forward proposals within a week, the leader of the Government
delegation Defence Secretary Austin Fernando, deliberated during
the next two days with senior Security Forces officials on what
they should be. Later, all of them met Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe
at "Temple Trees" on December 17. In as much as he was
conscious that the issue of re-settling internally displaced persons
was essential for normalisation, Premier Wickremesinghe, was equally
conscious that such a process in the High Security Zones would have
to take into consideration the national security interests. He acknowledged
military viewpoints in this regard and agreed to the formulation
of a plan that balanced normalisation with de-escalation of high
security. The formulation of that concept in the form of a series
of proposals was placed in the hands of Maj. Gen. Fonseka. Having
set the policy guidelines, Premier Wickremesinghe was off on a working
holiday to Singapore. Like him, other UNF
leaders, the
Colombo based diplomatic community, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) and others, all backing the peace process were aghast
at the events that followed in the days thereafter. As the second
year in the new millennium, one without war in the battlefields
gave way to a third, a war of words had erupted to embroil the UNF
Government and the LTTE - the first major battle in the peace process.
This week,
senior UNF leaders agreed, it need not have happened. A costly and
colossal blunder could have been easily avoided. They conceded that
Maj. Gen. Fonseka's five page "De Escalation Plan" with
its annexure should not have been forwarded to the LTTE. One high-ranking
UNF source associated with the peace process, who spoke on grounds
of anonymity, told The Sunday Times "that was an internal document
that expressed the Army's viewpoints and concerns. Someone should
have 'sanitized' it before it went to the LTTE."
The remarks
not only underscored the seriousness of an official lapse but also
laid bare a glaring irregularity - the Government's negotiators
did not seem to know the psyche or mood of the former enemy with
whom they were now negotiating peace. Otherwise, it is inconceivable
that an official document from the UNF Government, besides the grammatical
errors, would have contained references to "terrorists"
after they de-proscribed the LTTE on September 4, last year.
That is not to
fault Maj. Gen. Fonseka for his proposals or conceding that Security
Forces capabilities are not 100 per cent superior to that of the
LTTE. As a soldier, that is his responsibility and he must be commended
for making a dispassionate, professional appraisal of the ground
situation. But, whose responsibility it was to "sanitize,"
or in other words re-formulate the proposals in acceptable jargon,
for discussion with the LTTE?
Premier Wickremesinghe,
who spelt out the policy guidelines, was away in Singapore. Defence
Minister Tilak Marapana, was on a visit to India. Minister of Economic
Reforms, Science and Technology Milinda Moragoda, was away in Japan.
It goes without saying that none of them would have allowed the
Army's "De-escalation Plan" to be forwarded to the LTTE
in that original format and thus place the peace talks in peril.
How did it
happen then? As revealed in The Sunday Times last week, from Maj.
Gen. Fonseka, the plan went to Defence Secretary Fernando. He approved
it. Thereafter, in the absence of Norwegian Ambassador Jon Westborg,
it was handed over to Maj. Gen.(retd.) Trond Furuhovde, head of
SLMM for onward transmission to the LTTE. To his credit, Gen. Furuhovde,
keen to ensure that the tone and content of the plan did not become
an irritant in Government-LTTE relations, double-checked it with
Mr. Fernando. The Sunday Times learnt that if he could not persuade
to keep back the entire plan for a re-appraisal, whether the annexure
"A" (Summary of de-escalation proposals in relation to
re-settlement in HSZs) should be held over. The answer was in the
affirmative.
He wanted the
plan to be forwarded in that very format. The action of the Defence
Secretary and what followed is now history. It has not only embarrassed
the United National Front acutely but led to ill-founded fears that
the Government was on a collision course with the Army. Wild claims
were made that the UNF had no control over the Army and they were
acting differently. Colombo based diplomats raised questions on
the future of the peace process and why the Army was allowed to
take a position that seemed counter to Government's goals of peace.
A lack of foresight by one official had placed the Government's
peace process in danger, drawn accusations against the Army and
caused anxiety among those backing the peace process.
The LTTE singled
out the Army and charged it was "imposing unacceptable and
unrealistic conditions" to disrupt the peace process. They
felt insulted by the response. The most worrying impact is on tomorrow's
resumed peace talks in the Rose Garden resort at Nakorn Pathom in
Thailand.
If the Government
wanted to focus on core issues and human rights, as their Chief
Negotiator, Prof. G.L. Peiris declared, his LTTE counterpart, Anton
Balasingham made clear that would not happen in the next three days
of talks.
The Tamilnet
website quoted him saying in an interview that "the re-settlement
of displaced Tamil people and the normalisation of conditions in
their areas of residence will be the main issues to be taken up
at the negotiations in Thailand next month between Liberation Tigers
and the Sri Lankan Government
" He was also quoted saying
"detailed discussion on core issues cannot be undertaken when
hundreds of thousands of Tamil people remain unable to return to
their homes." See box story for the Tamilnet interview.
Little wonder,
Premier Wickremesinghe, who returned from Singapore last Thursday,
was angry at the media publicity Maj. Gen. Fonseka's plan had generated.
The London based Tamil Guardian newspaper not only published the
plan in full but also chided it for the grammatical errors. It was
also grist to the mill to those who opposed the Government's peace
initiatives and the opposition media. They seized the opportunity
to drive the point home that the Government and the Army were on
a collision course on the issue of High Security Zones.
Referring to
media reports Mr Wickremesinghe told a conference of military and
Government officials at "Temple Trees" on Thursday, there
was no need to go public on such issues. He was compelled to rebuke
Defence Secretary Fernando for his latest remarks at a press conference
on January 1 when the controversial Defence Review Committee headed
by him launched a website.
Though Mr.
Fernando began a news conference on that occasion by saying he would
only answer questions relating to that event, he readily went on
to reply to questions put to him on a variety of other issues. To
one such question, he said that Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, Security
Forces Commander, Jaffna, would not be transferred "just because
someone requests him to do so." He added "We have not
received any letter from any politician or anyone else requesting
Gen. Fonseka to be transferred from the North
." He was
alluding to a public statement by Hindu Religious Affairs Minister,
T. Maheswaran, demanding the withdrawal of Maj. Gen. Fonseka from
Jaffna.
Premier Wickremesinghe
felt that the prerogative of effecting transfers of the Army's sector
commanders belonged to the Commander of the Army. Hence, there was
no need for Mr. Fernando to make public declarations on such matters.
Even before
the Prime Minister returned to Sri Lanka, the furore over the HSZ
issue had drawn his attention. So much so, he asked to see and met
Minister Milinda Moragoda in Singapore, when he was en route to
Colombo from Tokyo. There he advised him to take damage control
measures no sooner he returned to Colombo. That included the task
of keeping President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga informed
of developments that had taken place.
Upon learning
that President Kumaratunga was out of Colombo, Mr. Moragoda had
a meeting with her international affairs advisor and former Foreign
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. There he briefed the latter on how
Maj. Gen. Fonseka's "De-escalation Plan" came to be formulated.
The Sunday Times learnt Mr. Moragoda was frank enough to admit it
was a mistake on the part of the Government to have sent the full
text of that plan to the LTTE. He was of the view the proposals
contained in that plan should have been re-formulated and sent for
detailed discussion since there were many options available. He
is learnt to have expressed the view that the UNF felt issues related
to the HSZ could be resolved.
On Friday evening,
Premier Wickremesinghe together with Ministers Tilak Marapana and
Milinda Moragoda, held a near 90-minute meeting with President Kumaratunga
at Janadipathi Mandiraya. There they briefed her on the issues coming
up at tomorrow's peace talks.
Following up
on Premier Wickremesinghe's Singapore meeting, Mr. Moragoda flew
with the Commanders of the Army (Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle) and
Air Force (Air Marshal Donald Perera) to Jaffna last Tuesday to
make an on the spot study of the HSZs. This is with a view to presenting
the UNF's position on the matter at tomorrow's talks.
He is likely
to announce that the Army would make immediate withdrawals from
the Jaffna town area from two hotels and some 80 houses. This, however,
also entails the resolving of some knotty issues like the acquisition
of land (in the Jaffna peninsula) to re-locate the Army and providing
accommodation for them.
The possibility
of obtaining pre-fabricated construction units under an Indian credit
line for this purpose is also being examined. In addition, the Government
is also to release an estimated 700 houses that lay immediately
outside the HSZ for immediate re-settlement of civilians. After
a top-level conference at the SF Headquarters in Palaly, Mr. Moragoda
and the military team also paid a call on the Bishop of Jaffna,
Rev. Thomas Savundranayagam. He is learnt to have told them that
the HSZ affected the re-settlement of displaced families now living
under very difficult conditions. The Commander of the Navy, Daya
Sandagiri, was conspicuous by his absence in Mr. Moragoda's team
to Jaffna last week, particularly in view of the concerns the Navy
has expressed over Maj. Gen. Fonseka's offer to hand over two areas
in the HSZ to Tiger guerrillas subject to conditions - one west
of Keerimalai and the other at Kovilkandy.
The Navy, The
Sunday Times learns, has expressed reservations about the offer
of the area west of Keerimalai and has said Maj. Gen. Fonseka, as
Security Forces Commander, had not consulted his Naval counterpart
in the Jaffna peninsula to obtain his views before incorporating
them in the "De-escalation Plan."
Vice Admiral
Sandagiri held a meeting last Tuesday with President Kumaratunga
to brief her on his New Year's eve visit to New Delhi for a meeting
with his Indian counterparts. The Sunday Times learnt Indian Naval
authorities showed Vice Admiral Sandagiri photographs and other
evidence of the vessel "MV Koimar," that was located transporting
ammunition and fuel for the LTTE in the deep seas off the north
eastern Coast of Sri Lanka last month. Sri Lanka Navy sources said
an arrangement to ensure closer co-operation between Sri Lankan
and Indian Navy patrols in the deep seas have now been formulated
but declined to divulge details for reasons of secrecy.
Navy patrols
in the north-eastern seas intensified since the mystery ship was
located have reported another find on December 29, last year. According
to a report reaching Navy Headquarters, a Navy patrol had observed
the flight of an unidentified light aircraft on that day between
11 p.m. and midnight one mile off the shore between Chalai and Mullaitivu.
It had been
observed on two occasions though it is not clear whether they were
two light aircraft or a single one making a return journey. The
Navy has forwarded its report to Air Force Headquarters. The tussle
over the HSZ also caused panic in Government circles on Thursday
when news arrived that the LTTE team from the Wanni, wanting to
travel to Thailand, were apprehensive to arrive in Colombo due to
security considerations. Fears had been heightened after Maj. Gen.
Fonseka's proposals and the resultant worry that the Army was hostile.
Norway's Ambassador to Colombo, Jon Westborg, who was in touch with
the LTTE and Government leaders, ensured some security guarantees
sought by the LTTE. Thereafter, a delegation comprising Tamil Selvam,
the Political Wing Leader and Karuna, "Eastern Commander,"
arrived in Colombo on Friday night by a Sri Lanka Air Force helicopter.
They later boarded a Bangkok bound flight.
The New Year's
eve drama over the HSZ between the UNF Government and the LTTE reminds
one of the seven years of separatist war during the People's Alliance
Government. Then, many blamed the incompetence of generals and politicians,
at least one of them who claimed to be both, for accountability
and accused then Government of inaction over their incompetence.
And now, under the United Front Government, that has waged a peace
offensive, it is a case of the ineptitude of incompetent bureaucrats.
Like the incompetent generals and blundering politicians during
a war, inefficient and incompetent bureaucrats can cause great harm
to a peace process. That is if UNF continues to ignore accountability
that by itself has already caused considerable embarrassment not
to mention the colossal damage.
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