With that credible information on hand, the Commander of the Navy Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, was busy last Wednesday morning (January 5) planning a top secret operation to bust the latest Tiger guerrilla attempt. He spoke on secure communication lines to his top men in the North and East - Rear Admiral Nandana Thuduwewatte, Commander Northern Naval Area (COMNORTH) and Rear Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, Commander Eastern Naval Area (COMEAST).

Within hours, Naval craft had taken up position off key north-eastern coastal points where Sea Tigers are usually busy. Two Fast Gun Boats (FGBs) moved into deep seas, some 50 nautical miles off Mullaitivu. Two more, together with two Fast Attack Craft (FACs) took up position off Ilanthanai near Vakarai. Another two FACs moved into the deep seas off Alampil. These deployments were in addition to "Operation Waruna Kirana" - the permanent Naval blockade off the north-east coast.

Vice Admiral Sandagiri had also contacted his two colleagues - Air Force Commander Air Vice Marshal Donald Perera and Army Commander Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle.

AVM Perera had ordered SLAF's newly acquired US surveillance aircraft to scour the skies over north-eastern seas. The malfunctioning of radar initially delayed take-off. However, Naval authorities were happy the Indian Navy which had been tracking the ship had obtained their own aerial surveillance. The Army was told to stand by for any ground support role including security if there was a requirement to bring the captured ship or other loaded vessels to Colombo.

At Sri Lanka Navy's base at Rangala in Colombo, SLNS "Sayura," the Indian built Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV), with a capability for an on board helicopter, was preparing to sail to Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. It was scheduled to leave yesterday (February 8) to take part in Milan 2003- a joint exercise conducted annually by the Indian Navy. Besides Sri Lanka, the Navies of Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Burma are to take part in this annual event.

"Sayura" changed plans, armed itself adequately and sailed towards the location where the LTTE ship was moving around, tracked unobtrusively by the Indian Navy. By Wednesday night, information had arrived in Colombo that at least three trawlers had been loaded with military hardware from the ship. They were to head for the north-eastern shores mingling around with fishing craft.

Late last year, the Sri Lanka Navy had problems apprehending the very last LTTE ship carrying military hardware (Situation Report - Decemeber 15 and December 22). The move prompted Vice Admiral Sandagiri to fly to New Delhi last New Year's eve to discuss close co-operation with his Indian counterparts to combat weapons smuggling. This time, Vice Admiral Sandagiri did not want anything to go wrong during his top-secret operation.

But by Thursday morning, his ambitious operation had been torpedoed. Someone had leaked details of what was going on. Early Thursday morning, the reporter of a vernacular daily was inquiring on the telephone from Naval authorities in Trincomalee and Kankesanthurai whether the "LTTE arms ship" had already been rounded up. Later in the day, the story spread to electronic media.

A political media boss took it upon himself to give official advice on how the media should project the story. They did on Thursday night and the following day. And that was all the Sri Lanka Navy and the nation knew about the latest Tiger guerrilla weapons ship. It had disappeared.

Since World War II, irritants in media-military relations over reportage in conflict zones world over has narrowed down immensely largely due to the growing technological revolution. But one sacred tenet, however, has remained unchanged by this transformation. That is the inevitable media commitment not to report on any impending operation. Such reportage not only serves as intelligence to the enemy but also endangers lives of own troops not to mention the disastrous effect it has on the operation itself. In other words such an act amounts to treachery. Here is a case of such a leak of highly damaging information being given official credence and broader exposure.

The episode, however, was not over. A related event on Wednesday had its bearing. Two trawlers were heading from a Sea Tiger base near Mullaitivu towards the ship loaded with military hardware for a mid-sea transfer of cargo One developed engine trouble. The Sea Tiger base sent another boat to rescue the disabled trawler. This boat was towing the trawler when the Sri Lanka Navy, off the island of Delft, intercepted it at 2 p.m. last Thursday (February 6). The event is better explained in an official account Navy Headquarters received from COMNORTH in Kankesanthu-rai:

"P 492 on patrol detected an LTTE boat fitted with 02 X 200 HP OBMS (horsepower out board motors) with 12 LTTE cadres (10 X males and 2 female) in civil towing a trawler with 03 persons approximately 03 NMs (nautical miles) south of Delft 1400 today and intercepted.

"(2) SLMM informed and directed to the location in P 497 and P 475 despatched for assistance P 492.

"(3) LTTE boat with trawler brought to South of Delft anchorage due rough seas approximately 1545 hrs for search by SLN (Sri Lanka Navy) and SLMM (Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission). SLN boarded LTTE boat with SLMM for combined search and due LTTE protest carried out search without SLN presence.

"(4) Search of LTTE boat revealed no weapons, ammo or explosive. On the advice of SLMM, LTTE boats released approximately 1700 hrs.

"(5) Search of trawler revealed no suspicious items on board. LTTE claimed ownership of trawler and 03 persons to be their fishermen. On the insistence of SLN for further search in engine room/bridges/compartments/hatches of the trawler. Another member of SLMM brought to location approximately 1830 hours.

"(6) On arrival location second member of SLMM received instructions not to board trawler by SLMM Headquarters in Colombo. When attempted boarding by SLN, LTTE stated they would commit suicide if boarded by SLN.

"(7) Matter informed to COMNAV (Commander, Navy) 2000 hours and instructions received to continue on main task assigned previously while keeping two FAC in location pending instruction from higher authorities regarding trawler."

It is clear, both from the above message and the sequence of events that the Sri Lanka Navy has been acting with great restraint. After releasing the boat with 12 Tiger cadres when SLMM members said nothing incriminating was found, they were holding the trawler for further search of the inner areas - engine room, hatches etc. Since the SLMM had been ordered not to board the trawler, COMNORTH was awaiting further instructions from Colombo. If the trawler (and the boat that towed it) were detected at 2 p.m. on Thursday, it was now 8 p.m. - six long hours - when they sought further instructions. Navy Headquarters had advised them to continue the main task - tracking other trawlers that may be bringing in military hardware from the ship in deep seas - whilst awaiting further orders.

Furthermore, what the Navy had detected near Delft islands was an unauthorised move - a contravention of the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and the LTTE. In addition, the Navy also could have arrested the first boat since it had two 200 horsepower outboard motors. Only OBMs below 15 horsepower are allowed by the Navy. The LTTE is fully aware of this requirement. Peace talks were underway in Berlin and the Navy, by acting with restraint, wanted to avoid being blamed for any disruption.

Whilst the Navy in the north were awaiting orders, late on Thursday night, another significant development since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement on February 22, last year, was taking place. That was 18 hours after Navy men had placed a seige on the trawler. President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, who is Commander-in-Chief had for the first time been personally monitoring the developments from President's House.

The hotline at Defence Minister Tilak Marapana's official residence at Stanmore Crescent rang. It was President Kumaratunga urging him to order the Navy to board the trawler and take appropriate action. Minister Marapana, who was equally concerned about the developing situation, explained it was a delicate situation since peace talks had already commenced in Berlin when President Kumaratunga had asserted that she could, as Commander-in-Chief order the Commander of the Navy into immediate action. Whilst endorsing the need for action, one source said, Mr. Marapana had responded that he needed time to clarify some matters. He had assured that President Kumaratunga's concerns would be addressed no sooner it was done. When the lengthy telephone conversation had ended, UNF leaders were making contacts with their delegation to the peace talks in Berlin.

The Sunday Times learnt UNF delegation leader, Prof. G.L. Peiris, raised issue over the matter with his LTTE counterpart, Anton Balasingham. He had apprised him on the developments connected with the Navy detection off Delft and the action they had proposed to take. According to authoritative sources, Dr. Balasingham had objected to Navy boarding the LTTE trawler to conduct any search - the same position taken up by the Tiger guerrilla cadres on board the same vessel. He had, however, agreed that members of the SLMM could board the vessel and conduct a search.

According to the same source, that led to Norwegian faciltitation team member Erik Solheim telephone Gen. (retd.) Trond Furuhovde, the outgoing head of the SLMM, to convey the decision that their members could conduct a search on the trawler. The news had arrived near midnight Thursday. The following morning (Friday), Naval authorities as well as the LTTE, had been informed of the move.

In a significant move, by Friday morning, President Kumaratunga, for the first time took the bold step of issuing written instructions to Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri asking him to carry out the following:

Take into custody all weapons/ammunition and military sensitive equipment, together with the boats.

In view of the ongoing peace talks, Tiger guerrillas aboard to be released after written assurances are obtained that they will not engage in activities that violate the Ceasefire Agreement or the laws of the land.

In a letter she wrote later on Friday to Mr. Marapana, she enclosed a copy of these instructions.

It was around 7 am Friday when two SLMM monitors - Per Sander Skavik and Sverein Loesnes - decided to board the trawler and carry out a search. Later, Navy Headquarters received a message from COMNORTH that said:

"Instructions received by SLMM representatives on board from their higher authorities through Jaffna HQ to board trawler and carry out search. SLMM representatives boarded trawler first light and reported presence of warlike materials hidden in bottom compartment. When SLN attempted to board LTTE stated they would set fire to the trawler and commit suicide.

"(2) Situation briefed to COMNAV (Commander, Navy) and awaiting instructions.

"(3) Items on board as per SLMM representatives include:

1. 1 X 23 mm Breech Block

2. 1 X 23 mm Barrel

3. 2 X boxes 23 mm Ammo

4. 1 X AK 47 rifle

5. 3 X hand Grenades

6. Some spare parts/links

7. 1 Comset"

It became clear that the trawler had left the north-eastern shores well prepared to bring in a part of the military hardware. According to intelligence sources, it was standard operational procedure for the trawlers to carry a 23 mm gun, one that is used for anti-aircraft fire. This was for use if they came under air attack.

After SLMM monitors reported the discovery of "warlike material" to COMNORTH, another controversy now erupted. The Sunday Times learnt the Navy's Northern Naval Area Commander, Rear Admiral Nandana Tuduwewatte, ordered his men to seize the warlike material. He had said the SLMM monitors could take custody of the three men on board the trawler and hand them over to the Police.

When the SLMM men on board the trawler moved in to hand over the material to the Navy men on a patrol boat, the guerrillas aboard warned they would commit suicide. The stand off led to COMNORTH seeking covering approval from Vice Admiral Sandagiri to seize the weapons and hand over the guerrillas to SLMM to be turned over to the Police.

Vice Admiral Sandagiri in turn sought instructions from higher authorities. It was forenoon in Sri Lanka. Those taking part in the peace talks were still asleep and it was not morning in Berlin. Whilst responses from Berlin were being awaited, at 12.40 p.m. (local time) something most unexpected happened.

One of the Tiger guerrillas, injured in one leg, who was regularly speaking on a communications set, evidently to local leaders set fire to the trawler and shouted at the two monitors to jump over-board. They did and were rescued by the Navy later. Soon thereafter, he wore a suicide jacket that lay close by, called his two colleagues closer and detonated the explosive mechanism. Their bodies blew into pieces. The deceased Sea Tigers were identified as "Major" Sudhan (real name Krishnaswamy Sudheeeswaran), "Captain" Pothikudevan (real name Sivaganesha-moorthy Dayabaran) and"Captain" Anban (real name Rasiah Kuhathas).

Why did they commit suicide even before a response came from Berlin? Intelligence sources say the man who wore the suicide jacket received instructions from Sea Tiger leader Soosai to commit suicide. There was, however, no independent confirmation of this report yesterday.

A report forwarded by Navy Commander Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, to President Kumaratunga and Defence Minister Marapana among others sets out the sequence of events:

"Sri Lanka Navy Fast Attack Craft (FAC) deployed on a routine patrol to cover area South of Delft, have detected a suspicious trawler being towed by a LTTE Boat around 1400 hrs on 06th February 2003. On closing up, it was observed 10 male & 2 female were onboard the LTTE Boat and 03 male onboard the trawler for which they claimed the ownership.

"Several attempts by SLN to search the LTTE Boat in the presence of SLMM reps were failed. On the advice of SLMM the LTTE Boat with 12 LTTE cadres were released as SLMM assured/confirmed that no warlike material / munitions available onboard. However, SLMM could not carry out proper search of the trawler for which instruction from higher authorities were awaited.

"On AM 07th February 2003 the trawler was searched by SLMM since SLN was not allowed to board and found following warlike materials hidden in bottom compartment of the trawler.

1. 01 X 23mm Gun barrel

2. 01 X 23mm Gun breech block

3. 02 X 23mm Ammunition boxes

4. 01 X AK 47 Rifle

5. 03 X Hand Grenades

6. A few spare parts & links for 23 ammo

7. 01 X Communication set

"In view of the above SLN suggested that the trawler and the 03 crew be taken into custody under the law of the land. Whilst the negotiation was progressed the LTTE set fire to the trawler and 03 LTTE cadres onboard committed suicide by exploding themselves at 1240 hrs. 03 SLMM members managed to jump overboard and recovered by the SLN FAC."

The episode of the latest LTTE attempt to smuggle in military hardware is not yet over. But it makes one thing quite clear - since the Ceasefire Agreement of February 22 last year, the LTTE has been expanding their military capability. The Tiger guerrilla military strength that stood at 9000 during last year's ceasefire has now increased 17,000. That is with the exclusion of their "police" cadres. New shipment of military hardware is intended to enhance their capability and preparedness. And now the much publicised conscription of child cadres, though some UNF leaders refuse to believe, is not for fancy dress parades or concerts but for an expanding guerrilla Army. This message comes to the fore every time reports of new weapons shipments are spoken of.

What of the Security Forces? It is true billions of rupees have been saved with no war being fought. That is salutary. Should preparedness be sacrificed? The answers are becoming clearer every day.

It seems the LTTE is much in tune with Sun Tzu, the Chinese philosopher of more than 2500 years ago. What he said on tactics then ring true even today:

"The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

"To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it……..

"………….To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. Nor is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole empire says, "Well done!" True excellence is to plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and balk his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of quick ear.

"What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. But his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. For inasmuch as they are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world at large knows nothing of them, and he therefore wins no reputation for wisdom; and inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage.

"He wins battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

"Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position that makes defeat impossible and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy…."

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