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Shock and
anger greet SLMM proposals
The Sunday Times exclusive revelations
in Situation Report and the front page lead story last week - proposals
by truce monitors to "recognize Sea Tigers as a de facto Naval
unit" of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and demarcate
areas for them at sea for "live firing exercises" among
others - have had far reaching repercussions.
Although there
has been no official response from the United National Front Government
so far, it has nevertheless caused concern in its ranks. Opposition
parties have raised strong protests. Deeply concerned that the proposals
would impinge on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri
Lanka, those in Security Forces and Police have reacted with anger.
So did a vast section of the national media, the nation's citizenry
and Sri Lankan expatriate groups abroad. It raised concerns in the
Colombo based
diplomatic community too. Many missions who pledged support for
the ongoing peace process whilst re-iterating their commitment for
a united Sri Lanka were shocked. One area where worries were heightened
is in neighbouring India. The recognition of the LTTE Sea Tigers
as a legitimate Navy of a nameless country appears to have caused
serious concern. More so since the LTTE remains banned in India
and a proposal had come even before a negotiated peace settlement
was reached.
Soon after
The Sunday Times report appeared, India's
High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, Nirupam Sen, is learnt to have been
summoned to New Delhi by his Government for consultations. Reports
from the Indian capital spoke of discussions he held with senior
Ministers, high ranking Navy and other officials there. Diplomatic
missions of some Asian and Western Governments sought to ascertain
whether the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) proposals appearing
in The Sunday Times were in fact true.
They soon learnt they were.
But the most
important impact was on the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission itself.
If the proposals were made by Head of the SLMM, retired Norwegian
Major General Tryggve Teleffsen in the form of an Initial
Discussion Paper, it has now been withdrawn. An SLMM
press release on Friday night said "a second draft of proposals"
has been sent to the Parties and declared that the "final
composition of The Sri Lanka Armed Forces should be reached at the
Peace Talks."
This is the
direct outcome of the revelations made in The Sunday Times last
week. What the SLMM has now done is to provide both the Government
of Sri Lanka (through the Secretariat Co-ordinating the Peace Process
- SCOPP) and the LTTE with a new document also titled MEASURES TO
BE CONSIDERED FOR PREVENTING INCIDENTS BETWEEN THE SRI LANKA NAVY
(SLN) AND LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE) AT SEA. Though
it retains the dates mentioned in the previous document, the SLMM
second draft does not contain the highly controversial proposals
listed earlier. Nor is it formally titled as an Initial
Discussion Paper or bear the signature of Maj. Gen.
(retd) Teleffsen.
In the second
draft proposals submitted by the SLMM, they have omitted reference
contained in the first Initial Discussion Paper
of proposals to the Government to recognize the Sea Tigers as a
naval force. As to why in the first instance these proposals were
presented is not clear. The SLMM has also withdrawn their proposal
that the Government and the LTTE "should permit
observers from the other Party onboard their vessels whilst conducting
exercises and training." This is in addition
to withdrawal of a number of other proposals listed in these columns
last week (See Situation Report - April
20). The Initial Discussion Paper that
gave cause to a national debate, now raging, is not official any
more.
However, there
are still two contentious issues though the SLMM cannot be blamed
at all for making them. They are "Proposed Measures" by
the SLMM that says:
* OFFENSIVE
NAVAL OPERATIONS: Neither party shall conduct offensive or aggressive
operations at sea.
In terms of
the February 22, 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, the provision dealing
with Offensive Naval Operations (1.3) states: "The Sri Lankan
armed forces shall continue to perform their legitimate task of
safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka
without engaging in offensive operations
against the LTTE."
Either through
an oversight or otherwise, the Government agreed to this provision
in the CFA that debars Sri Lanka Navy from "engaging in offensive
operations against the LTTE." This, however, does not cover
what the Navy terms "defensive operations." An example
cited is the Navy firing of an LTTE vessel "MV
Koimar" in the deep seas off Mullaitivu on March
10 (Situation Report - March 16). They
point out that the Navy retaliated in defence after they were fired
upon.
It is significant
to note that even in the Ceasefire Agreement, operations at sea
have been wrongly termed as "offensive naval operations."
In actual fact they are naval operations on the Sri Lanka Government
side whereas LTTE maneouvres are maritime operations. This confusion
has prevailed from the very beginning.
*
EXERCISE AND TRAINING AREAS: LTTE will conduct training and exercises
within a designated area at sea. LTTE vessels when at sea outside
such designated exercise area should not carry weapons or explosives
on board.
As reported
last week, the Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri,
had reacted angrily to the SLMM proposals. He had rejected the SLMM
proposal that "the Navy and the Sea Tigers should
have specific marked exercise and training areas at sea, designed
for navigation training and for live firing exercises as well…"
Here is Vice
Admiral Sandagiri's response: "Sea (Territorial
Waters, Contiguous Zone upto EEZ - Exclusive Economic Zone) is under
SLN control. No other party can be allowed to conduct military training
at sea since it is against the Constitution and sovereignty of the
country and article 1.3 of the CFA."
However, The
Sunday Times learnt that the Government has over-ruled
his objections on this matter. Instead, the Government, which responded
to the original SLMM Initial Discussion Paper,
though accepting all of Vice Admiral Sandagiri's other observations,
had agreed to allow LTTE to conduct training and exercises within
a designated area at sea. A SCOPP source who did not wish to be
named explained that the Government offer did not cover live firing
exercises and no mention of it has been expressly made.
It is not clear
how the Sea Tigers could conduct training and exercises within any
designated area at sea without resort to live firing. Unlike on
land, training and exercises for any Navy at sea almost often encompasses
live firing. Such exercises are preceded by warnings to those navigating
near the area or aircraft using the air space above. There are some
limitations. Among them are training and exercises on casualty evacuation
or search and rescue.
Moreover, an
official Government response to permit Sea Tigers to conduct training
and exercises at sea, even without live firing, on the one hand,
amounts to official recognition of LTTE's sea faring arm. On the
other, it implies a demarcation of a part of the territorial waters
of Sri Lanka for exclusive use by the LTTE, a move that has serious
implications on Sri Lanka's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
A de facto (from the fact) LTTE sea going arm, by virtue of being
allowed a designated area at sea, would automatically receive de
jure (from the law, by right) status.
In this context,
it is relevant to ask whether equal recognition has been given to
LTTE land forces including the Black Tigers, their suicide arm.
The Sunday Times has obtained full texts
of the latest SLMM second draft proposals as well as the response
of Navy Chief Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, to their earlier Initial
Discussion Paper. See box stories.
Despite all
these developments, the Sri Lanka Rupavahini, the national television
network that continues to be the tool for virulent state propaganda
of successive Governments had a different, if not more sinister,
story to report on the same issue. No better than the way it functioned
during the People's Alliance regime when its channels were used
for witch hunting journalists whose reports were found to be uncomfortable
to the Government. See separate box story on botton
for details .
The SLMM said
on Friday it had called upon the Government and the LTTE to forward
their comments on the second draft of the proposals before April
30. "After that SLMM intends to have separate discussions with
the Parties on these arrangements and has suggested a meeting between
senior naval and political representatives of both Parties, the
Norwegian facilitator and SLMM at Omantai crossing point on 7th
of May 2003," Teitur Torkelsson, SLMM spokesman said in a press
release.
The Government
evidently is focusing on the technicalities of the Ceasefire Agreement
in isolation of the larger dimension of its responsibility for safeguarding
the sovereignty of the nation. Any concessions now made in this
regard will surely have its repercussions on the core issues that
are yet to be discussed.
In saying this, I must re-iterate that the issue taken up is not
to jeopardize the ongoing peace talks in any way but rather that
peace is achieved within the sovereignty of a united Sri Lanka.
That is the people's aspiration.
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SLN the only legitimate
force at Lankan sea
Navy Commander Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri reacted angrily
last week to proposals made by the SLMM in an Initial Discussion
Paper that called for recognition of Sea Tigers as a naval
unit and demarcation of areas for them in the high seas for
live firing exercises.
The Sunday Times today publishes the full
text of his response sent to the Ministry of Defence. For
purposes of clarity, references are made to SLMM proposals
wherever necessary:
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CFA AND INTERNATIONAL
LAWS AT SEA:
SLMM proposal: The Parties naval units must
comply fully with the CFA and with the international laws
at Sea.
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
i. This applies only to SLN, as SLN has been
dominating and controlling the Territorial Waters around Sri
Lanka even though the Mullaitivu factor was considered as
their strong hold. SLN continued to deploy units in Op Varuna
Kirana at distance 6 NM, i.e. well within territorial waters
and effectively confronted the sea tigers at very close proximity
to so called enemy dominated land area.
Eg. The last encounter just few hours before
the declaration of CFA was ended approx 3 NM from Mullaitivu.
ii The Sea Tiger arm of LTTE is not a legitimate
organization / force to carry weapons / munitions at sea according
to International Laws at Sea and also in the Territorial Waters
of Sri Lanka which controlled by SLN as per 1.7 of CFA.
POLICY ON ACTIVE CFA MEASURES AT
SEA:
SLMM : The general policy regarding active Ceasefire measures
at sea must be determined at the highest level (central level).
The Maritime Committees should work out the details.
Vice Admiral Sandagiri"
This should be done at political level with
the views of SLN.
MARITIME COMMITTEE (MC)
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
Strongly recommended to reactivate the District
Committee Meetings (DCM) / Sub Committee for De-escalation
and Normalcy meeting with the inclusion of senior most Naval
Monitor of SLMM as a member of SDN and should be brought under
the purview of SDN.
RECOGNITION OF THE LTTE SEA TIGERS
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
At the time of the MOU was signed, it was very clear that
SLN was in total control of the sea and is the only legitimate
force at sea. Hence issue of de facto force was of no relevance.
At the end of peace talks some day, even Federal Status is
given to North and East, there will be only one Navy and that
is SLN. Therefore, excluding LTTE Sea Tigers from the normal
law of the country is unacceptable and out of the question.
IDENTIFICATION
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
This implies that LTTE sea tigers are in par with SLN, which
is not. Therefore the proposal is totally unacceptable.
CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
Proposal not possible. Refraining the violation of CFA, unlikely
at sea off Iranativu on 13th July 2002 and Delft on 06th February
2003 by LTTE, itself would (sic) a confidence building measures
between two parties.
COMMUNICATIONS
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
Yes. This is required to maintain communications with LTTE
declared movements.
INSPECTION
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
i) This is possible as far as practicable / feasible, i.e.
if a SLN vessel on patrol detects a suspicious vessel or boat
smuggling in warlike material and not complies with SLN instructions,
SLN will have to follow the ROE. In these situations chances
are more likely that SLMM member may not be onboard.
ii) Stamping as only "grave violation" of CFA will
merely (sic) not sufficient, unless SLMM is geared to take
strong action against LTTE involved in violation of CFA. Incidents
occurred in Iranativu on 13th July 2002 and Delft 06th February
2003 relevant in this regard.
iii) Proposal unacceptable. International law and law of the
country will be upheld by the SLN.
OFFENSIVE NAVAL OPERATIONS
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
SLN has the right to dominate and free movement at sea in
view that she has to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the country and also in conformity to CFA article
1.3.
BRIEFING ON THE CFA AND LAWS AT SEA
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
Already done.
SLN AND LTTE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
(ROE)
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
Only SLN can apply ROE since she is the only legitimate force
authorised to safeguard the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka
and also in conformity to CFA article 1.3.
EXERCISE AND TRAINING AREAS
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
Sea (Territorial Waters, Contiguous Zone up to EEZ) is under
SLN control. No other party can be allowed to conduct military
training at sea since it is against the constitution and sovereignty
of the country and the article 1.3 of CFA.
LEGAL MARITIME SUPPLY LINES
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
A system is already in place and is working well. Law of the
country prevail.
SLMM INVOLVEMENT
Vice Admiral Sandagiri:
This is being practiced.Restricted Zone (from Great Basses
to Puttalam) was established for total domination of sea areas
by SLN preventing any illegal activities at sea and continued
up to the time of signing MOU / CFA. As a gesture of good
will and to support the government peace process, SLN consented
to relax such restrictions gradually (D + 90 days) in normalising
the fishing activities. SLN anticipated difficulties to develop
when the fishing is relaxed and the possible LTTE engaging
in illegal activities at sea. Therefore, a firm commitment
from SLMM was expected by way of Naval Monitors be present
onboard SLN vessels, numbering ten for each area (North &
East), so that no misunderstanding in the determinations by
SLMM on the legitimate right of SLN activities at sea.
Submitted for information and necessary action.
D.W.K. Sandagiri
Vice Admiral
Commander of the Navy
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SLMM
proposals: The revised version
The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) has withdrawn the
"Initial Discussion Paper", the
contents of which were exclusively revealed in these columns
last week.
Here
is the full text of the SLMM's "Second Set of Proposals"
titled "MEASURES TO BE CONSIDERED FOR PREVENTING INCIDENTS
BETWEEN THE SRI LANKA NAVY (SLN) AND LIBERATION TIGERS OF
TAMIL EELAM (LTTE) AT SEA.
01. Introduction
Ever since the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was signed, there
have been a number of incidents relating to the Parties' activity
at sea. Some of the most serious incidents relating to the
CFA have occurred at sea, endangering the Cease-fire and the
Peace Process.
To Prevent future incidents at sea that could threaten the
stability of the ceasefire, GOSL and LTTE at the Sixth Round
of Peace Talks have decided that effective arrangements should
be worked out and implemented between the two Parties.
02. Proposed Measures
(a) Compliance with National and International Laws and the
CFA
The Parties must comply fully with national and international
laws and regulations applicable to navigation and with the
CFA.
(b) Policy on CFA on measures at Sea
The general policy regarding ceasefire measures at sea must
be determined at the highest policy-making level.
(c) Regional Maritime Committees (RMCs)
(i) Maritime Committee- will be established at the national
level.
(ii) As a tool to prevent incidents and violations of the
CFA at sea, two Regional Maritime Committees (RMCs) shall
be established (one each in Trincomalee and Jaffna). The RMCs
should consist of representatives of the two Parties' and
be headed by SLMM Naval Monitors (NM) of the particular Region.
(d) Identification
The vessels of the Parties' shall satisfy the requirements
of shipping identification such as appropriate marking, number
of load line and flag of nationality, as prescribed by applicable
international laws and regulations, including the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Organisation (IMO) and United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea.
(e) Communications
When at sea, vessels of both Parties' shall communicate on
Channel 16 in accordance with applicable international laws
and regulations.
(f) Inspection
Sri Lanka Navy's rights and obligations and legitimate task
of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Sri Lanka are recognised and specifically stipulated in
the CFA. SLN will exercise its rights under international
law to prevent in Sri Lanka waters the infringement of its
laws and regulations. Hence, any vessel challenged or intercepted
by the SLN, will comply with instructions and orders given
by the SLN, including (but not limited to):
i. An intercepted vessel shall adhere to the Rules of Engagement
(ROE) (Annex 1).
ii Destruction of evidence, and deliberate exploding/sinking
of vessels as well as threatening to commit suicide to avoid
inspection shall be considered as grave violation of the CFA.
iii When an incident occurs at sea the Parties should refrain
from escalating the situation.
(g) Vessels of Third Parties
Parties shall not engage in any hostile activity against vessels
of Third parties, which are exercising the right of innocent
passage in Sri Lanka Waters under International Law or are
otherwise engaged in lawful activities in Sri Lanka Waters,
in accordance with the laws and regulations of Sri Lanka.
(h) Offensive naval Operations
Subject to the provisions of paragraph (f) neither Party shall
conduct offensive or aggressive operations at sea.
(i) Briefing on the CFA and Laws at Sea
All crews on vessels belonging to the Parties should be thoroughly
briefed on the CFA and Laws and Regulations governing navigation
and good seamanship.
(j) Exercise and Training Areas
LTTE will conduct training and exercises within a designated
area at sea. LTTE vessels when at sea outside such designated
exercise area should not carry weapons or explosives onboard.
(k) Modalities for Sea Movements
The modalities for transfer of cadres at sea by the LTTE have
already been worked out and their operation will continue.
The Parties will discuss the possibility of working out modalities
for any other movements.
(m) SLMM Involvement
SLMM shall play a more proactive role regarding naval monitoring.
For this purpose SLMM will increase the number of monitors
at sea so that SLMM naval monitors are available at a very
short notice. Hence, if an incident at sea should occur, SLMM
should be notified, and naval monitors sent to the scene immediately.
As a fundamental precondition for the.
SLMM involvement the parties must ensure full compliance with
rulings of the SLMM, guarantee the security of its personnel
in all situations, and take disciplinary action against anyone
endangering the lives of SLMM personnel.
03. Plan of Progress
Details and input regarding the proposed measures in Paragraph
02 above have to be worked out by the Parties, and forwarded
to SLMM HQ not later than Thursday 17th April 03.
Based on the feedback from the Parties SLMM will compile a
detailed proposal and forward this to the Parties not later
than Monday 21st of April 03.
On the 24th of April 03 senior naval and political representatives
from both sides, as well as representatives from SLMM, will
attend a meeting at Omantai crossing point to finalise the
measures and effective arrangements. The Royal Norwegian Government
will convene the meeting.
Please Note
Prior to the meeting on the 24th April 03, SLMM is prepared
to meet the Parties separately to discuss the measures. |
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‘Attempt
to stop me from reporting the truth’
The nightly Sinhala news bulletin of Rupavahini on Wednesday
had a different story to tell its viewers over the SLMM proposals
calling upon the Government to "recognize the LTTE Sea
Tigers as a de facto naval unit" and demarcate areas
at sea for "live firing exercises" by them.
It reported that Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe, had
told the pre-Cabinet meeting that there are elements trying
to disrupt the peace process. It went on to quote him as saying
that he spoke to the Managing Director of a Sinhala daily
newspaper about a campaign against the peace process.
The Premier had been told. Rupavahini said, that they get
the information from a Defence Correspondent of a weekend
newspaper. It added that Premier Wickremasinghe had assured
the Cabinet he will not be deterred by such elements and will
overcome the obstacles. He had said that the Government faced
similar situations when the Ceasefire Agreement was signed.
Later on the same night, the Rupavahini English news bulletin,
however, said Iqbal Athas, Defence Correspondent of The Sunday
Times was providing the information. The next day, the State
owned Independent Television Network (ITN) news bulletin also
telecast the same report but made no references to names.
The allegation, it appears, is that I had provided information
about the SLMM proposals to a journalist (or journalists)
at the Divaina newspaper and this was how the newspaper had
reported on the matter and carried a strong front-page editorial.
The Managing Director referred to is Mr. Nimal Welgama of
Upali Newspapers Ltd.
Mr. Welgama told The Sunday Times 'I did not say that any
reporters of Divaina obtained the story from Iqbal Athas.
I said our reporters had checked the story about the SLMM
proposals with their own sources before publishing it. I,
however, mentioned that it had been written a day ahead by
Iqbal Athas in The Sunday Times."
Hence
the Rupavahini news report to project me as being anti-peace
and feeding information to other media to sabotage the peace
talks is just a part of a witch hunt. It is not the first
occasion and will not be the last either. Some Government
propagandists appear to be hurt or frightened about the truth
- in this instance the report on the SLMM proposals. I had
during the past weeks pointed out the pressures on me for
saying the truth. So, here is one more instance of trying
to stop me from saying it. More will undoubtedly follow.
This is no better than the Rupavahini during the days of the
People's Alliance Government. Then a vicious campaign was
carried out against me to suggest that I was a Tiger guerrilla
accomplice for exposing wide spread corruption in military
procurements, criticising the Government's war efforts and
military offensives. Muck rakers like PA's Mahinda Abeysundera
and his coterie of mud slingers used special programmes not
only in the Rupavahini but also in the Sri Lanka Broadcasting
Corporation to witch hunt me then.
It seems no different now. I was once branded a Tiger accomplice
and am now being given a new sobriquet - someone out to wreck
the peace process.
If telling the truth, substantiated with facts, is the only
qualification for earning those titles during a witch hunt,
so be it. - Iqbal Athas |
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