The three options before the Muslims and their implications
By Dr. H.M. Mauroof
It could be said that a near
consensus is now available in the country for a political solution
to the ethnic problem. Sharing of power is the underlying factor
in this consensus.
The debate
on how to share power has now graduated from a 'devolutionary' one
to a 'federal' one, which is a qualitative upgrading. The present
status of the process, and, the slow but steady shifts in the country's
political constellations, seem to progress in a positive direction
towards a successful solution irrespective of who retains power
at the Centre. Devolution, federation or separation has never been
a Muslim proposal, demand, need or requirement.
These have been
the Tamil community's proposals and demands from time to time based
on their aspirations, needs or experiences; and the Sinhala, community's
responses to them. While the Muslim community welcomes a consensual
settlement of the issue, its only concern is that its own position
should not suffer degradation, not to speak of any upgrading.
In this context
political restructuring of the Northern and Eastern Provinces under
a federal arrangement must be so designed as to constitutionally
ensure the rights of all the three communities; political, security
(personal and property), identity, equality, access to land, water,
jobs, education entitlements should be spelt out unequivocally.
To satisfy
such Muslim needs three main proposals have emerged from time to
time:
i] The Northern and Eastern Provinces be considered as two distinct
and separate federal units.
ii] The North
and East be formally in one federal unit but with inbuilt mechanisms
to ensure the rights, privileges and duties of every community.
iii] Creation
of a separate federal unit for the Muslims in the South of the Eastern
Province.
For the following reasons it is the first alternative that has the
greatest chance of success, from the Muslim point of view, both
in the short and long terms:
(a) The Eastern
Province is the only province in the country with an ethnic composition
of almost equal proportions of all three communities; the Tamils
constitute the largest single community followed by the Muslims
and then the Sinhalese. Any two communities together will constitute
a two-thirds majority.
(b) The preponderant
majority of the inhabitants of the Province are farmers, and a vast
majority of them are tenant and small-scale farmers whose holdings
are intertwined; this demands co-operation amongst the communities.
(c) There is
no plausible ethnic contiguity in the province though each community
has a large proportion of people.
(d) The Tamils
of the Eastern Province are of a different social stock than that
of the North. Until the LTTE's gun power overtook the province,
the Tamil population of the Eastern Province, till the latter part
of the 1980s, always had the fear of Jaffna hegemony.
(e) The chances
of success of the peace talks through consensus among the three
communities will increase manifold.
The second alternative also has a reasonable chance of success provided:
(a) The Centre's
powers to intervene in cases of discrimination are Constitutionally
enshrined.
(b) Regiments
of the Army and law enforcement authorities be established and be
truly representative of the three communities.
(c) The rights
of each community be defined and written into the Constitution.
As far as the Muslims are concerned the bases for these are in documents
(tabled in Parliament) and signed in India in April 1988 by the
representatives of the LTTE and of the Muslims, and, in another
document issued to the Muslims by the leaders of the TULF. This
was when President J.R. Jayewardene asked the Muslims to negotiate
their plight not with him but with the Tamil leaders who at the
time were in asylum in Tamil Nadu.
(d) The federal
system should be so designed that the different constituents within
the federated unit must have meaningful representation at the centre.
(e) The Constitution
should designate a date, as it had been done in the proposals submitted
to parliament by the President with the 2000 Constitution, by which
date the three districts in the Eastern Province are given the chance
to vote at a referendum.
The third of
the above-mentioned alternatives, much touted from time to time
by the SLMC and some Muslims from the Ampara District, are fraught
with two particular disadvantages that should really attract rejection
by the Muslims of the East:
(a) When one
takes the totality of the Muslim population of the Northern and
Eastern Provinces, the proposed South East Province will clearly
have lesser number of Muslims than in the rest of the North-East.
One remembers
the fate of the millions of Muslims during the last half a century
at the hands of chauvinists after the separation of Pakistan and
today's Bangladesh from imperial India. Who is prepared to abandon
the Muslims of Kattankudy, Eravur, Valaichenai, Mutur, Kinniya,
Mannar, Jaffna etc., to be continued to be savaged as if what had
happened to them in the last two decades, and even in the present
post-ceasefire period, is not enough?
(b) Additionally
the inveterate Sinhala chauvinist elements still left in the country
are certain to twist this proposal to suit themselves and try to
whip up communal forces in the rest of the country.
Muslims in
the country, particularly those in the North-East who should vitally
take the leadership, should debate these issues in public and urgently
formulate a common stand. This stand should be sought to be articulated
at the peace talks.
Also, these must be canvassed with the President, the Prime Minister,
the leadership of the LTTE and with all the political and other
forces in the country.
The writer is President of the National Muslim Movement
|