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Tigers talking big from position of strength We are not least concerned about the snags and problems of Sri Lanka's constitution. The Sri Lankan government should think and take concrete steps to go beyond the parameters of the constitution to resolve the interim administration issue…. That in essence is what LTTE Political Wing leader, S.P. Thamilselvan, told a crowded, hour long news conference last Thursday from the newly constructed Peace Secretariat building in Kilinochchi. The event, originally scheduled for Wednesday, was put off for the next day to allow time to make public a five-page letter guerrilla Chief Negotiator, Anton Balasingham, wrote to Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, Vidar Helgesen. This was in direct response to three specific proposals he (Mr Helgesen) had placed before the LTTE on behalf of the UNF Government. That was during talks with Mr. Thamilselvan in Kilinochchi on May 17. The specific proposals were Government's answer to demands made by LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, to "establish an interim administrative structure with adequate powers to undertake North-eastern re-construction and development activities." He placed them before Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Peterson during talks in Wanni, barely a week before Mr. Helgessen went there. The UNF Government proposals were spelt out in three separate documents - a Draft Agreement (between the GOSL and LTTE), an informal paper on "Elements of a Strengthened and Expanded Mechanism for Reconstruction and Development of the North and East," and a letter suggesting the use of locally elected bodies as a basis for development activities. The LTTE has rejected all three and placed the tough new demands, almost impossible for any Government to deliver. With the aid donor meeting only two weeks away, the Government is doing its utmost to come up with a solution acceptable to the LTTE. UNF leaders have been locked in consultation with Colombo-based diplomats of the donor community, among other matters, to sound out their views on how best funds committed by them should be spent. They have been asked to spell out some modalities. Minister Milinda Moragoda flies next week to Tokyo to assure the Japanese Government that everything is being done to resolve the imbroglio. Critics, commentators, academics, analysts and the like will no doubt focus more detailed attention this week to this first major crisis on the peace front for the UNF Government since the Ceasefire Agreement of February 22, 2002. If such a crisis revolves around an all powerful "interim administrative set up" for the LTTE and hinges on the upcoming aid donor meeting in Tokyo, there are equally bigger hurdles for the Government to clear when it comes to another all important question - the resumption of peace talks. At least two contentious issues remain to be sorted out - the LTTE demands for troop withdrawals from High Security Zones (HSZ) and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission's (SLMM) highly controversial proposals to carve out live firing and training areas in the country's territorial waters for use by Sea Tigers. Even if the Government paves the way for the LTTE to the donor meeting in Tokyo, the gigantic task of clearing the hurdles to please them to return to peace talks still remains. During the stalemate that has now set in, many will undoubtedly take comfort in the LTTE assurance that they will not return to war. Whether that will include those responsible for the country's defence establishment in the UNF Government remains a pertinent question. The reason? Soon after the ceasefire 15 months ago, believe it or not, they had wrongly assumed that a peace settlement had already been reached. Or so it seemed. Hence they embarked on security planning for a "post peace settlement" era. This is whilst their former arch rival, the Tiger guerrillas engaged themselves in a planned strengthening of their military machine. First
to the guerrillas Armed cadres who stood at 7500 before the ceasefire now exceed 19,000. During the past 15 months, recruitment and training of cadres, not to mention child soldiers, have been reported periodically in the media. Hardly a fortnight passes without the much publicised "passing out parades." The procurement and smuggling in of military hardware across the north eastern seas has continued. So much so, the Sri Lanka Navy was engaged in a deep sea encounter to sink the LTTE cargo vessel MV Koimar, carrying fuel and assorted ammunition (Situation Report - March 16) If the LTTE's military machine has been strongest in the north, since the ceasefire, it has been effectively extended to the east. There again, it is not only the cadres that have risen from a reported 2,000 before the ceasefire to over 8,000. Intercepts of radio transmissions in the Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts in the past weeks spoke of cadres being ordered to report to specific issuing points to collect new weapons and communications equipment. Long range weapons have been moved in to some areas of the east to face security forces installations. An expanding Sea Tiger network has facilitated not only movement of cadres but also warlike material between the north and east. A string of "Police Stations" that existed only in the north have spread out to the east despite a futile campaign of lies and deception by Government propagandists to show they existed even before. There are credible reports now of the formation of an Air Wing. What of the
Government? Soon after the ceasefire, a retired British military
officer was invited on a paid assignment to examine the role of
the Security Forces. In his first report on THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW, Gen. Sir Michael notes that "the burgeoning peace process can only be further sustained by positive and co-ordinated action at all levels in the political, economic, social and security sectors." "Central to the peace process," he says in an introductory note to the report "will be the restructuring of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces and the re-integration of the LTTE fighters into civil society." Gen. Sir Michael has commended the Army for "fighting bravely" during the 19 year war but adds that "too often they have seen victory turn to defeat." By February 22, when the Ceasefire Agreement was signed, he says "tactical initiative was being lost and the capability of the LTTE had become, in some respects, superior to those of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces." The reasons given by him are "a lack of intelligence, failures in the policy of static defence, inadequate equipment and poor administration…" He says they "resulted in a lack of confidence amongst many of the middle and lower ranked members of the Armed Forces with regards to their political management and senior military leadership." However, senior
Sri Lankan military officers who have over a decade of experience
in fighting Tiger guerrillas disagree with Gen. Sir Michael that
"tactical initiative" was altogether lost when the ceasefire
came into effect. To the contrary, they point out, that Long Range
Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) had begun to cause concern for the
LTTE. So was the Navy interception of cargo vessels bringing in
military hardware. The "strategic imperatives" he refers to is the scenario after the ceasefire. Therefore, the "changes," he says "will of course much depend on the requirements of national policy." He cautions that "it is unlikely present force levels can be substantially reduced in the immediate future - if it is accepted that there will be a Sri Lankan commitment to international peace keeping missions…" If no concrete measures were taken to address the shortcomings highlighted by Gen. Sir Michael in his first report, his subsequent one is further proof that the UNF Government was still keen on downsizing the Army and finding placements for them in United Nations Peace Keeping Force. Hence the national priority was not to prepare the Security Forces to be in a state of readiness to meet any threats. It was rather to diminish whatever role they were playing despite the shortcomings. A clear case of placing the cart before the horse. Even before a peace settlement was reached, here was a Government paying money to seek advice from a retired foreign military expert on how to downsize the Army and send its men abroad to serve on UN missions. The full text of Gen. Sir Michael's report THE NEED FOR AN AGREED PEACE PROCESS, appearing on this page speaks eloquently about what the Government planned to do. In his report, Gen. Sir Michael says that "having decided what peacekeeping doctrine is appropriate for Sri Lanka, a long-term training programme" will have to be undertaken to prepare for this new role. He also refers to other aspects related to the peace process in the report. The euphoria of the Ceasefire Agreement that led to the UNF Government response that its military readiness should be responsive to the expectations of a peace dividend changed in the recent months. In late March, Security Forces were told to prepare themselves for any eventuality and stock up requirements at least for three months. Funds for this purpose are being released by the Treasury. But revamping military capability is still long way off. For obvious reasons, one cannot detail out the shortcomings of each service or its poorer levels of preparedness. As repeatedly revealed in these columns, bureaucratic apathy at the Ministry of Defence coupled together with political interference over procurements - a malady that severely inflicted the defence establishment during the previous People's Alliance Government - sad enough, remains among the main reasons. To say that troops should remain at a high level of preparedness at all times is not to suggest that they go to war. Nor is it to stymie or sabotage peace talks. National security is for a nation's well being. And its people have a right to know how they and a nation will be protected from all threats including those to peace. Sir
Michael’s report on the need for an agreed peace process Here is the
full text: 1. Although there has been continued progress at the political level in the search for a lasting peace in Sri Lanka, - and this has received wide international acclaim - there has not hitherto been the same degree of progress on the ground. 2. Post conflict actions that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructure and institutions are clearly necessary to avoid a relapse into conflict. In Sri Lanka, the perceived lack of material progress on the grounds has already caused disappointment amongst Tamil speaking people, - particularly those living in the war-torn areas. The continued existence of high security zones, particularly those in Jaffna, are resulting in political problems that could have long term consequences for the overall peace process. 3. To support further political progress at the top, there urgently need to be established in Sri Lanka, two additional peace-building elements. First, there must be an agreed process that sets out all the political, security, economic and social measures that must be taken to move the situation from the present cease-fire agreement to the final politically agreed solution. Second, there has to be a mechanism capable of delivering that process at the regional, district and local levels of government. 4. A public information campaign agreed by both parties to the conflict must also be established in order to counter the propaganda of those who wish to disrupt the burgeoning peace process. 5. Finally,
a neutral international organisation will almost certainly be required
in Sri Lanka to supervise the implementation of the peace process,
deal with complaints and, where necessary, expose those who violate
the agreements or who obstruct the overall peace process. The present
SLMM, although doing excellent work, is clearly not sufficiently
empowered or numerous to undertake such proactive role. The European
Union might be invited to provide this international supervisory
organisation. 6. In order to move the situation forward, there are a number of carefully co-ordinated steps that must be taken in any peace process. These include:
7. The disbursement of international aid for economic re-development should be directly linked to each stage of the process. MECHANISM 9. At each level of the JCO there would be political, security, humanitarian and civil aid representation. The military commanders on both sides would have to be present at all meetings. 10. These meetings should be chaired by a member of the international supervisory organisation. 11. Meetings should be held daily at local level and any local dispute that could not be resolved at this level should be referred to the district or regional level. District and regional meetings could be held weekly. 12. The international supervisory organisation should be given the necessary authority to resolve disputes and this would require complete freedom of movement, as well as the right to search for undeclared weapons. There would have to be full consent from both sides to the conflict for the presence and role of the international supervisory organisation. 13. An important part of the peace process will be the integration of LTTE fighters into civilian society. Some may wish to join a local ethnically based police force to be deployed within Tamil areas. Such a transition can probably only be done via an international police presence, which would help train such a force. Once again the European Union could be invited to provide such a presence. PEACEKEEPING 15. The UN will only accept peacekeeping forces capable of sustaining themselves with regards to self-defence and logistics. This requires the deployment of a complete force package, including communications, engineers and logistic support services, - all of whom have to be individually trained in the complex tasks of peacekeeping. 16. Having decided what peacekeeping doctrine is appropriate for Sri Lanka, a long-term training programme will then have to be undertaken to prepare for this new role. Training will not only include such tasks as the protection of humanitarian assistance, the restoration and maintenance of order, the enforcement of sanctions, the guarantee of freedom of movement, but also international law regarding human rights and war crimes. 17. A new military training establishment will therefore be required in Sri Lanka with specialist training aids to enable the Armed Forces of Sri Lanka to operate effectively across the spectrum of peacekeeping including Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 situations. 18. Senior officers will also need to become experienced in the top management of peacekeeping forces. This will require a presence, possibly at one star level in the military control structure of the UN in New York. 19. It is suggested that a small team from UK be invited to help create a peacekeeping training programme in Sri Lanka. Colonel Wilkinson from King's College London who is presently working in Sri Lanka on the re-organisation of the management of defence, was responsible for writing the British Army manual of peacekeeping and he has also advised NATO and the UN on peacekeeping doctrine. He is ideally placed to give further advice on this subject in Sri Lanka. RECOMMENDATIONS 21. The European Union is also invited to establish an international police presence in Sri Lanka to assist with the creation of a predominantly Tamil police force. 22. I continue to advise the Prime Minister, Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe, on the peace process and that I also give a seminar on this process, at an appropriate time, at the high-level peace talks. 23. I explain to Mr Anton Balasingham in London the concepts and processes of peace. 24. Colonel
Wilkinson of King's College London is invited to advise further
on the creation of a peacekeeping capability within the Armed Forces
of Sri Lanka. Athas to address
global conference of investigative journalists The four-day conference, organised by Investigative Reporters and Editors (IRE) Inc., is to be hosted by the Washington Post and the US News and World Report, and is being co-sponsored by USA Today, TIME magazine and the International Centre for Journalists. The line-up of speakers at the conference, which is scheduled to take place from June 5 to 8, include Pulitzer Prize winners, newspaper magnates, writers, academics and some of the best known names in American journalism. The speaker's
list includes Ben Bradlee and Bob Woodward of the Washington Post,
Seymour Hersch of New Yorker magazine, David Cay Johnston of the
New York Times, Alan Miller of Los Angeles Times and James Steele
of TIME magazine. It includes French journalist Mariane Pearl, whose husband Daniel Pearl of the Wall Street Journal who was abducted and later executed by a group of militants in Pakistan last year. This session is being held at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. Athas is a member of the Washington based International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), a world-wide body of investigative journalists. He was one among a ten member ICIJ team that won an award from the Society of Professional Journalists - the largest and most broad-based journalism organisation in the US - for Online Investigative Reporting. It was for their report on "Making a Killing - the Business of War" - the role of mercenary groups around the world. This award is being made in July. According to a press release issued by the organisation, Athas has been bestowed with the singular honour of being the only foreign investigative reporter listed among the speakers at the conference so far. A grassroots non-governmental media organisation, Investigative Reporters and Editors, was formed in 1975 specifically to improve the quality of investigative reporting both in and outside the United States. The organisation which appropriately uses the acronym IRE, has expressed outrage over restrictions placed on civil liberties, particularly relating to the media, by successive US administrations, and has increasingly demanded confidential government documents under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act. |
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