Are negotiation skills stalling peace talks?
By Sellakapu S Upasiri de Silva
This period is destined to be a particularly dramatic period in the politics of Sri Lanka. Suspension of peace negotiations by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and their refusal to take part in the recently held donor conference in Tokyo has increased this uncertainty. Sri Lankan politicians of the opposition and the majority of the general public have great doubts about the outcome of the peace process, as the LTTE has confronted the Sri Lankan government with near-impossible demands of an Interim Administration (IA). The main question in most Sri Lankans' mind may be 'what will be the LTTE's next move and will this impasse continue?'.
Politicians in the south bound by the constitution are trying hard to convince the LTTE, that their demand for an IA is impossible to be met beyond the present constitution. The biggest question is, will the LTTE supremo take this as an answer?
The LTTE has publicly criticised the skills of the Sri Lankan delegation for the failure of the peace negotiations saying that nothing was achieved from the last six rounds of negotiations and it is pointless to prolong these negotiations. Is this true?
What about the skills of the LTTE negotiating team? Do the LTTE negotiators including their chief negotiator Anton Balasingham have the skills to negotiate this delicate problem to achieve an acceptable outcome for the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government other than bullying the Sri Lankan government to submit to their aggressive demands? Do they practice any constructive negotiation skills used by many negotiators worldwide? Constructive negotiation skills are to establish a positive climate of mutual credibility of creating a climate consisting of cordial, co-operative, brisk and businesslike manners. The LTTE has never practiced these skills and now places the failure of the last six rounds of negotiation on the Sri Lankan government negotiators, as the main reason for their withdrawal from the peace negotiations.
Any right thinking person will agree with me that the LTTE is attending these peace negotiations with set goals and they will not change these goals to achieve less unless pushed to the wall by very capable negotiators or a super power. Sri Lankan negotiators lack courage to confront the LTTE and try to practice cordial co-operative aggressive or hard negotiation skills to win over the LTTE. It is like trying to straighten a dog's tail.
To add fuel to fire, Eastern Division Military leader of the LTTE, Karuna, publicly castigated the Sri Lankan government peace negotiators in Switzerland while addressing a public meeting (of LTTE diehards). The electronic and print media in Switzerland gave very good publicity to this speech by Karuna, where he said the Sri Lankan negotiating team was clueless and Prof. Peiris used to telephone Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe every 10 minutes to get directions. If this statement is true, then it clearly indicates that the LTTE leadership was planning to suspend the negotiations, as they were not satisfied with the skills and the tactics of the UNF negotiators.
What are we
negotiating?
Negotiation to end the hostilities with the LTTE is not an easy task. Why? After 20 years of fighting and many failed negotiations the LTTE is very hungry to achieve the best for them i.e. Eelam. If so why is the UNF government negotiating without any proper discussions with the President and the opposition politicians? The professional opinion of many experienced negotiators is that the Sri Lankan government never took these negotiations very seriously. Why did they take a very relaxed attitude to these negotiations? Is it that because they had an understanding with the LTTE leadership prior to the 2001 election and they thought that everything will be a piece of cake and can be settled according to their prior arrangements with the LTTE representatives. It is the understanding of many that the UNF never thought that the LTTE will go back on their agreement reached during the 2001 discussions, but things have changed and the UNF government is in a quandary as they have given much more to the LTTE trusting them as equal partners. Did the UNP leadership have any agreement with the LTTE in 2001?
By analysing the speech given by Prof. Peiris in Sydney, and his answer to questions by myself and others, we realized that the UNF government uses constructive or soft negotiation skills by giving into all the demands of the LTTE leadership, while the LTTE negotiators, aggressive as they are, used the aggressive or hard type of negotiation skills to achieve what they are aiming to get from the Sri Lankan government.
Prof. Peiris spoke with authority at the Sydney meeting, but failed to convince the audience, mostly expatriate Sri Lankans, what he and his team members are negotiating to achieve. It became very clear to those present that even though Prof. Peiris is a very clever academic and a twister of words he proved that he would never be a good negotiator. He never showed any foresight in answering any of the questions at that meeting and gave some blunt responses thinking that he was addressing a meeting in Sri Lanka without realising that he was confronted by some well-informed ex-Sri Lankan individuals of a very high intellectual calibre.
The present government did much better than the way the PA government handled peace talks in 1984. The negotiating team included three Cabinet Ministers without any proven negotiation skills, but the LTTE delegation comprised delegates without any authority or any negotiation skills to discuss and negotiate this delicate conflict, as they were forced to confer with the LTTE leader at all times. Every individual in Sri Lanka and ex-Sri Lankans like myself may ask from the UNF government negotiators what our goals are and what we are trying to negotiate with the LTTE. It is a terrorist organisation banned in many countries fighting for the last 20 years to establish a country called Eelam for them. They are ready to sacrifice everybody other than Prabhakaran's children to achieve this goal and the negotiators should consider this as a prime point of consideration. The Sri Lankan government should consider that this might be the vision of LTTE, when they sit at the negotiation table. Sri Lankans and the Sri Lankan government are not ready to grant them this wish.
The foundations of a negotiation is laid far in advance of arriving at the negotiation table. One fact is that everybody who takes part in negotiations has some experience of negotiating before coming to negotiate any new dispute. Preliminaries to negotiation probably start with the parties having some vision. Gradually, that vision is clarified and its economic feasibility evaluated. As it takes shape the negotiators need advisors of various disciplines. The UNF government may be having a vision. This vision may be to give what the LTTE is demanding or a vision to meet the aspiration of the LTTE within the parameters of the Sri Lankan constitution and the other stakeholders - the people of Sri Lanka.
After six rounds of negotiations, the relationship between the parties has frozen, and it is impossible for the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE negotiators to meet and talk. The most common form of negotiation depends upon successive talking. But our negotiators failed to achieve this. Is this because our UNF government negotiators were negotiating with a vision created at the 2001 pre-election agreement? Did Ranil Wickremesinghe (through advisors around him now) agree with the LTTE leadership through the Singapore-based LTTE members to give an interim administration to the LTTE, knowing that he may be giving them some false hopes? If so what type of interim administration was he offering them? Will the PA and the other political parties agree to the UNF interim administration?
Bargaining positions?
When negotiators bargain over a position, they tend to lock themselves into that position. LTTE seems to be bargaining over a position. That is their interim administration in the North and the East. The more they clarify their position and defend it against attack, the more committed they are to their position. The more they try to convince the Sri Lankan government and others who support them [such as Norway and the EU (as most Nordic (Scandinavian) countries support the LTTE stand] the more difficult it is for them to change their position.
On several occasions peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians failed as both parties were bargaining for positions and neither wanted to give-up their established positions. Will this position bargaining by the LTTE end up the same way as previous peace negotiations?
The LTTE is paying more attention to the position they have taken than to the underlying concern of the parties. In this case an agreement is less likely. Any agreement reached may reflect a mechanical splitting of the difference between the final position rather than a solution carefully crafted to meet the legitimate interest of the parties. If the LTTE is adamant and the Sri Lankan government is willing to settle this devastating problem then the result will be an agreement less satisfactory to each side than it could have been.
The Sri Lankan government has recognized the high cost of hard positional bargaining particularly on the parties and their relationship due to their pre-election agreement with the LTTE in 2001. UNF negotiators are trying to follow a more gentle or constructive style of negotiation. Instead of seeing the other side as adversaries, they prefer to see them as friends. They try to avoid confrontation and negotiate with the intention of making offers and concessions. They believe the LTTE to be friendly, when they are not. The UNF negotiators as well as the PM has overlooked the position that the LTTE is a terrorist group and their only method of achieving any concession is by using the gun.
On the other hand will the LTTE use a more aggressive or hard style of negotiation where they treat the Sri Lankan side as adversaries and their main aim or the goal is victory? Using aggressive or hard negotiation skills the LTTE demand concessions as a condition of their relationship with the UNF government. They distrust the Sri Lankan government (President and the PM), the Armed Forces and the Sinhala people by trying to be hard on the problem by digging into a position and making threats. They use the TNA and the CWC locally and Norway and the EU internationally to apply pressure to achieve their position.
Who is the expert negotiator behind the LTTE negotiating team? The way they out fox the government and its negotiators they must be well advised by some well experienced negotiator(s).
Why should the UNF government propose an apex body to undertake the infrastructure development in Sri Lanka's North and East? It is not a separate country. Donor countries and the investors are investing these large sums of money to re-construct the North and East as they trust the Sri Lankan government. The only requirement they seek from the LTTE is to settle this issue and end this conflict in a manner suitable for all the stakeholders. The Sri Lankan government should establish an Infrastructure Development Authority within the Sri Lankan constitution under a Parliament Act, and appoint representatives from the LTTE and the Sinhala and Muslim population to man the IDA. Five representatives each from the LTTE, Sri Lankan government, IMF, World Bank and the donor community, should supervise this authority to prevent any corrupt practices.
Corruption in the Sri Lankan construction industry is very rampant and the LTTE is aware of it. The LTTE was one of the victims of corrupt construction practices. They mistrust the people as well as the contract procurement system adopted by the construction industry professionals since 1980s.
The LTTE is combining the people with the problem, and bringing the High Security Zones and the IA as the main obstacles in these negotiations. The Sri Lankan government has given many concessions to the LTTE, but what concession have the LTTE given to the Sri Lankan government? The only concession is to stop bombing and allowing people to use the A9 highway. The use of A9 has proved to be a moneymaking establishment for the LTTE as they have up to now collected over Rs. 4 billion as tax revenue.
It is high time Balasingham realised that the mandate given by the majority Sinhalese, the Tamils and the Muslims to the UNF is to deal with the LTTE within the Sri Lankan constitution, not to meet his unjustified demands for a separate Eelam or an interim administration outside the Sri Lankan constitution.
Appeasement no
answer?
The Sri Lankan government should establish a working relationship independent of agreement or disagreement with the LTTE. The more seriously the Sri Lankan government disagrees with the LTTE, the more important it is that the Sri Lankan government be able to deal well with that disagreement. A good working relationship is one that can cope with differences. Such a relationship cannot be bought by making substantive concessions or by pretending that disagreement does not exit. Experience suggests that appeasement does not often work.
I hope the Prime Minister will appoint capable negotiators along with Prof. Peiris (to continue the process) to negotiate with the LTTE. It is very wise to establish a good relationship with the PA and appoint some capable PA negotiators (not those who took part in the 1994 peace negotiations) even though the LTTE has opposed the inclusion of PA negotiators. It is necessary for the Sri Lankan government to be aggressive and firm with the LTTE if they are eager to settle this dispute. When delegating responsibilities to the negotiating team, they should be given adequate authority to negotiate within the approved guidelines. Without authority (this applies to both sides) the negotiators will never be able to reach an appropriate settlement without seeking authority from the leaders. Always consider the LTTE as a terrorist group, and try to influence their decisions, even though they will do everything possible to influence the Sri Lankan government.
Within the LTTE there is internal pressure to behave in a more moderate manner. Leaders of the LTTE like leaders of all other terrorist organizations worldwide do not want their organisation to be identified with terrorist movements like al-Qaeda by the Americans.
Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe should take into consideration that the fear in the minds of the LTTE works in his favour as the entire world is trying to eliminate terrorist groups like the LTTE. Regrettably the government negotiators and the UNF government have not properly utilized the advantage of this fear. What a pity.
(The writer is a Sri Lankan construction specialist and engineer who lives in Australia)
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