The sham behind defence reforms

Instead of commemorative attacks, Tiger guerrillas observed the sixteenth anniversary of Black Tiger day (July 5) in the North and East with ceremonies to remember their dead. This is the second time during the ceasefire they have done so. Black Tiger cadres pay homage to dead colleagues during a ceremony in Sampur, Trincomalee yesterday. Pic by Sinniah Gurunathan

It is like the proverbial mountain labouring to bring forth a mouse. A three member official Committee laboured for just eight weeks and delivered a report. The findings were transformed into a draft law. That is after the first similar effort was still born.

Like the first, the aim of the second one was also to empower the United National Front (UNF) to have a greater direction and control over the defence establishment. This is at the expense of the Presidency, which in terms of the existing Constitution, wields these executive powers as the Commander in Chief.

It comes at a time when the 16 month long ceasefire remains shaky amidst rising tensions between the Security Forces and Tiger guerrillas. The peace talks remain suspended. There are periodic convulsions over cohabitation between the UNF and President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. With all these, even to the dumbest among students of politics, the effort is nothing more than a new phase in a power struggle. But the protagonists of the exercise have given it a fashionable name - part of defence reforms to strengthen Parliament.

The draft Higher Defence Control Act, exclusively revealed in The Sunday Times last week, is born from the labour of a controversial Defence Reforms Committee or the DRC. Ever since Defence Minister, Tilak Marapana, placed his signature on July 5, last year, on a two page decree, its role has been controversial and sometimes comical.

Though the date has no bearing, July 5 also marks Black Tiger day. On July 5, 1987, "Captain Miller," the first suicide cadre drove an explosive laden truck into Nelliady Central College, three kilometres southwest of Point Pedro. The incident, a precursor to the arrival of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka came, when troops involved in "Operation Liberation" to wrest control of the Vadamaratchi area of the peninsula were resting. Every year since then, the anniversary has been marked by suicide attacks that have so far killed 241 Black Tigers. The past two years have been an exception in view of the ceasefire. However, it is not without significance that yesterday, it was observed in guerrilla held areas with ceremonies to remember their dead.

Mr Marapana called upon the Committee to probe three different aspects relating to the nation's defence establishment - (1) Higher Defence Control (2) Revision of Regulations made under Service Acts and on the future organisation, and (3) Structure of the Armed Forces. These guidelines were given without any preamble on the need for the reforms. Or at least if they were given, the public were not aware. It is chaired by Austin Fernando, Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and comprises Charitha Ratwatte, Secretary to the Treasury and Lt. Gen. Denis Perera, a former Commander of the Army.

Mr. Fernando, a senior retired public servant was associated with the United National Front's parliamentary election campaign in December 2001. He was later named as Defence Secretary. Though he counts years of experience in the State administrative service, he has no exposure to the defence establishment during his career.

Mr Ratwatte, an attorney-at-law is a close confidante of Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe. Since the Treasury bank rolls the defence establishment and funds all military procurements, the UNF feels, as the senior-most official, he should play a role in defence matters. Until his appointment as Treasury Secretary, however, he has not been associated with the defence establishment.

A one time Commander of the Army, Lt. Gen. Denis Perera, retired in 1981. This is more than two years before the exacerbation of the violent separatist campaign by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). That was soon after the unfortunate ethnic violence of July 1983. In fact, during this period he was away from Sri Lanka serving as the country's High Commissioner in Australia.

In referring to the selection of the trio one is by no means raising doubts over their integrity. If their appointments were imperative, there should have been other members, more qualified, in the Committee since the objective was expressly for defence reforms. That should have included retired or serving members of the Security Forces and civilians knowledgeable in politico-military matters. There are hundreds of such persons who have a wealth of experience having closely associated with the ongoing crisis.

If until 1983 the Sri Lankan Armed Forces were essentially a parade ground force, it is this near two decade of warfare that saw their growth and greater militarization. That transformation is the main, if not the only reason, why defence reforms became essential. It is those closely involved with the growth of the military, both in human and material terms, who are better able to identify the areas where reforms are necessary. Without identifying such areas, how does one formulate proposals for reform? Why were they left out? The reasons seem to be clearer now even to the dumbest.

A broadly constituted Committee would have had the expertise to draw in the views of a wider section of the defence establishment and civil society. They have been shut out. The fact that restrictions were placed is proven by Mr. Marapana's own decree to the Committee to "consider written and or verbal submissions from service personnel where applicable and considered necessary."

In other words, defence reforms which concerns every single citizen of Sri Lanka, has not received broader consultation both from those in the defence establishment and civil society. The Committee seems to have applied the "where applicable and necessary" requirement strictly. Evidently, Mr. Marapana, a former Attorney General, whose advent to politics as Defence Minister was only in December 2001 had not been correctly advised.

Regrettably, even the British Government which gave support to the defence reforms programme have not been able to ensure greater transparency. More so, when the Armed Forces in Sri Lanka are very much modelled on the lines of the British. Hence, the British tax payer's money also appears to have contributed to a partisan political exercise.

Just nine weeks and three days after they were issued a decree, the Committee brought out its first report on Higher Defence Control. Barely two weeks later, had the UNF Cabinet approved a draft Joint Chiefs of Staff Act to remove some of the powers of the President, who is Commander-in-Chief.

The Sunday Times can reveal today the damaging consequences of this move. The Commanders of the Army (Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle), Navy (Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri) and Air Force (Air Marshal Donald Perera) disagreed with some of the major recommendations on Higher Defence Control (and subsequently incorporated in the first draft Joint Chiefs of Staff Act, which ironically was drafted even before they gave their comments).

"We recommend that changes in Law that do NOT require any amendments to the Constitution, ONLY be considered at this stage. This is after a process of consultation that should include the Service Commanders. Attorney General's advice may also be sought in this regard," they said in observations on Higher Defence Control they submitted to the Committee.

The full text of these observations obtained by The Sunday Times appears in a box story below.

It is ironic that despite the reservations expressed by the three serving Armed Forces Commanders, the UNF Government has chosen to go ahead now with the latest draft Higher Defence Control Act. This is despite reservations expressed by the three serving Commanders on provisions contained in this draft, also based on recommendations on Higher Defence Control. Must one say anything more to prove that the whole exercise is politically motivated?

Dealing with the subject of Higher Defence Control in the decree he issued, Mr. Marapana called upon the three-member Committee to recommend the composition and functions of (1) the National Security Council (2) the Ministry of Defence (3) any Joint Command of the Forces or Co-ordinating Headquarters if necessary (4) the Headquarters of each of the Armed Forces, and (5) the Headquarters of any subordinate commands. The Committee, whose decree was dated July 5 2002, was called upon to complete its report by August 31 of the same year. The fact that it was given only seven weeks to undertake such a task reflects the haste though the reasons have become clear only now.

It is customary and democratic for Government appointed Committees of Inquiry to place advertisements setting out their terms of reference and call for public representations before a deadline. In the case of the DRC, which dealt with an all important subject, there were no such advertisements. Hence many in the defence establishment and civil society were unaware. Not even those in the opposition political parties who have a legitimate reason to be concerned over defence reforms.
If that was bad enough, it transpired that, in some instances, only one member of the Committee conducted sittings. At least one high ranking retired military and public official refused to testify. That was General (retd.) Hamilton Wanasinghe.

He is a former Army Commander, one time General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) and a former Defence Secretary. He wanted his views placed before a full sitting of the Committee but did not have an opportunity. Needless to say the inputs of this respected officer and bureaucrat would have been valuable. There have been many other senior military officials who complained that although there was a three member committee, the exercise was largely a "one man show." Another complaint related to the offensive or patronising style in which the Committee conducted business.

Whilst dealing with the second part of its study - Regulations made under Service Acts - Lt. Gen. (retired) Denis Perera, wrote to the Commanders of the Army (Lt. Gen. Balagalle) and Navy (Vice Admiral Sandagiri). It was on the Review of the Army/Navy/Air Force Pensions and Gratuities Code.

In the course of his four page letter, Lt. Gen. (retd.) Perera noted …"In the late nineteen fifties a public servant outside the Police Force was appointed to be Inspector General of Police with disastrous effects on the Police and the country. Mercifully the Armed Forces have not had such an experience. Whilst the Head of State is empowered by the Constitution, a Head of State is not infallible and can make mistakes - though of course under the current Constitution the Head of State is not liable to be charged in a Court of Law for any transgressions of the law of the country." Although Lt. Gen. (retd.) Perera makes those observations, it seems to have slipped his mind that the Chairman of the DRC and Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, had served as acting Chief of Defence Staff (a military post) for a year. That is until three weeks ago.

Needless to say the way the remarks were placed offended them. They thought they were aspersions on their Commander-in-Chief. It drew a strong rebuff from both the Army and the Navy Commanders.

The Committee's recommendations on Higher Defence Control came into the public domain only after it was revealed exclusively by The Sunday Times (Situation Report - September 29,2002). So did the comments on Higher Defence Control made by retired Major General Asoka Jayawardena, who was co-opted to the Committee after its first report was formulated. (Situation Report - November 17, 2002). Yet, neither the Ministry of Defence nor the Defence Review Committee issue any official statements on the contents of these documents. There has not been one until now.

Under these circumstances came an unprecedented event - a "roundtable discussion to review the first stage of recommendations" presented by the Defence Reforms Committee on November 21, last year. The venue was one of Colombo's well known night spots, the Supper Club, at former Hotel Lanka Oberoi. The fact that this public discussion was on a matter where the recommendations have not been officially announced might be hilarious. But other matters were not.

Taking part were Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, the Chairman of DRC, Lt. Gen. (retd.) Denis Perera, the member working most and late comer Maj. Gen. (retd.) Asoka Jayawardena. Though the Committee's recommendations were not made public, they were making their debut for a "public discussion."

It was hosted by the German based Berghoff Foundation for Conflict Studies. This is by no means to cast aspersions on this NGO for coming forth to ensure a public discourse on a matter so vital to Sri Lankans.

They should be commended for it. But making the recommendations public officially and ensuring a broader public debate on the subject should have been the responsibility of the UNF Government. Surely, it could easily have been done from Parliament which it wants to strengthen or confer "more powers." It would have been only appropriate for Defence Minister Marapana to have made a public statement from there. It could then have been given wide publicity.

After all it concerns a matter of national security. It is a crying shame, if not a humiliating spectacle for any self respecting Government to see its Defence Secretary and two Defence Reform Committee members having to fall back on the funding of an NGO. That is to give their fellow countrymen an idea what defence reforms were going to be. That again is from the floor of a night club. That was how the subject of defence reforms, with little consultation from the defence establishment, civil society and an opposition, was given top priority.

Through near 20 years of Eelam War many ad hoc changes in the military organisation have been made primarily to meet political exigencies. None of these have proved to improve the organisational capacity of the Armed Forces to meet the strategic and tactical demands to combat the Eelam Wars. On the contrary, these ad hoc organisational experiments have contributed to many a military debacle. All these organisational experiments were done to suit political caprice and ego with little input from the professional soldiery. The follies of such ad hoc and hasty changes have not achieved any military success.

At the moment the requirement is to evaluate and remedy the many defects prevailing in the Armed Forces. Many of these stem from lack of manpower, lack of training, lack of military hardware and large scale corruption. In fact these are the reasons that have lowered the morale and efficiency of the Armed Forces.

In as much as higher defence organisation and military command does require reforms due to the increased militarization after 1983, the priority issue today is to improve the preparedness and effectiveness of the Armed Forces to combat any threat to national sovereignty. Considering threat perceptions to the nation today that is a national priority and not to enter into military reforms to satisfy only political exigencies.
Or, has that been mistaken for the threat perceptions of a political party or group?

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