Aid,
peace talks and sovereignty
The World Bank's announcement last week that it had increased its
aid pledge to Sri Lanka to a billion dollars over the next four
years, from $800 million (or $200 million a year) announced at last
month's Tokyo donor conference, is certainly welcome news to a country
struggling to raise economic growth and improve the lot of its people.
The fact that
the World Bank's announcement of its generosity came on the eve
of the government's own announcement of new proposals for an interim
power sharing arrangement to be controlled by the LTTE in the north
and east in an effort to revive the stalled peace process must surely
be a coincidence.
World Bank country
director Peter Harrold was at pains to point out that the pledges
amounted to a quintupling of previous levels of aid and that a big
chunk of the organisation's lending to Sri Lanka is in the form
of grants and the balance on what he called "our usual terms"
- interest free, with repayments over 40 years, and starting only
in 2013. "We are aware," he said, "that many in Sri
Lanka are concerned about the possible debt burden of the Tokyo
commitments."
The World Bank
must also be aware of other concerns such as the conditions attached
to the loans, in this case the most notable being that it is explicitly
tied to progress being achieved in the peace process, and economic
reforms, which usually means reducing social safety nets that protect
the poor and removing barriers that prevent exploitation of Third
World resources by big business.
There is growing
unease over the linkages between the aid that has been pledged to
Sri Lanka and peace talks aimed at ending the Eelam war. Donors
have often stated that the disbursements of much of this aid will
depend on the progress of the talks between the government and the
LTTE in arriving at a lasting solution to the ethnic problem.
The concern
is whether these conditions mean making compromises that, in effect,
erode the country's sovereignty and put a terrorist group in effective
control of over one-third of the island. In other words, whether
the largesse of the foreign donors is designed to project the peace
process in the direction they desire.
Harrold himself
described the interim administration as the "key" to the
resumption of peace talks and said the donors were "very interested"
in it. In a defensive remark that is revealing he also said: "But
nobody is exerting unnecessary pressure at present." Does it
mean that more pressure might be required, perhaps later?
The LTTE has publicly stated its desire for an interim administration
that is outside the Constitution.
The World Bank
itself is apparently prepared to be flexible in its own way. As
Harrold said the bank is prepared to work with "whatever arrangement
is put in place" and that its legal agreements with the government
were flexible enough to accommodate changes in the interim administrative
set up.
The bank also
appears to be ready for the worst. Its Country Assistance Strategy
unveiled last week said lending would fall to previous levels -
of just $50-60 a year - if the peace process broke down and hostilities
resumed in the north-east, and economic reforms were delayed.
It also has
an "exit strategy" - a worst-case scenario of what would
happen if the war resumed on what it called a "national scale".
According to this, there would be no new lending and in all probability,
the bank might even suspend all operations, although this last option,
it said, was "highly unlikely". |