Kadi's concerns irk Cabinet Ministers
By Anthony David
Barely five weeks after the exclusive revelations in The Sunday
Times (Situation Report - August 3) the gradual transformation of
the landscape around Trincomalee with guerrillas opening new military
camps, re-occupying ones abandoned and setting up satellite camps
around bases that existed, has now blown into a thorny political
issue between the UNF Government and the opposition People's Alliance.
Triggering off
the acrimonious battle was a briefing, former Foreign Minister and
international affairs adviser to the President, Lakshman Kadirgamar,
gave The Island and The Sunday Times publishers and editors on Friday,
August 29.
At the conference
room at his Wijerama residence, he produced a full-scale colour
grid map marking out the military installations of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (See the map on this page) and explained
the dangers posed to the strategic port of Trincomalee and its environs
by this development.
Mr. Kadirgamar
made clear that heightening national security concerns did not allow
his conscience to remain quiet. That was the reason why he had chosen
to alert the editors and publishers.
The sentiments
expressed by him were reflected again in a nine-page PA statement
(together with a black and white copy of the same map) issued on
Friday. Excerpts:
"Before the ceasefire agreement there was no Tiger camp on
the southern perimeter of Trincomalee harbour. This region comes
under the Kinniya and Mutur Divisional Secretary areas and although
LTTE members were seen here occasionally, the region never was under
the control of the Tigers.
"In 1967
the Sri Lanka Army and the Navy jointly started and carried out
a search operation from Foul Point upto Kattaparichchan in the east
and Ilakkanthai in the south. And in 1998 the special naval boat
fleet again carried out a search operation from Foul Point upto
Ilakkanthai sea-board.
"These
operations made it quite patent that there existed no permanent
Tiger camp of any type in the area. The first Tiger camp started
after the ceasefire agreement, to the South of Trincoamalee. By
the ceasefire agreement Mullaitivu and Vakarai were recognized as
Tiger-controlled areas, as they were permitted sea travel.
"When they
first started sea travel between Mullaitivu and Vakaraia they sought
permission from ceasefire monitors to use Illakanthai as a temporary
point of embarkation and disembarkation for cadres and taking in
of cargo. That was not at all in conformity with the ceasefire agreement.
"Although
the Sri Lanka Navy objected to these illegal Tiger demands, security
officers of the UNF Government agreed to grant the requests. Because
of this approval the Sea Tigers, for the first time, used Ilakkanthai
as a transit point between Mullaitivu and Vakarai. From April 2003
Sea Tiger craft came direct from Mullaitivu to Illakanthai and gradually
transformed it as a main Tiger camp. Fast attack craft of the LTTE
and suicide bomber sea craft of the LTTE is presently stationed
there.
"As this
camp is situated within approximately four miles off Trincomalee,
a Ilakanthai forms a chief launching pad on Trincomalee. The emergence
of Ilakkanthai Tiger base is another outcome of the Government's
silence in the face of the aggressive policy of the LTTE.
"During
the recent past 13 LTTE camps have been set up around the southern
perimeter of Trincomalee from Ilakkanthai in the eastern direction.
This coincides with the citing of the LTTE Naval camp in Ilakkanthai.
"The cluster of LTTE camps put up recently around Trincomalee
are code named 3-2 camp in Sampur, 0-2 camp in Villukulam and 0-1
camp, 32 MF camp, Dolphin and India One camp.
In Kattaparichchan,
located in the southern and eastern direction are 1-1 camp, 73 camp,
0-0 camp, and B.C. Camp 3 located in the eastern direction. "This
has been done in flagrant violation of the MoU but the Government
has remained tight-lipped on this matter. Further emboldened by
this attitude on the part of the Government, the LTTE has proceeded
to set up another camp in close proximity to Manirasakulam.
"The Wan
Ella camp has thus become the 14th camp put up by the LTTE surrounding
Trincomalee. The Government not only maintains a strict silence
on this matter in the face of this high handed action by the LTTE
but also proceeded to justify their actions through media releases."
Mr. Kadirgamar's
briefing to publishers and editors came just after he had ended
a tour of India. During a visit to New Delhi, he had briefed both
Indian Government and Opposition leaders on the developments in
Trincomalee. The move, The Sunday Times learnt, had already triggered
off Indian concerns. The Government there is learnt to be taking
stock of the situation and is also learnt to have made informal
contacts on the matter with the Government of Norway, currently
facilitating the peace process.
Mr. Kadirgamar
made clear that the UNF Government's failure to take action to neutralize
the growing LTTE threat to Trincomalee not only endangered Sri Lanka's
but also India's own security interests. When a publisher asked
whether he could bring Mr. Kadirgamar's concerns to the attention
of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, he replied "yes."
That saw the
beginning of the new crisis. The Government felt that the grid map
was a "sexed up" version of the map that appeared in The
Sunday Times. The term "sexed up" had come into vogue
in the journalistic lexicon after the BBC accused the Labour Government
of Prime Minister, Tony Blair, for sexing up a report on threats
posed by deposed Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussain, in order to obtain
Parliamentary approval to send troops to join coalition forces in
Iraq.
Premier Wickremesinghe
who was briefed of the map and the comments made by Mr. Kadirgamar
requested Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri to give the
same briefing to Defence Minister, Tilak Marapana and Defence Secretary,
Austin Fernando last Sunday. The Navy Chief complied. The briefing
was given by Rear Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, Commander Eastern
Naval Area, in the company of Vice Admiral Sandagiri.
Premier Wickremesinghe's
subsequent inquiries had revealed that Mr. Kadirgamar had been briefed
on the security situation in Trincomalee earlier by Vice Admiral
Sandagiri, Rear Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, Army Commander Lt.
Gen. Lionel Balagalle and Director Operations at Army Headquarters.
Meanwhile, The
Sunday Times learnt that Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, had
obtained from Army Headquarters the text of the briefing given to
Mr. Kadirgamar by Lt. Gen. Balagalle. This was because the Army
Chief himself was on an official visit to South Korea at that time.
That had also been handed over to Premier Wickremaeinghe.
The very next
day, Premier Wickremesinghe himself met Navy Chief, Vice Admiral
Sandagiri, to obtain a first hand account of the developments. The
meeting, The Sunday Times learnt, saw Premier Wickremesinghe listening
attentively to the Navy Chief, quite in contrast to his initial
reaction where he believed the Navy was hyping up the security situation.
He had earlier
asked the Navy top brass whether the security forces wanted to go
to war when the UNF Government was talking peace. Last Wednesday
Premier Wickremesinghe briefed the Cabinet about these developments.
President Kumaratunga
was absent at this meeting. Some Ministers used the opportunity
to raise issue over the propriety of Mr. Kadirgamar bringing up
the matter when he was the beneficiary of an official Government
bungalow and Army commandos for personal security.
It seemed that
provision of security meant that beneficiaries had no right to raise
issues of national security concerns that affected the territorial
integrity or sovereignty of Sri Lanka. Some UNF Cabinet Ministers
argued on the basis that those receiving protection over threats
to their lives should remain silent even when national interests
were being endangered.
If that was
absurd enough, UNF spin-doctors went to work to further malign Mr.
Kadirgamar. This came through a vicious campaign where the state
media was portraying Mr. Kadirgamar as an alarmist, by making references
to what transpired at the Cabinet meeting. They charged that he
was using government facilities and was still criticizing the government.
The propaganda
was countered by PA stalwarts Sarath Amunugama and Mangala Samaraweera
during Friday's news conference. That included the issue of the
nine-page statement.
But the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) raised the most pertinent question. JVP's
Wimal Weerawansa said the PA was raising these issues. But it was
President Chandrika Kumaratunga who was the Commander-in-Chief.
Instead of merely calling for reports on the issues raised, what
action has she taken so far, he asked? Indeed the question begs
an answer.
Naval
purchase reports 'absolutely incorrect', says Marapana
Defence Minister Tilak Marapana has rejected as 'absolutely incorrect'
recent reports that the Sri Lanka Navy was about to purchase weapons
for its Fast Attack Crafts (FACs) when a cheaper US manufactured
weapon called 'Bushmaster' was available at a cheaper price.
The Minister
in a statement says that though another company had offered canons
at a cheaper price, as some had pointed out, it did not include
the cost of upgrading the fire control system, which is also an
essential part of the deal. He also states that the upgrading of
the system should any way be handed over to the Israeli company,
as they are the once with the proper technical knowledge to do so,
as they had manufactured the systems.
The Sri Lankan
government, at the time of purchasing the fire control systems,
had also agreed not to allow any company, other than the Israeli
company, to upgrade the systems, the Minister adds. The text of
the statement is as follows:
'My attention
has been drawn to a controversy given publicity in the media, surrounding
the purchase of weapons for the Naval Fast Attack Craft. The main
allegation seems to be that whilst a weapon called "Bushmaster"
is available to be purchased at a much cheaper rate, the Navy is
about to purchase, instead, a weapon at approximately three times
higher than this price. This is absolutely incorrect. The prices
compared are the cost of a "Bushmaster" cannon with the
cost of a cannon, including the cost of integration of the cannon
to an existing Israeli Fire System. (Weapon system consisting of
an Electro Optical Device, the Mount containing the gyro and computer
system and the cannon)
The proposed
transaction was subjected to my examination and a Cabinet paper
presented by me was approved by the Cabinet Sub-committee on Budget
and Tenders, and finally, by the Cabinet itself. The proposal was
not the purchase of a complete weapons system but the upgrading
of the existing 15 Israeli manufactured Fire Control Systems already
fitted on 15 of your fast attack crafts, by replacing the existing
23 mm cannons with 30 mm cannons and modifying the rest of the system
to accommodate this change.
In the first
place, this upgrade can only be attended to by the Israeli Government-owned
company who are the manufacturers of this Fire Control Systems.
The cannon could be of any make, but the installation of the cannon
and the upgrading of the Fire Control Systems, consequent to a change
of the cannon, can only be done by this Israeli company. The technical
know-how and the accessories necessary for this exercise is available
only with this Israeli company (being the manufacturers of this
system) and the Government of Sri Lanka, at the time of the purchase
of these systems, has signed an agreement with this company preventing
any other party modifying or upgrading the systems.
Therefore,
when the Navy wished to have the systems upgraded by replacing the
existing 23 mm canon (to get a better range), the Israeli government
was requested to submit offers for the purpose. They offered three
offers, using three different 30 mm canons, including the "Bushmaster".
According to
the Israeli offer, the total cost of the upgrade, using the "Bushmaster"
canon, was around US$ 824,000.00, using a Swiss made "Oerilikon"
canon, was US$ 724,000.00 and with a Russian canon US$ 553,000.00
per Fire Control system. The upgrade using the Russian canon was
rejected by the Evaluation Committee, as it invoked a deck modification
(at a further cost to be borne by the Navy) and the "Oerilikon"
was chosen, it being cheaper.
Therefore it
is absolutely incorrect to state that the cheaper "Bushmaster"
was rejected in favour of a more expensive cannon. The "Bushmaster"
suppliers later made an offer to supply the canon at US$ 228,472.00
per canon, but this was the price for the canon alone and does not
include the cost of the upgrade to the system which, as I said earlier,
could be executed only by the Israeli company which manufactured
the Fire Control System to which this canon is to be fitted. The
Israeli company had already quoted US$ 824,000.00 to upgrade the
system using the "Bushmaster ".
As this must
necessarily have caused much concern amongst the public, and in
particular, the armed forces, I shall be very thankful if this communication
could be given publicity in your paper.
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