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India has spoken: what's next? Guerrillas in striped fatigues, armed with Kalashnikovs stood guard outside the building. One of their leaders waxed eloquent to these MPs, all of them elected freely through the ballot. With a small red flag of "Thamil Eelam" in front of him, when S.P. Tamilselvan, leader of the Political Wing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam spoke, there was pin drop silence. All of them listened intently. The TNA team was led by Rajayothayam Sampanthan (Trincomalee), a one time fiery critic of the LTTE who sought protection from the Police Special Task Force (STF) commandos for fear of his life from them. It was also not so long ago, at another closed door meeting, he wept like a child before senior Indian High Commission officials in Colombo. That was to plead his case over switching allegiance. "What can I do? I have to save my life. I have no choice," he lamented whilst wiping tears cascading down his chubby cheeks. At last Wednesday's closed door meeting, however, he nodded his head in approval every time Mr. Tamilselvan stared at his face. So did his colleagues - Mavai Senathirajah (Jaffna), Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam (Jaffna), Selvam Adaikkalanathan (Vavuniya), Raja Kuhaneswaran (Wanni), Sivasakthi Ananthan (Wanni), M.K. Sivajilingam (Jaffna), A. Vinayagamoorthy (Jaffna) and Suresh Premachandran (Jaffna). The pro-LTTE Tamilnet website, now a "must see" for those on both sides of the "north-south" divide, boasted quoting Mr.Sampanthan "….as it is the first time the LTTE will be submitting its concrete set of proposals in writing, they discussed the proposals at great length." Yes, they did. But not all the proposals and not all the issues were discussed at "great length." If the Tamilnet references made one assume it was indeed a full and frank discussion on the LTTE's proposals, it was both wrong and misleading. Why? Because, Mr. Tamilselvan made clear he was not going to disclose details. He did not give a reason. The Sunday Times learnt the LTTE had been told by Norwegian facilitators not to divulge any details until 24 hours after they were handed over. The LTTE had originally planned to give their proposals to Norwegian Ambassador in Colombo, Hans Brattskar on September 26 and hold a news conference in Kilinochchi the next day. The dates have now been changed to October 31 and November 1. Next Friday, (October 31) Mr. Brattskar is expected to fly from Colombo to Kilinochchi to bring them to be handed over to the UNF Government. On Saturday (November 1), Mr. Tamilselvan will hold a news conference in Kilinochchi to formally announce the full text. Even the Colombo based foreign correspondents and local journalists are to be invited. Unlike the UNF, the guerrillas seemed keen to make their demands known even before talks begin. But Mr. Tamilselvan did give MPs of the Tamil National Alliance an important clue of what is going to come. The Sunday Times learnt he told them that the proposed interim administrative structure the LTTE will demand will seek to incorporate powers relating to land use, security, revenue, police and a judiciary. That left little room for guess work over the character of the demands. These are all subjects expressly left out by the UNF Government when it forwarded their proposals in July, this year, for a provisional administration for the north-east. This was the third such proposal made since the LTTE pulled out of the peace talks in April, this year. The guerrillas made clear that the future of the ceasefire would depend on Government's acceptance of their proposals, being made for the first time since the near two decade long armed conflict. Mr Tamilselvan called upon the TNA parliamentarians to work hard to create a "ground-swell" of public opinion. He said they should begin doing so even before the proposals become public. He also made clear there would be no move by the LTTE to set up a different umbrella Tamil political organisation at this juncture. Hence, for the first time since the 20 month long ceasefire, the main elements of what the LTTE will demand became known to more than a few last Wednesday. Insisting on powers for land use, security, revenue, police and judiciary, one would argue, has the trappings for a separate state. This is the reason why the UNF Government was explicit in excluding these subjects in their July proposals. If that is highly a contentious issue, a grave situation will arise with the LTTE insisting that the powers it is seeking for an interim administrative set up will be linked to a final settlement. An equally grave situation has already arisen after Mr Tamilselvan's assertion that the LTTE will only talk to a UNF Government delegation and not to any Muslim representatives. The same position was articulated by Military Wing leader for Batticaloa S. Muralitharan alias Karuna when he spoke to Tamil media last week. He said "we regard Muslim people living in the North-East as a segment of Tamil people." But a sharp rejoinder to Karuna's remarks came in Parliament on Wednesday when Muslim parliamentarians of various hues were unanimous in their views - Muslims should have separate representation at upcoming peace talks. In view of this, the UNF Government will find it difficult, if not impossible, to talk peace with the guerrillas without a separate Muslim delegation taking part. That places them at loggerheads with the LTTE. If the "battle
lines" are getting clearly defined for the first time after
ceasefire, with each other's negotiating postures increasingly becoming
public, there is now a new dimension, or flashpoint. That is the
talks this week in New Delhi between Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe
and Indian Premier, Atal Behari Vajpayee. A Joint Statement that
followed has left a Sword of Damocles hanging over the LTTE. The significance of this unanimity, amidst the bitter acrimony between the two sides, is underscored by a key element - the Government of India seems to have met the aspirations of the two major political groups in the country, the UNF and the PA through this three page joint statement. This is undoubtedly an important landmark in the history of Indo-Sri Lanka relations. It allayed fears of security concerns for the UNF. For the PA, it endorsed President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga's persistent demand that an interim administration should an integral part of a final settlement. Both sides were also delighted in their own way that India had sent a strong message to the LTTE. Many of the recent joint declarations that followed visits by dignitaries from one country to another spoke largely on diplomatic niceties and mundane issues - the free and frank exchange of views, the need to further strengthen close ties that exist and so on. But last Tuesday's New Delhi Joint Statement is eloquent on a number of crucial issues. More importantly, the Government of India, which maintained a studied, self-imposed silence since the ceasefire on February 22, has now spoken. What are the important features of this Joint Statement? It begins by assigning priority to economic matters. That takes almost two thirds of the contents. Since the ceasefire and the resultant air of normalcy, there has been a significant growth in trade and economic ties between India and Sri Lanka. It is indeed a credit for Premier Wickremesinghe to have personally pursued efforts to concretise this relationship through formal arrangements, joint studies and other forms of co-operation. Another creditable factor is that he raised issue over civil aviation links between India and Sri Lanka. India has lifted restrictions on Sri Lankan airlines flights to six capitals - Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Bangalore, Hyderabad Kolkata and 18 other destinatrons. It was easier for Sri Lankans to fly to most parts of the world. But existing requirements prevented them from easily obtaining a seat in a flight to most of these Indian cities. The change will now facilitate increased travel and thus a greater interaction between the people of two countries. Premier Wickremesinghe's previous efforts to forge a link through a bridge across the Palk Straits from Mannar to the Tamil Nadu coast and a ferry service covering the same area have failed so far. The move appears to have met with opposition from Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Jeyaram Jeyalalitha. In that context, the Joint Statement contains a one liner: "The Sri Lankan Prime Minister proposed commencement of a ferry service linking Colombo with Kochi (Kerala)." It does not mention an Indian response to the proposal. Evidently New Delhi has carefully avoided earning the wrath of Ms Jeyalalitha. Whether the proposal to bypass Tamil Nadu and propose a ferry service linking the neighbouring state of Kerala will become a new irritant for her remains to be seen. A most important element of the Joint Statement begins by saying "The Sri Lankan Prime Minister apprised the Indian leadership of recent developments in the peace process and proposals made by his Government for the establishment of an interim administration." For the first time since the ceasefire of February 22, last year, the Government of India has set out its policy vis-à-vis the peace talks - it expects the LTTE response to be "reasonable and comprehensive" and points out that India supports a negotiated settlement "acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society within the framework of a united Sri Lanka and consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for individual rights." By becoming a party to this Joint Statement, it is clear, Premier Wickremasinghe and the UNF acquiesce with, or share this policy. What of the LTTE? India also makes it clear its policy is that an "enduring solution has to emerge purely through internal political process." Though it has not spelt out what this process is, India has sent a clear message to all other countries, including some trying to use financial leverage, not to impose their will or pressures. That is not all. India also makes says "any interim arrangement should be an integral part of the final settlement and should be in the framework of the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka." Is that not a strong message to the LTTE? Does it not spell out the confines or the parameters within which India expects them to formulate their proposals? The clues emerging from Kilinochchi after Mr Tamilselvan's meeting with the TNA parliamentarians reveal they will go far, far beyond what India wants. If that is critical enough, the Joint Statement says "the two Prime Ministers discussed the supply of equipment to the Sri Lankan defence forces and agreed that the two sides will commence discussions with a view to concluding a defence co-operation agreement at the earliest." That is not all. It adds "India will maintain an abiding interest in the security of Sri Lanka and remains committed to its sovereignty and territorial integrity." Is this not a warning to the LTTE that any attempts that impinge on Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity will draw a response from India? The UNF Government Spokesman and Chief Negotiator, now well known for his blatant spin during media briefings, declared on Thursday that arrangements with India regarding security "has no bearing on any apprehensions on the part of the Government of Sri Lanka with regard to a re-commencement of the war." Why have these arrangements at all after 20 long months of ceasefire. Only the deaf, the dumb and the blind would believe such Goebelsian pronouncements, and the question is whether the discerning public believe what he says. If there is no apprehension of a possible re-commencement of war, why have Tiger guerrillas doubled their strength, recruited children, begun smuggling military hardware and embarked on further training. Why did his cabinet colleague, the Minister of Defence, Tilak Marapana, concede this stark fact in Parliament only a week ago. Have the guerrillas not been following the Maoist dictum of preparing for war when talking peace. In this backdrop, the fact that the security forces have been ill equipped, was facing desertions and receiving very poor responses to recruitment drives is now well known. The corollary of all this is that the security forces are not on a high level of preparedness to meet a contingency. Consequently there has been a marked shift in the military balance between the security forces and the guerrillas. Most of this has been due to UNF Government's conscious lapses. They did not want to offend the guerrillas. But reports of them developing a strong military machine jolted them. In seeking to forge a defence co-operation agreement with India, Premier Wickremesinghe has thus obtained an assurance that can correct the imbalance. The scope and content of the proposed Defence Co-operation Agreement will now become the subject of discussions between the Defence Secretaries of the two Governments. Premier Wickremesinghe would be better advised to ensure the Sri Lankan side is backed by competent officials, who have a professional knowledge. This agreement for defence co-operation has given rise to notions in some quarters of a treaty that may lead again to the deployment of Indian troops in Sri Lanka. This is furthest from the truth. Recently India entered into a defence co-operation agreement with Singapore though this economically stable island nation has no internal or external security threats. Therefore the agreement focused on exchange of intelligence information with regard to Islamic fundamentalist groups. Similarly the defence co-operation agreement between India and Sri Lanka will formalise the training of troops now carried out by India in addition to provision of military hardware. It will cover exchange of intelligence, joint exchanges and deal with other areas of common interest. Already the news of an impending defence co-operation agreement between India and Sri Lanka has raised concerns in LTTE quarters. The first formal response came in the pro-LTTE Tamil Guardian newspaper printed in London. An editorial in this week's edition, the newspaper said "Mr Wickremesinghe's public courting of Delhi in this regard has struck a raw nerve and revived unpleasant memories. More importantly, the move suggests Colombo clearly expects to coerce the LTTE into a political solution - as opposed to co-operatively negotiating one, it added. Pointing out that Colombo's "frantic efforts" to augment its military capability will undoubtedly "prompt a strategy rethink in the Wanni," Tamil Guardian says it is "unlikely to contribute to a conducive atmosphere" at the negotiating table. Excerpts from the editorial: "Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, is clearly expecting the LTTE leadership to share his assessment of the risks and react appropriately - i.e. follow his lines of rationale. As such, he is turning what ought to be a process of conflict resolution into one of military blackmail. "The question, however, is what if the LTTE does not react quite as Mr.Wickremesinghe intends when, instead of striking a deal that accommodates the aspirations of the Tamil people, he attempts to foist - at the point of a bayonet - a formulation of the present Sinhala domination on them? "…one can expect Mr. Wickremesinghe's efforts to shift the military advantage drastically in his favour to have a profound impact on the peace process as a whole. His predilection for shaking an 'international safety net' at the LTTE has already raised the movement's hackles. "The Tigers warned in June, for example, that 'by seeking this 'safety net' the Colombo regime has shifted the peace process from third party facilitation to the realm of international arbitration by formidable external forces that has far reaching consequences to the political and economic destiny of the island.' Another dimension to Premier Wickremesinghe's visit to New Delhi came in a report in Doodarshan, the national television network of India. It quoted Home Minister, L. K. Advani, of warning the Sri Lankan Prime Minister to be wary about a foreign intelligence agency operating in Sri Lanka. The TV station said it posed serious threats to Sri Lanka's national security. Although the LTTE leaders in the Wanni have not yet responded officially, one source who spoke on grounds of anonymity on the telephone from Kilinochchi declared that by proposing a defence co-operation agreement with India, Premier Wickremesinghe has "taken the situation back to what prevailed on February 21, 2002 - a day before the ceasefire came into effect." He was alluding to the uneasy climate that prevailed before the ceasefire. He declined to elaborate but cautioned that coming events will prove whether the Premier's move has increased the "prospects for peace or for war." Either way, the coming weeks will be crucial not only to the peace process but also to the calm that has remained in the past twenty months. |
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