Thoughts from London

Moving in the right geo-political direction
Governments can change and are changed. So can policies and programmes. But a country's geographical position remains unchanged and unalterable (unless, of course, some seismic convulsion does so). This is axiomatic and forms the bedrock of geopolitical and geo-strategic thinking.

The reality of a country's geographical location is particularly important in formulating policy given Sri Lanka's own position in the Indian Ocean and in relation to the Indian subcontinent. We are a small nation with a small economy lying so near to a neighbour that is not only a giant in terms of size but also has a huge population, is a nuclear power, is militarily strong and is the regional superpower.

Besides that Sri Lanka and India have cultural and linguistic affinities that make the relationship closer than it would have otherwise been. These are facts known to almost every Sri Lankan and should not need reiteration except that, in recent times, the government appears to have forgotten or ignored them in the embarrassing haste to cement a relationship with the United States that is distinguished by an unmistakable impression of subservience more characteristic of Latin American autocrats.

Fortunately news emanating from New Delhi and Colombo following Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's visit to India suggests a valuable course correction that is more appreciative of geopolitical and geo-strategic imperatives arising out of Sri Lanka's still unresolved conflict.

If newspaper commentaries are correct then Sri Lanka is trying to thrash out a defence cooperation agreement with India that could prove invaluable even if Eelam War 4 breaks out or not. Undoubtedly there are those (please not "those of us") who have atavistic fears of India following the historical invasions from the north and the presence of some 60 million Tamils across the narrow Palk Strait in Tamil Nadu.

They have more recent memories of India's coercive diplomacy and New Delhi's virtual imposition of the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987 and subsequent events. While suspicion of - and possibly anger at - Indian interference and intervention in Sri Lankan affairs is understandable, there is a need to consider the realpolitik.

It is well known that for all the LTTE's talk of a federal-style polity for the north and east that retains Sri Lanka's unity and territorial integrity, the group is strengthening itself military by smuggling arms into the country.

The discovery of arms caches in Thailand and Indonesia and more recently news of a clandestine arms ship that got away because of the indiscretions (or sabotage) of the Scandinavian-dominated Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, is proof enough that the LTTE is preparing for war while talking peace.

It does not need a military strategist to understand how porous the seas to the north and east are because of the absence of a navy of sufficient strength or fully equipped spotter aircraft to maintain a constant vigil that would deter the LTTE's arms merchants.

A strong blue-water navy backed by air surveillance is lacking because those Alice-in-Wonderland politicians and officials, who optimistically believe in the good faith of the Tigers, refuse to accept the lessons of history.

Consequently the country has let its military guard down thereby increasing considerably the vulnerability of Sri Lanka to internal armed attacks. So between those who are committed to work hand-in-glove with the cabal in power in Washington and the over-ambitious peaceniks still trying to collect their peace dividend, the country appeared unprepared to face another threat to its security.

It is to Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's credit that though he seemed inclined to go along with those who wished him to pay pooja to Washington, he kept his options open with regard to military collaboration with India.

When a formal cross services agreement with Washington which would have given American troops access to Sri Lankan air space and ports and other facilities fell through, probably because of Indian objections, Ranil Wickremesinghe saw the significance of the Indian connection.

Still pro-American elements in his government and others supporting it, are hoping for US military backing to pressure the LTTE. But in hard practical terms, it is only India with its vastly superior navy and air power that can provide the wide sweep of the Indian Ocean to the north and east of us to interdict LTTE arms smuggling operations.

Moreover, news reports have indicated that the Tigers could be having storage facilities in the Andaman Islands for arms that are shipped from Myanmar, Thailand, Kampuchea and Indonesia. Who better than the Indian navy and Indian intelligence to curb such operations, especially when the fissiparous tendencies actively pursued by the LTTE could well influence similar movements in India's vulnerable periphery.

But while Prime Minister Wickremesinghe pursues his India policy there is need to take note of sycophantic effusions that could do more harm to his image than good.
Mr. Wickremesinghe has generally been a careful person, particularly as a politician. He is not one who can be rushed into a decision or a situation, preferring to take time to weigh the pros and cons.

So when over-zealous editorialists say that Prime Minister Wickremesinghe has "both Delhi and Washington eating out of his hand", we are left wondering whether this is more semantic gobbledegook, misunderstanding of common English phrases or journalistic over-spin.

Whatever the reason for such grandiloquence, Mr Wickremesinghe will perhaps be the first to feel embarrassed by having his hand cast in the role of a serving plate. Equally embarrassing would be the comparison with Lee Kuan Yew who is said to have juggled relations with his neighbours like a politician par excellence. Mr. Wickremesinghe might have played his hand quite consummately in pulling the rug from under the feet of the PA during a recent parliamentary debate.

But surely the Lee Kuan Yew analogy is false. Lee ruled Singapore as an autocrat and with an iron fist. He brooked no opposition, did not allow freedom of expression and so Singapore lacked democratic politics. Lee could take any decisions without having to face criticism, at least publicly. Surely this is not the ethos in which Mr. Wickremesinghe has to govern a country already wracked by dissension.

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