Are we sacrificing the peace dividend?
Whatever the merits and demerits of the constitutional and political
crisis, there can be little doubt that its timing could not have
been any worse. The constitutional propriety of the President's
decision may be right, but it certainly was at the wrong time, in
as far as the economy was concerned.
Just as when
the country was tasting a part of the peace dividend and hoping
that a durable and permanent settlement would bring a full peace
dividend, the President's move to take over the defence portfolio,
put the peace process on hold. Some of the benefits that the people
as a whole were looking forward to, have become at best, uncertain,
at worst dashed to the ground. The moves on the political chessboard
are certainly proving intriguing and exciting. But whoever wins
the political chess game, the people of the country are the likely
losers.
A quick resolution
of the problem and a clear picture of the future are essential for
the process of economic recovery to gain speed and momentum. The
worst affected sectors of the economy are the expected foreign aid
flows that may not be available for sometime or not at all. The
uncertainty in the political environment and security situation
would no doubt affect foreign aid disbursement as well as foreign
investment. Even local investors are likely to postpone their decisions
to invest. Tourism is likely to be adversely affected just at the
time when peace was ushering in a sharp revival of tourism and policies
were being implemented to facilitate tourism and increase the country's
capacity to cope with a much larger number of tourists.
These favourable
developments should not be interpreted as indicating that the economy
was faring well before the political crisis. Although several economic
indicators like the increase in foreign reserves, increased foreign
investment flows, sharp increase in tourist arrivals and the unprecedented
rise in the stock market indices, gave the impression of an economic
boom, in reality it was only a modest economic recovery. Comparisons
with the poor economic performance of last year buttressed the impression
that the economy was faring well. In fact there were serious fundamental
weaknesses in the economy and the real economic performance was
modest.
Let us look
at these weaknesses. In the first eight months of this year the
public debt continued to increase. It increased by over 5 per cent
from Rs. 1669 billion at the end of last year to Rs 1767 billion
at the end of August this year. The increase in public debt in the
past 12 months was 5.9 per cent. This means that the public debt
continues to be higher than the GDP. At the end of the year the
public debt as a proportion of GDP is likely to be at the current
level of 105 per cent of GDP.
The GDP grew
by 5.5 per cent during the first and the second quarters, giving
a 5.6 per cent growth for the first half of the year. However, this
growth is not as impressive as it seems since the growth rates are
from a low base. If the economy achieves the projected 5.5 per cent
growth rate gives less than a 2 per cent average economic growth
for the past three years (2000-2003). This is near stagnation of
the Sri Lankan economy.
Though industry
grew by 6.9 per cent in the first half of this year, this was in
comparison with a decline of three per cent in the first half of
last year. Indicative of the modest performance in industry is that
industrial exports grew by only 12 per cent in the last 12 months,
from August 2002 to 2003 of this year. This is inadequate as we
are measuring the growth on the basis of a low performance of the
previous twelve months. Industrial production increased by only
2.4 per cent in the last 12 months ending August 2003. Agricultural
production declined in the first half of 2003. Agricultural export
earnings declined by 1.3 per cent in the first 8 months. The notable
increase in GDP was in services that grew by 7 per cent.
Although the
recovery in industrial exports is significant, the industrial export
growth of only 12 per cent is a cause for anxiety. This growth in
industrial exports is less impressive when one realises that the
industrial export earnings this year are lower than what we earned
in the comparable period of 2000. By August 2003 the trade deficit
for the year had reached US$ 876 million, higher than the deficit
for the same period in 2002.
The extrapolation
of the eight months trade deficit for the year means that the deficit
is likely to reach around US$ 1300 million at the end of 2003. Such
a large trade deficit indicates that the economic recovery has failed
to correct fundamental weaknesses and raises questions on the export
competitiveness of the country.
In spite of
the fact that a more balanced assessment of the economy indicates
a more modest economic gain than generally supposed, there was no
doubt that the economy was poised to gain momentum. The political
uncertainties are a definite setback to this. |