Why a Defence takeover
There is a tragic if not frighteningly bizarre paradox to last week's political developments. Tiger guerrillas have demanded self-rule for five years in the North-East. They want only money from the government for their all powerful Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). This body is clearly a stepping stone for a separate state. Yet there were no protests This is in contrast to countrywide protests over setting up of less powerful Provincial Councils in the wake of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord of 1987.
Instead ruling United National Front (UNF) and the main opposition People's Alliance (PA) are locked in a festering national battle. And that, fanned by their respective propaganda mills, is bringing a nation to the brink of disaster, both economically and politically.

This is whilst the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), has militarily fortified itself during the twenty long months of ceasefire. They have won unprecedented international recognition. They have created for themselves a brand new image in the country's political firmament. All these achievements have come whilst the UNF ignored or fully supported their efforts in this regard. The LTTE is now watching the political power play in the south with gleeful silence.

All this is the result of the November 4 sacking of three Cabinet Ministers - Tilak Marapana (Defence), John Ameratunga (Interior) and Imtiaz Bakeer Markar (Communications). She took over their portfolios. First to some immediate repercussions caused. It is now becoming increasingly clear that some of the measures that accompanied the takeover were not well thought out. Others were not properly articulated. They caused damage to the economy. They also revived memories of a dark era of the past.

Main among them was the move to declare a State of Emergency. A feuding section of the Presidential media apparatus, The Sunday Times learnt had leaked to selected foreign media the news that a state of emergency had already been declared. This powerful cabal has for months wielded such influence that they picked and chose to which media news releases should be sent and who should be shut out.

This was even before a Presidential proclamation could reach the Government Printer. Later, when staff there was picking out spelling mistakes on the draft, protests over the declaration were arriving at the Janadipathi Mandiraya. They came from several quarters including senior diplomats representing western nations.

The foreign publicity pitch was backed by images of troops guarding some state institutions. Highly exaggerated accounts in some foreign visual media revived memories of past horrors perpetrated by the PA. It left the impression that Colombo was burning. They sent shock waves in many world capitals. Colossal damage had been done. An economy that was showing signs of recovery during the uneasy calm of the ceasefire was struck a fatal blow.

A state of emergency, called for by armed forces chiefs, to deal with possible acts of sabotage after the take-over of the three Ministries was called off. There was a stupid irony about it. It came even before an emergency was enforced. Yet, someone failed to take sufficient care. They failed to tell the Foreign Ministry about it.

Acting Foreign Secretary, Ms Serala Fernando sent out a circular fax to all Sri Lanka diplomatic missions abroad on November 6, two days after the take over. It was a "confidential, priority" message. It said "Office of the President has requested that all Missions be informed that declaration of emergency is only for a very short period of time. Please brief the relevant authorities in your country of accreditation in order to reassure that the situation here is normal."

That the Foreign Ministry message went to Sri Lankan diplomatic missions abroad a day after it was known that there was no state of emergency is bad enough. Now the same cabal at the Presidency that had leaked the story was back at work. This time they were lining up interviews for President Kumaratunga with the foreign media to tell a different story. It was too little too late. Severe damage had already been done to the economy and the image of the country.

In the first place, if a state of emergency was indeed imposed, the nation and the outside world should have been told of the fact. The reasons for it should have been explained. Here is a case of self destruction that successive regimes are prone to.
Like in previous instances, there will be no accountability. This episode, like others, will go into the limbo of forgotten things whilst a nation suffers.

One sector of the economy that has been badly hit is the tourist industry. "We fear more cancellations due to recent developments and the Norwegian announcement of the temporary suspension of their facilitator role," K. Selvam, Director General of the Ceylon Tourist Board told The Sunday Times. He said the crisis comes at a time when tourist arrivals were increasing.

Tourism Minister, Gamini Lokuge said that over 3,000 tourists have already cancelled planned visits to Sri Lanka in November and December. He said he fears more cancellations. The latest had been from a group of Swedish tourists due in Colombo this week. He warned that an estimated half a million arrivals by end of this year will not materialise. Hence thousands who depend on the tourist industry will suffer, he added.
There were similar concerns in the business community too. Top management personalities of several companies complained of concerns expressed by their foreign principals. Would be investors, some from India, had shied off. International banking institutions were making detailed inquiries about developments and what the security situation portends.

Last Wednesday armed forces commanders also raised the same issue when they had a meeting with President Kumaratunga. They told her of the adverse impact exaggerated reports of the declaration of a state of emergency has had. They impressed on her the need for corrective action to prevent more damage to national interests. They also took the opportunity to appeal to her to ensure that the budget proposals are presented in Parliament. Among those who were anxiously awaiting a pay rise were troops.

Within minutes, state media was repeating reports that budget proposals would be presented when Parliament resumes after prorogation on November 19. President Kumaratunga who made copious notes had also assured armed forces commanders of action on various other issues they raised.

To the uninitiated, President Kumaratunga's move to take over the three portfolios was a surprise. Not to those who have been following events associated with the defence establishment closely. Strengthening indications that such action will become inevitable someday was clear from the time a separate Ministry of Defence came to function under the UNF regime.

Hardly a month after the UNF Government assumed office in December 2001, Police raided a Forward Operations cell or Safe House of the Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). It was in the mistaken belief that it was a hide-out from which plots to assassinate UNF leaders were being hatched.

In the aftermath Army Commander (Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle), Director of Military Intelligence (Brigadier Kapila Hendavithana) and other senior officers were charged in the Chief Magistrate's Courts in Kandy for storing weapons and explosives in the Safe House. This was the first time in the nation's history that such action has been taken.
It later became abundantly clear that the Safe House was used only as a "forward operations cell" to carry out assassinations of Tiger guerrilla leaders in the Eastern Province. This was after The Sunday Times began exclusive revelations in these columns beginning January 6.

The Directorate of Military Intelligence was being helped in this task by the Police Special Task Force (STF). It turned out that frustrated retired military officers supported by some politicians had been behind the campaign to discredit the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) operations carried out by the DMI. Yet, the UNF Government took no action to explain to the public the correct facts. It allowed a malicious propaganda campaign against the Army's actions to continue.

However, it failed. No punishment was meted out to those who perpetrated this national crime. Retired Judge Dharmasiri Jayawickerema, a one-man Presidential Commission of Inquiry probed this matter during lengthy sittings at a conference room at the Bandaranaike International Conference Hall. He is expected to hand over his report to President Kumaratunga later next week.

Government inaction led to serious consequences. Up to yesterday, over 44 persons, enlisted intelligence operatives, policemen, civilian informants and members of moderate Tamil political parties have been assassinated. There have been 31 attempted killings and 17 abductions. Though some of the killings have been during broad day light and in the City, the Police have not been able to identify or arrest the guerrilla killers.

Nor have they been able to track down the increasing number of Safe Houses the guerrillas have set up in the City and immediate suburbs. They have also not been able to curb smuggling of weapons into these Safe Houses after the complete withdrawal of check-points and other security measures. This came after the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of February 22 last year.

Another aspect has been the inability of state intelligence agencies to keep close tabs on guerrilla activity. They were pre-occupied with political pursuits. A sequel to this came last Tuesday when Defence Secretary, Cyril Herath, himself a top intelligence officer at one time, visited the headquarters of a local intelligence agency. Accompanied by senior officials, he saw to the sealing of an electronic unit that had been used to monitor telephone conversations.

It turned out that the exercise has been carried out in the past not to monitor those posing national security threats or those involved in terrorist activity. Instead, among the targets were opposition politicians, hand picked journalists and senior military men. For obvious reasons one cannot elaborate.

Since the ceasefire, details of how Tiger guerrillas have been strengthening both their political and military capabilities have been repeatedly highlighted in these columns. Politically they extended an administrative infrastructure that prevailed in the Wanni to the East. This was by opening up, among others, "law courts, police stations, tax collection machinery." Embarrassed UNF leaders tried to hide this fact by claiming that they had existed before. But the efforts failed.

More significant were the improvement and strengthening of the guerrilla military machine. If the total strength of armed LTTE cadres, according to local intelligence, stood at 9,390 before the ceasefire, it increased to 19,750. This is in respect of both the North and East and includes members of the so-called Eelappadai, a civilian militia. Intelligence officials say at least 30 per cent of the strength is child soldiers.

The LTTE has been smuggling in more state of the art military hardware. Intelligence sources say this includes surface-to-surface missiles and more surface-to-air missiles. The Navy intercepted and sank at least two vessels smuggling in military hardware, one in March and another in June, this year.

The strengthening of the guerrilla military machine was in marked contrast to Sri Lankan armed forces. They have been forced to shrink their presence in the North under the CFA. If the CFA aimed to retain the status quo that prevailed on February 22, last year, it did not happen. The military balance began to change drastically.

Army desertions during the ceasefire have been much higher than during times of war. In the year 2000 there were 4,972. The numbers increased in the succeeding years: 2001 (6,018), 2002 (7,326) and 2003 (4337) for the first five months. Recruitment drives after the ceasefire fell far short of targets. In 2002 the Army launched a drive to recruit 10,000 soldiers but ended up with only 2,503. In August, a drive to recruit 5,000 yielded less than 2,500. Applications to formally seek release from the Army have also increased unprecedentedly in the past 20 months.

The Sunday Times revealed exclusively how guerrillas opened up new military camps, re-occupied ones they abandoned and set up a string of satellite camps around the bases that existed in the Trincomalee district. The report in these columns revealed that newly recruited cadres have been trained and moved in. New weaponry and communications equipment have been widely distributed. The People's Alliance raised issue over this with Indian leaders. If the Government denied it at first, later Defence Minister, Tilak Marapana, was to admit it in Parliament.

There have long been strengthening indications that a take over of the subject of defence from UNF was becoming inevitable. The security balance between the armed forces and Tiger guerrillas was drastically changing. Those entrusted by Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe, to look after the subject of defence were unable to arrest this trend, either through fear or through sheer incompetence. That meant the take over of not only the defence portfolio but also interior. The UNF had split the two Ministries. Why take over Mass Communications then? More on that later.

President Kumaratunga had been writing stinging letters to both Premier Wickremasinghe and Defence Minister Marapana over these developments. Some of her concerns have been made public, such as the LTTE build-up in Trincomalee, where a threat has emerged, not only to the strategic port there, but also to Indian investments, including the World War 11 vintage oil tanks leased out to the state-owned Indian Oil Corporation (IOC). Other correspondence, however, still remains confidential.

In this backdrop a further investigation by The Sunday Times into Tiger guerrilla military build up (since the ceasefire) makes interesting revelations. Here are some details:
Military infrastructure development: Temporary buildings and camps in the North-East have been converted to permanent ones. Construction of underground bunkers, quarters and medical facilities continues. Since there were no restrictions on the movement of steel and cement after the ceasefire, large quantities were moved into guerrilla dominated areas. Most of the guerrilla strong points facing armed forces positions outside the forward defence localities are now made of re-inforced concrete.
Acquisition of new weaponry: New radar equipment have been acquired to monitor sea and air movements. New Direction Finding Equipment (DFE) have been acquired and placed in key locations in the North-East to locate artillery and Mortar positions of the armed forces.

Large stocks of artillery and mortar ammunition have stockpiled. Additional stocks of anti-aircraft weaponry have been acquired. A new Air Wing has been established. Training is being conducted with the help of micro-light aircraft. The Sea Tigers, the sea going arm of the guerrillas, have been strengthened. Some of the craft have been equipped with sophisticated and powerful radars. New guns have been fitted on the vessels. Live firing exercises in the deep seas continue. Manufacture of improvised explosives devices (IEDs) continue.

Refresher training for cadres continues at a pace. They include special training in handling heavy weapons, explosives, communications and the use of high tech equipment. Advance training for Sea Tigers include under water demolition, attacks and suicidal missions for Black Tigers. Civilian groups are also being put through para military training.

Model training is said to be carried out on a number of vital targets. These are some of the many things that have been going on. Here again, for obvious reasons, some of the details cannot be revealed. With the takeover of the subject of defence, ironic enough, sections of the UNF now expect President Kumaratunga to declare war on the LTTE.

They cite her recent ultimatum to UNF leaders to ensure guerrillas vacate Manirasakulam (Kuranku Paanchan Kulam) within ten days. But she told armed forces Commanders after the take over that they should strictly abide by the CFA and co-operate with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). Not only that. She asked that officers or men violating this directive be taken to task.

Despite this, there have been complaints of a disturbing trend. Passengers boarding civilian flights to Jaffna complained of high handedness and harassment by armed forces personnel. Similar complaints have also come from those civilians crossing the check-point at Omanthai. Some travellers said they were unduly harassed and humiliated - a marked contrast to a trouble free life they enjoyed during the ceasefire. Sad enough the armed forces hierarchy have to depend on reports from their own top brass. It is not always that the truth is told.

In these circumstances, even if one is accused of being an apologist for President Kumaratunga, it should be said boldly that her takeover of the subject of defence has done the nation a great service - it has halted a rapidly deteriorating military balance after the ceasefire. The fact that those whom Premier Wickremesinghe entrusted this subject failed in their responsibility is no secret.

So much so, Premier Wickremesinghe had to activate his so called "international safety net" 20 months after the ceasefire. That he sought defence co-operation from neighbouring India underscores the situation further. If the trend continued, with little or no bargaining position left for the UNF, yielding to guerrilla demands would have left little option .

On the other hand, a neglect of the intelligence services and the armed forces has not helped the UNF to protect the very Ceasefire Agreement it has entered into with the LTTE. What of the takeover of the Ministry of Mass Communications? The explanation offered by PA leaders that it was on moral grounds to build a better society is hilarious. This tragi-comedy is being repeatedly enacted at news conferences.

Some of the state media, particularly electronic, has been responsible for highly controversial if not anti national acts. This is since independence. A few examples: it was the Rupavahini, the national television network that ran documentaries repeatedly portraying Velupillai Prabhakaran as a great leader. It not only angered serving armed forces personnel but also left the families of officers and men who had died fighting for the country distraught.

It was the Independent Television Network (ITN) that publicly ridiculed Navy officers for attacking and sinking guerrilla vessels attempting to smuggle military hardware. A regular military programme often humiliated armed forces officers and personnel. It was the Ministry of Mass Communications that recommended a licence for the LTTE to operate a radio station. The Customs duty for it has still not been paid. It has now come to light that this radio station is functioning below capacity. When its capacity is boosted, it is said to reach not only countrywide but also parts of South India.

The peace process has been stalled as a result of the recent political developments. Premier Wickremesinghe has called upon President Kumaratunga to take over the peace process or return the subject of defence to his Government. He has said he cannot continue the peace process without both. Perhaps he has good reasons.

President Kumaratunga's response has been to offer a Deputy Defence Minister position to the UNF and the setting up of a Technical Committee. Such a Committee is to identify areas where the peace process impacts on defence and take appropriate action.
Both sides are now conscious of the ground realities. Both have to be mindful about the seriousness of the issues involved. If they do not reach common ground, a nation faces doom.