Amend
the Bribery and Corruption Commission Act now
This column, last week, analysed the structure of the independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong and contrasted
its vibrant functioning with the dismal performance of its Sri Lankan
counter part. Piquantly, President Chandrika Kumaratunga has now
seen fit to reprimand the United National Front government regarding
the in-operative nature of Sri Lanka's Bribery and Corruption Commission,
attributing the passivity of the administration to the corruption
prevalent in government ranks.
One
could descend to vulgar commonalities and call this a classic instance
of the pot calling the kettle black, given that the Kumaratunga
administration itself was not exactly lily white during seven years
or so in power. However, apart from trading accusations with regard
to which regime is the more corrupt, (an exercise as terribly mind
boggling as it is futile), it is imperative that the office of the
President as well as the office of the Prime Minister take immediate
steps to amend the Bribery and Corruption Commission Act, in order
to address fundamental inadequacies in the law itself.
Some
of these inadequacies were examined in last week's column. With
the hindsight that is unfortunately ours in the context of Sri Lanka's
Commission being wracked by internal disputes during its past nine
years of existence whilst being absolutely unable to perform its
stipulated tasks, particular amendments to Act No 19 of 1994 have
become very clear.
Firstly,
the Act should be amended in a manner that broad bases its criteria
for appointment of its Commissioners. This is now an accepted necessity.
Currently, it prescribes a Commission of three members, two of whom
are mandated to be retired judges of the Supreme Court and Court
of Appeal while the other has to be an individual with wide experience
relating to the investigation of crime and law enforcement.
Its
powers need to be tightened in respect of an independent police
force under its command, instead of being compelled to draw on serving
police officers, (with all the attendant complications), for its
investigations. As the Colombo office of Transparency International
detailed further in one of its recent reports, the independence
of the Commission should be ensured by it not being made dependent
upon the Treasury for its finances.
Meanwhile,
the body has consistently disallowed a proactive role in its investigations.
Rampant bribery and corruption in Sri Lanka is disregarded by the
Commission on the reasoning that it is not able to investigate a
complaint on its own initiative given that Section 4 of the Act
states only that the authority of the Commission may be invoked
in writing by any individual writing to the Commission. Consequently,
it is best that this Section is amended in order that the Commission
is given explicit powers to engage in investigations of its own
accord.
Further
amendments clarifying of the role of its Director General are also
necessary. Section 16 provides for a Director General to "assist
the Commission in the discharge of the functions assigned to the
Commission" who is appointed by the President minus any minimum
criteria for appointment save only that it should be in consultation
with the members of the Commission. In addition, though a laborious
procedure is prescribed for removal of the Commissioners, provisions
governing the removal of the Director General are minus very basic
safeguards. Here again, we have seen ad nauseam instances in the
past where disputes between the Director General and the Commission
have crippled its functioning. These lacunae should be corrected
and a more equable balance brought about between the two.
While
these amendments relate to the internal functioning of the Commission,
a measure of external supervision is also important. In this respect,
the Commission should be overseen by independent committees like
the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong.
In the latter case, advisory committees, (formed of citizens and
professionals), oversee the overall direction of the ICAC, advises
on policy matters, examines the investigative work of the ICAC,
looks at corruption prevention studies, educates the public and
enlists their support. An internal investigation and monitoring
group handles all complaints against ICAC staff that are then reported
to the operations review committee. As last week's column pointed
out, an independent ICAC Complaints Committee chaired by an Executive
Council member monitors and reviews all complaints against the ICAC,
thus further buttressing the internal integrity of the ICAC,.
The
Sri Lanka Act should be overhauled to provide for a measure of independent
supervision given its severe internal controversies, including a
recent instance in 2002 where a private plaint was filed against
one of its Commissioners for disclosing information on pending investigations
regarding a dissident politician to President Chandrika Kumaratunga
in violation of the secrecy oath;
Specific
legal provision should also allow persons appearing before the Commission
to have legal representation in the face of allegations made currently,
that this is not permitted as a matter of course. The Commission
ought also to exclusively employ a team of legal officers. Retention
of legal personnel from the Attorney General's Department which
is the main state law arm, sits basically at odds with the goal
of the Commission which should be to expose corruption within the
Government ranks which, in effect, includes the Department;
Finally,
should Section 5(a) of the Act be amended in order that removal
of Commissioners is decided upon not by Parliament but by an independent
tribunal which has the capacity to come to legal findings of "
misbehavior and/or incapacity" against impugned Commissioners?
Attempts to politicise removal of the Commissioners that we saw
in the past may then be avoided. As a necessary corollary, the law
should also make provision for an interim body to be set up that
could deal into pending complaints during this time period.
These
are substantive amendments that need to be made to Act No. 19 of
1994. In the alternative, (even if its year long vacancy is filled),
we will continue to have a Commission that is tossed about like
a football between our politicians, to their continuing and mutual
advantage. Is it any wonder that despite the political colour of
any government, we continue to see public funds being ripped off,
vast amounts of money changing hands for political favours and financially
swollen upstarts holding the system to ransom, if not the law itself?
For how much longer should we tolerate these absurdities? |