Situation Report

East on powder-keg
The changing balance of power in the North-East crisis after Karuna rebellion
Chief of Defence Staff and Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle, the country's top most military officer, was busy with routine chores that Tuesday afternoon of March 3, when his phone rang. He was at his desk at Army Headquarters.

A staffer told him it was a Mr. Varathan in Batticaloa who says it was very urgent. "Put him through," he said. The caller turned out to be Banu Avaliyan. His nom de guerre was Varathan. He was Secretary to Kannan Muralitharan Vinayagamoorthy, better known as "Colonel Karuna," the Military Wing leader of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for Batticaloa district. He told Lt. Gen. Balagalle there was an important message for him from "Col. Karuna."

That was a fervent appeal to the Security Forces to prevent a formidable group of guerrilla leaders from Batticaloa who were to cross over to the Wanni that day. They were to travel past SF controlled areas. The group was led by Political Wing leader of the district, Kaushalyan and his family. Other names made available included political, intelligence and military wing cadres.

The plea was followed by a disclosure. "Col. Karuna" had decided to break ranks with his leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Varathan said his leader wanted to enter into a separate ceasefire agreement with the Government. That bombshell was followed by another. "Col. Karuna" had wanted it known that LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, wants to go to war if the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) won the upcoming parliamentary elections on April 2. But it was not his intention to join in such a war effort.

The Sunday Times learned that "Col Karuna" stood by Varathan's side as he made the call to Lt. Gen. Balagalle from a secret location outside Batticaloa. A stunned Army Chief had a brief exchange of words with "Col. Karuna" to be sure what he was hearing was real. Later, he told Varathan it would be difficult to stop the cadres who were to leave the area. He asked him to put down his request for a separate ceasefire agreement in writing.

No sooner he finished the phone call, Lt. Gen. Balagalle reached out for the hot line and phoned Defence Secretary Cyril Herath to break the news. He in turn was to inform President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga.

Within an hour a written request for a separate ceasefire agreement had arrived. Signed by Karikalan, once ousted by Mr. Prabhakaran as Political Wing leader for Batticaloa, the document had been faxed to Lt. Gen. Balagalle. It turned out "Col. Karuna" had named Karikalan as the new Political Wing leader. This was even before confirmation reached him that Kaushalyan, who fled, had arrived in Wanni.

Lt. Gen. Balagalle was to remind Varathan that the request should be faxed to the Ministry of Defence. But hours after a copy of the fax had arrived there, news reached Colombo that even Karikalan had fled to Wanni.

As minutes and hours ticked by, more senior political, military and intelligence wing cadres began to flee Batticaloa. There were also many others - doctors, photographers, video cameramen, auditors among the lot. Varathan remained busy on the telephone as "Col. Karuna," now heavily guarded by loyal guerrillas stood close. He made contact with the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Colombo. He was to inform them that "Col. Karuna" was now in control of the East.

Guerrillas loyal to the duo were also busy making contact with military and Police Special Task Force (STF) personnel in the area. They told them that a spate of political assassinations during the polls campaign was directed by LTTE's intelligence boss Pottu Amman (Shivasankaran). There were assurances there would be no more such killings and soundings were made for an informal "mutual defence co-operation" arrangement between the two sides. Quite clearly, "Col. Karuna's" faction wanted both the blessings and backing of the Security Forces in their stand off against Mr. Prabhakaran and his men in the Wanni. At the field level, they seemed to have it.

The next day, "Col. Karuna" cut off all high frequency radio links from Batticaloa with the LTTE command in Wanni. STF communications monitors in the area said there was hardly any radio traffic between the two sides. "Col. Karuna" summoned his senior political, military and intelligence wing loyalists for an emergency meeting at Thennaham in Karadiy-anaru where an LTTE VIP meeting facility is located. He named Rabat as the new military leader for the districts of Batticaloa and Amparai.

Whilst making plans to bring back over 500 eastern cadres now deployed in the Wanni, "Col. Karuna" ordered a crackdown on all cadres of northern origin. Businessmen from the North were ordered to leave Batticaloa. Loyal cadres were asked to seal off all entry/exit points in this eastern sea board district. He set in motion a process to consolidate his military power and prepare for the worst.

That was how what was perceived to be the impossible, a rift in the LTTE, occurred, shocking Sri Lankans and the international community alike. If such a rift came splitting a festering Tamil cultural divide between the North and East, worse enough was the timing. For more than two years after the ceasefire, it was a divided Sinhala polity in the south that was accused of becoming an impediment to the peace process. Now, it was the LTTE that was cracked in the middle plunging the fragile peace process into complete uncertainty.

The exodus of LTTE political, military and intelligence cadres from the east with a host of others beginning March 3 was preceded only days earlier by one man - Kamson, who handled all guerrilla finances for the Batticaloa and Amparai districts. It was his deliberations with LTTE leadership in the Wanni that had triggered off a recall of senior cadres.

"Col. Karuna" who had a deep-rooted resentment against LTTE's intelligence boss Pottu Amman was receiving feedbacks through his own intelligence channels from the Wanni. He told his confidantes Pottu had succeeded in a plot to fix him. He was now being summoned to Wanni for an inquiry over misconduct and misappropriation of funds. He felt he was sure to be placed under detention if he heeded a call from his leader, Mr. Prabhakaran to return to Wanni. Hence, he chose to go his own way.

"There was unequal distribution of resources (assistance from NGOs, international community and Tamil diaspora. There was unjust appointment of Tamil Eelam divisional heads. There was none from the east," Col. Karuna told The Sunday Times.

One source said the top 30 of the Tiger hierarchy were all from the North. The fact that relations between Pottu Amman and "Col. Karuna" had strained beyond redemption after the ceasefire was clear not only to the senior hierarchy of the LTTE. Even Sri Lanka Government negotiators who met "Col. Karuna" during peace talks in Thailand were aware. None other than the Batticaloa military leader confided in them that "Pottu should not be trusted."

"Col. Karuna" had earlierwon the admiration of his leader, Mr. Prabhakaran for many reasons. If he was a front line guerrilla who fought many a battle against Security Forces in the North after mustering a large strength of eastern cadres, he had made an outstanding contribution after the ceasefire. He had raised the guerrilla strength from a paltry 3,000 in the district to well over 7500 - a figure that exceeded Security Forces presence in the area.

He had also generated his own funds from the district by imposing "taxes." With little or no objection from the ruling United National Front (UNF), it was "Col. Karuna" who, during the period of the ceasefire, set up an LTTE-backed civil administration in the east with courts, police stations and other units. This was whilst some UNF leaders, who were acutely embarrassed, denied the existence of such structures and berated the media that exposed their presence.

These were not all. "Col. Karuna's" armoury at that time was limited. But the ceasefire had brought about a drastic change. With increased mobility of the Sea Tigers, the sea going arm of the LTTE, vast quantities of military hardware was brought into the district. Artillery and mortar positions directed at Security Forces installations were established at almost every location. Advanced training was provided to the cadres. Sophisticated and encrypted communication sets were issued to them.

"Col. Karuna" was still angry that despite the powerful military machine he had built in the east, he was being ignored by the leadership in the Wanni. There was no money being released for urgent humanitarian relief or for development activity. During his foreign visits with colleagues from the Wanni, he spoke to many hosts among the Tamil diaspora for financial assistance to develop the east. He made no secret of the fact that the LTTE leadership in the North was ignoring the east. But Pottu saw a different picture. "Col. Karuna," now a powerful man in the East, was showing signs of becoming too independent and too powerful. That was a threat to his leader.

The Tiger guerrilla leadership that met in Kilinochchi on March 4 named "Col. Karuna's" deputy, Ramesh (Thambirasa Thuraisingham alias Ramesh) as the new overall Military/Political Leader for Batticaloa. Praba was named as military leader for Batticaloa. Both of them, who were among those who crossed to the Wanni, are still held up. The LTTE leadership decided to impose the death penalty on "Col. Karuna" and "the other traitors" for defying the leader, Mr. Prabhakaran.

"Charges" are also being framed against "Col. Karuna" for allegedly misappropriating millions of rupees and for reported misconduct with female cadres - accusations, which he dismisses as baseless.

As killer squads headed for Batticaloa from Wanni, a confrontation between cadres loyal to Mr. Prabhakaran and "Col. Karuna" is becoming increasingly inevitable. This is despite assertions by LTTE Political Wing leader S.P. Thamilselvan that the current dispute would be resolved without recourse to bloodshed. Already a guerrilla cadre who was arrested by the "Col. Karuna" faction is said to have confessed he came on a mission to kill the Batticaloa military wing leader. "Col. Karuna" has since moved to a secure location.

A delegation of businessmen from Batticaloa and Eastern University academics led by the Bishop of Batticaloa, Kingsley Swamipillai, travelled to Wanni for a meeting with Mr. Thamilselvan. The latter conveyed a message - full amnesty for "Col. Karuna" including what was called "an international guarantee" to seek refuge in any part of the world if he gave up. But "Col. Karuna" had his own response. He offered to work with his leader, Mr. Prabhakaran if he sacked Pottu Amman, Thamilselvan and "guerrilla Police Chief" Nadesan. That put paid to peace moves.

In the Batticaloa district, guerrillas loyal to "Col. Karuna" burnt down the houses of Ramesh and Kaushalyan. They also arranged public protests against Mr. Prabhakaran in Tirukovil, Chenkalady, Kalmunai, Kiran, Valachenai, Palukamam and Poratuvu.

The flashpoint for a possible confrontation appears to be the border between the districts of Trincomalee and Batticaloa. In Trincomalee south, more than 1500 cadres loyal to Mr. Prabhakaran are said to have amassed themselves. This is said to include over 90 cadres from the Wanni led by "Brigadier Sornam" and a further 60 cadres from the "Charles Anthony Regiment" led by Sivaram.

As a counter measure, "Col. Karuna" has tasked Jim Kelly, named as the new deputy military leader for Batticaloa, to move to Vakarai (Batticaloa north) with more than 300 fighting cadres. This is to supplement the strength already present there. In this general area, guerrillas loyal to "Col. Karuna" have set up "check-points" and are checking the identities of those moving in the area. Bunkers are being built in the south bank of Verugal Aru in Batticaloa north. Across this river, the northern side of the bank is defended by cadres loyal to Mr. Prabhakaran.

In the seas off Verugal, there were reports last Tuesday that a boat carrying guerrilla cadres from the Wanni was attacked by those loyal to "Col. Karuna." However, sources close to the latter say no such incident occurred.

The tense situation in the area also gave rise to wild rumours. One spoke of reports that the LTTE military leader for Trincomalee, Pathuman (Sivasubramaniam Varadan), a close confidant of "Col. Karuna," who had been recalled to Wanni, was shot dead. Another spoke of fierce gun battles between the two factions in which large groups were killed. All these reports turned out to be false.

Norwegian special envoy Erik Solheim and Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar who were in Kilinochchi on Thursday had a lengthy meeting with Pathuman. He was said to be in good health. The latter told them he planned to return to Trincomalee (as military wing leader) in the next couple of days. The Norwegian team also learnt that contrary to reports in Colombo that "Brigadier Sornam" was the new Trincomalee military wing leader, he was in the north eastern port city on "a special assignment."

"Col. Karuna" who gave a telephone interview told The Sunday Times there had been no confrontations between the two rival factions. He said such reports were untrue. (See box story for his answers).

Mr. Solheim arrived in Colombo on a previously arranged trip and has been busy with several engagements. When he met UNF leaders, appeals were made to him to use the Norwegian good offices to patch up the rivalry between the two factions of the LTTE. Whilst pointing out that they would remain neutral, UNF leaders said the Norwegian facilitators should talk to both sides. This was much the same way they did soon after there was factional in fighting in the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC).

However, The Sunday Times learnt the UNF leadership did make overtures to establish a link with "Col. Karuna's" faction. A one time parliamentarian who made the approach failed to make direct contact with "Col. Karuna" and was asked to meet members of the political wing.

During their meeting with Mr. Solheim and Ambassador Brattaskar, the LTTE Political Wing leader, Mr Thamilselvan said the ongoing crisis was an internal problem. Hence, the LTTE leadership would resolve it internally and did not see a role in it for the Norwegian facilitators. Mr Solheim is learnt to have explained that as facilitators Norway would steer clear of internal disputes.

This was like the position they took up when there was a political crisis between President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. This was soon after she took over the defence, interior and mass communication portfolios.

Mr Solheim and his entourage flew from Kilinochchi to Trincomalee on Friday for meetings with representatives of the Muslim community and for a briefing by Maj. Gen. Sunil Tennekoon, General Officer Commanding the Army’s 22 Division. The Norwegian special envoy was full of praise over the account he received from Maj. Gen. Tennekoon. Later, the team met with Scandinavian truce monitors in the east. Although the monitors will not observe the ceasefire in areas dominated by "Col. Karuna's" men, they are to continue with all other responsibilities tasked to them.

On their return to Colombo on Friday afternoon, the Norwegian team met with Defence Secretary Cyril Herath. They will meet President Kumaratunga tomorrow. If the UNF has chosen to remain neutral in the ongoing crisis within the LTTE, at least officially, the position of the United People's Freedom Alliance seems the same. However, with a greater responsibility in their hands since the subject of defence now vests in them, there appear to be a great deal of confusion.

President Kumaratunga who took over the subject of defence on November 4, last year, has not named either a Minister or a Deputy Minister. With her being fully preoccupied with the ongoing UPFA election campaign, the task of running the nation's defence establishment has fallen on one person - a retired Police chief Cyril Herath who has had little or no experience on matters military or defence. Contributing to this sad and disturbing state of affairs is the disarray in the nation's intelligence agencies due to serious internecine power struggles and the consequent inability to project a cohesive picture of the ground realities that exist.

As a result, rightly or wrongly, in the LTTE held Wanni, the Security Forces in the east are being perceived as staunch backers of "Col. Karuna's" faction. With little or no directions to those at the ground level, despite some short lived sessions of the National Security Council, the consequences that may follow as a result of the lack of a cohesive approach can be disastrous. Yet, five months after the take over of the defence portfolio, national security interests seem to have been relegated to low priority. That too is when the UPFA has declared in its manifesto that it wants to talk peace with the LTTE when it is voted to power.

"Col. Karuna" admitted to The Sunday Times he refused a request from his leader Velupillai Prabhakaran for 1,000 cadres from the east. "It directly means a war preparation. I don't like war. I don't like my soldiers to be killed in Wanni soil," he said. What of preparations by the Security Forces? The UNF Government ignored them whilst the guerrillas built a powerful military machine and consolidated themselves to unprecedented levels in the east. The People's Alliance, precursors to the UPFA, took over defence on the grounds that national security was threatened.

Five months after that take over; there has been no change in the preparedness of the Security Forces. Nor have they received the bulk of their urgently needed equipment. Whilst a nation is deeply absorbed in political campaigns, national security interests have been left in the hands of a few incompetent men with little or no political leadership. Like during a war, the Security Forces (and even the Police) can be made the scapegoats when things go wrong during a peace time. That seems to be the tragedy of the Sri Lankan nation.

I am ready to take Prabhakaran on: Karuna
He was a man most trusted by the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. So much so, he was just one of a few who were allowed to see him with his fully loaded automatic pistol in his holster strapped around his waist.

Thirty-eight-year old Kannan Muralitharan Vinayagamoorthy, better known as "Col. Karuna" is now the most hated. Mr Prabhakaran has despatched death squads from Wanni to Batticaloa to eliminate him.

A student of St. Michael's College, Batticaloa where he studied up to GCE (Advanced Level), "Col. Karuna" joined the LTTE (third batch) in 1981 and was trained in a camp in Salem, South India. Then he was a member of the elite TOSIS - Tiger Organisation Security Intelligence Service in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

Appointed military leader for Batticaloa and Amparai districts in 1987, "Col. Karuna" was in charge of all LTTE training camps in the district. From a secret location in Batticaloa, "Col. Karuna" answered questions put to him by The Sunday Times on the telephone. He was assisted by an interpreter. Here are excerpts:

REASONS FOR BREAKING AWAY FROM THE LTTE:
There is unequal distribution of resources (assistance from NGOs, international community and Tamil diaspora). There are unjust appointments of Tamil Eelam divisional heads. There are none from the east. There are unacceptable demands made to me to send soldiers from the East to the North. Eastern soldiers are used as cannon fodder. Already we find it difficult to maintain our organisation in the east and to carry out development activities for the benefit of our people. We cannot understand what is happening to the money in the Wanni. They earn about Rs 500 million a month through "taxation" alone. What is the meaning of authority if I don't use it for the benefit of my people.

ABOUT HIS REFUSAL TO RELEASE 1000 CADRES TO WANNI:
It clearly means a war prepraration. I don't like war. I don't like my soldiers to be killed on Wanni soil at all.

ON ALLEGATIONS THAT FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
ARE INVOLVED IN THE CURRENT CRISIS:
No such external forces are involved at all. The only force behind me is the expectations of my people and my soldiers.
ON REPORTS OF FIGHTING:

No incident reported until now.
ON MOVES TO PATCH UP DIFFERENCES:
The present moves in the Wanni are not positive or favourable.
ON MOVES BY THE UNF TO ESTABLISH A LINK:

We are not opposed to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe.
ON MR PRABHAKARAN'S DECISION TO PASS DOWN DEATH SENTENCE. ARE YOUR PREPARED TO TAKE HIM ON?: Unquestionably yes.
ON THE LOYALTY OF LTTE CADRES IN BATTICALOA:
Yes, definitely they are loyal to me. It is their problems that I am fighting for.

ON UPCOMING PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS:
We are not against the elections. The people support us.
ON WHY HE RESENTS POTTU AMMAN:
There are two basic reasons: He has been the sole cause for the split within the LTTE. He is the man responsible for all the violations in the east.

ON ASSASSINATION SQUADS ARRIVING IN BATTICALOA:
Wanni is trying to make the situation complicated.
SUPPORT OR PROTECTION FROM SECURITY FORCES:
We are not seeking any fresh contacts. From the very date of the CFA (Ceasefire Agreement) we have established a very close understanding. It is very important, if we are to maintain a good ceasefire. It is practical. That is not something peculiar to the east.

It is happening in all parts of the North and East.
ABOUT NOT BEING INCLUDED IN THE PEACE PROCESS:
I can ask a question from the parties concerned. What is the ultimate aim of this peace process? What about the bargaining power of Mr. Prabhakaran?

CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH MR. PRABHAKARAN:
Equal and friendly partnership. No attempt towards war.

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