Situation Report

Guerillas loyal to “Col. Karuna”training to fire mortars at an LTTE base in the Batticaloa district. Pic by Lakshman Gunatillke

Showdown at Verugal
Tiger guerrilla leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, appears to be facing his worse dilemma after waging a separatist war for nearly two decades and talking peace for two years.

Both struggles brought him closer to his perceived goal of Eelam. Whether such an entity is to be in the form of an independent state or one with all the trappings, linked by some mechanism to a unitary Sri Lanka, in essence remained the crucial issue. At least, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) demand for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) underscored this reality.

Bolstering this reality on the ground were many developments since the United National Front (UNF) Government-LTTE Ceasefire Agreement of February 22, 2002. The LTTE which had its own "civil administrative" structure in the Wanni with a tax collection machinery, Police, Law Courts, Prisons and other similar institutions had successfully extended them to the East.

It is only after the Ceasefire Agreement that these institutions came to be established and developed in the East. For example, Police Stations and Law Courts were set up in the Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts. Tax collection machinery was expanded there and the Tiger guerrilla writ began to be increasingly effective.

All this transformation, significant enough, came in concert with a stronger military machine the guerrillas built in the North-East after the ceasefire. This was by smuggling in more state-of-the-art military hardware and further modernising their ocean going arm, the Sea Tigers.

Mr Prabhakaran's once trusted Military Commander "Col. Karuna's" recent actions seems to have come as serious threats to the LTTE's newly developed military capability in the East. So much so, the task before the now enraged guerrilla leader is not merely to hunt down "Col. Karuna" and mete out "justice" to him.

A bigger task seems to have fallen on Mr. Prabhakaran. He had fought the Sri Lankan Security Forces (and even the Police) to build a "civilian and military" infrastructure, first in the Wanni and later expanded it to the East after the ceasefire, with the help of his once trusted military leader, "Col. Karuna." Now, he has been forced to prepare for war with "Col. Karuna" and his men to protect this same infrastructure without which his goal of Eelam will be futile.

For Mr. Prabhakaran, this appears to have become as much a high priority as the manhunt he has launched for "Col. Karuna." The picture that is emerging before the security establishment in Colombo tells the tale of Mr. Prabhakaran's dilemma.

The guerrilla military leadership in the Wanni want to avoid a blood bath with cadres in the East in their bid to capture "Col. Karuna" dead or alive. Intelligence sources say special squads have been tasked to infiltrate Batticaloa and seize him, if possible, to face "trial" in the Wanni. But that is no easy task. "Col. Karuna" is alive to the reality and has moved to safe ground. So much so, he is even avoiding the media he so assiduously cultivated in the days after he chose to break away from the LTTE.

His confidantes have advised on the possibility of an attack by killers posing off as media cameramen - the same way Afghan warlord Ahmed Shah Masood was killed by suspected Al Qaeda members when an improvised explosive device in a video camera detonated when he was being interviewed.

But a more significant development is the build up of guerrilla cadres from the Wanni in areas south of Trincomalee, particularly along the Verugal river. Large groups of guerrillas recruited from the Wanni region are being poured into the southern banks of the river. They are building bunkers and defence lines. Across the river, (north of the Batticaloa district), guerrillas loyal to "Col. Karuna" are doing just the same to prevent a possible incursion. There are over a thousand cadres massed on both sides of the river. What makes a confrontation inevitable would be a crossing by either side.

By mounting a large build up in the area south of Trincomalee, the capital of so called Eelam, the guerrilla military leadership in the Wanni is trying to prevent an incursion of "Col Karuna's" men into the Trincomalee district. They do not want him to dismantle the infrastructure that has been developed in this area - one of the major contributory factors that led to President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga taking over the defence portfolio from the UNF Government on November 4, last year.

It was The Sunday Times that exclusively revealed on August 3, 2002 (Situation Report headlined Tiger trap for Trinco Siege) how a rapidly developing scenario was changing the military balance in the district. The report pointed out "The importance of Trincomalee continues after the ceasefire as both a naval, political and economic centre. It still remains the life line for some 40,000 troops and policemen deployed in the Jaffna peninsula.

"It is only a few hundreds who travel in and out of the peninsula daily. The bulk moves about by ships from Trincomalee after traversing along the main Alpha Eight highway. Military supplies and provisions for their sustenance take the same route. Hence crippling Trincomalee or choking Alpha Eight, like denying oxygen to a dying person, can be fatal to troops holding the peninsula.

The report revealed how the guerrillas have opened up new military camps, re-occupied ones they abandoned and set up a string of satellite camps around the bases that existed…….. New weaponry and communications equipment have been widely distributed.

The Sunday Times noted "this rapidly developing scenario in and around Trincomalele is signalling a marked shift to the military balance. The Tiger guerrillas are continuing to become stronger militarily whilst the ground they dominate are expanding. This is in the backdrop of the Security Forces being plagued with desertions, hit by lack of resources and forced to maintain an inactive profile lest they be accused of sabotaging the peace process".

Intelligence sources say it is for this reason that Pathuman (Sivasubramaniam Varathan), who some sections of the Colombo media said was killed, is being detained in the Wanni. Despite claims that he was to move out of Trincomalee to continue his role as military leader, he is being held in view of his close relationship with "Col. Karuna," these sources say.

As reported in these columns last week, Norway's Special Envoy, Erik Solheim and Ambassador Hans Brattskar had a meeting with Pathuman when they visited Wanni during the previous week. They were accompanied by Lisa Golden from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and Kjersti Tromsdal from their Embassy in Colombo.

Intelligence sources say the LTTE leadership in Wanni obliged a Norwegian team's request for a meeting with Pathuman for two main reasons. It was firstly to demolish rumours that he had been killed and to show he was in sound health. Secondly, it was to show there was "business as usual" and Pathuman would get back to Trincomalee to resume work as military wing leader. However, these sources say he is in fact "under detention" because of fears he would follow "Col. Karuna" and dismantle the infrastructure in Trincomalee. In Batticaloa, "Col. Karuna" had already shut down LTTE "Police Stations" and "Law Courts" besides other organisations.

"Brigadier Sornam" who had been moved from the Wanni to the Trincomalee district was spearheading a process of consolidation. This included moving cadres recruited from Wanni to strategic areas besides the Verugal river and keeping close tabs on those recruited from the East. In effect, he is putting into effect a process of Wanni cadres taking control of the Trincomalee district.

Most cadres from the Wanni are pouring in to Trincomalee district unofficially. This is in view of delays caused when resorting to provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement and seeking escort from the Security Forces for such movement. Defence Secretary Cyril Herath has made clear to the LTTE that at least a week's notice would be needed before their requests are entertained. An official LTTE request for the movement of 50 cadres from Wanni to the Trincomalee district is still pending.

This is in marked contrast to some 450 cadres from Batticaloa who are still held up in Wanni. Despite many efforts by "Col. Karuna" to seek their release, the men have not been allowed to return to the Batticaloa district. This is not the only concern for "Col. Karuna" since he chose to break from the LTTE and go his own way.

The Security Forces have also been called upon to monitor developments particularly in the Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts. The newly appointed Eastern Naval Area Commander, Commodore Upali Ranaweera, promoted Rear Admiral last Friday, has ordered the deployment of additional Naval craft to patrol seas off Trincomalee and Batticaloa.

In a related development, the LTTE has initiated moves to urge all its Wanni cadres to return immediately to Kilinochchi from Batticaloa and Amparai districts. Military leaders in the Wanni have said they would no longer be required to produce Identity Cards issued to them by the LTTE. This was because of reports that some of these cards have been seized by "Col. Karuna's" faction. Upon entering Wanni, the cadres have been assured that a temporary ID without photographs would be issued by a Mr. Thangan.

”Col. Karuna’s aides were in contact with the military leadership, to whom he gave an assurance that he would not join any moves by his erstwhile leader, Mr. Prabhakaran, to declare war on the Security Forces. Yesterday, they were desperately seeking clarification on remarks attributed to President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga in an interview with the BBC that she would negotiate peace with the LTTE leadership in Wanni.

"Does that mean that "Col. Karuna's" faction would be marginalised or ignored altogether, they wanted to know. At least one senior leader of the "Col. Karuna" faction was strong in his comments when he declared to a high ranking military official "that would amount to a total let down."

President Kumaratunga's remarks about future peace negotiations come in the backdrop of her meeting last Monday with Norwegian special envoy, Erik Solheim and Ambassador Hans Brattskar. During their talks with her on the peace process, the delegation, The Sunday Times learnt conveyed opinions expressed by Tiger guerrilla leaders in Wanni.

As reported in these columns last week, LTTE Political Wing leader S.P. Tamilselvan told the Norwegian delegation that the ongoing crisis was an internal problem. He had said that the LTTE leadership would resolve it internally and did not see a role for Norwegian facilitators. The Sunday Times learnt that Tiger guerrilla political wing leader urged the Norwegian facilitators to convey their displeasure to higher authorities over a reported dialogue a military leader in Colombo had with "Col. Karuna" and his aides. The LTTE perceived the move as full Security Forces backing for "Col. Karuna's" faction.

Although the ongoing crisis in the LTTE was referred in an interview by Chief Negotiator and ideologue, Anton Balasingham, to Tamil Guardian, a London based newspaper as a "temporary aberration," the issue seems to have caused sharp divisions in the Tamil diaspora overseas. In France, leaflets strongly critical of Mr. Prabhakaran had been distributed among the Tamil community. Similar activity has also been reported from Switzerland and Canada. The consequence of this division causes problems for the "LTTE's economy." Tamil sources say it may dry up or divert some of the funding that reaches the LTTE in Kilinochchi.

In this backdrop, the most immediate concern for the defence establishment in Colombo is the run up to the polls on April 2. They want to ensure no development that will cause security concerns will take place. One high ranking intelligence source told The Sunday Times "nothing untoward is likely. However, it will all depend on how Mr Prabhakaran will see things going for him in the next 11 days."

The source was alluding to offers made earlier by the LTTE to conduct polls in areas dominated by them. There were informal soundings made that they would be prepared to allow polling booths to be set up closer to defended localities of the Security Forces and even permit armed policemen to secure them. The willingness to allow voters in their "areas" to exercise their franchise obviously meant they could persuade them to support Tamil National Alliance (TNA) candidates whom they are backing.

Yet, it seems highly unlikely Elections Commissioner, Dayananda Dissanayake, would want to establish polling booths in areas dominated by the LTTE. He has put off a final decision on the Matter for March 25 when he meets the armed forces commanders and the Police Chief.

The subject came up for discussion at a meeting Mr. Dissanayake held on March 15 with armed forces commanders - Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle (Army), Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri (Navy), Air Commodore Laksan Salgado (acting Commander, Air Force) and Police Chief Indra de Silva. The foursome were in favour of polling booths being set up in Security Forces controlled areas and have assured them of all measures to facilitate easy polling.

They have suggested that shuttle bus services be operated between "controlled" and "uncontrolled" areas so voters could come early to their respective polling booths. The armed forces chiefs have suggested that voters refrain from carrying any baggage and have asked the Elections Chief to inform the LTTE, through polls monitoring groups, to persuade voters not to take any. The armed forces chiefs have also asked for an appeal to be conveyed to the LTTE to desist from operating heavy vehicles to the controlled areas on polls day.

The polls on April 2, therefore, will not only determine the future course of the peace process. It seems set to determine the future of the LTTE itself in the wake of the crisis caused by renegade military leader "Col. Karuna."

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