Thoughts from London

West to blame too for Ranil's defeat
So the Sri Lankan voter did what he does best -throw out the incumbent government. Since independence 56 years ago, Sri Lankans have changed governments at regular intervals.

This time too they kept with tradition and ousted the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration despite the fact that its mandate would have run for another four years. But tradition alone cannot be why they acted as they did. There must have been compelling reasons to turn out a government that had been given a mandate by the people a little over two years back.

It was not such a close election as some had predicted though the result left the two main groups without a clear majority. The UNF lost several of the constituencies it had held previously and district-wise it was virtually a clean sweep for the opposition. On election day the BBC asked me whether I considered the election a referendum on the peace process.

Looking at the outcome of the election from here, it seems more than a referendum on the conduct of the peace process. A variety of reasons contributed to the downfall of the government, not the least of which was the behaviour of the international community- nation states as well as multilateral institutions- and the activities of some of the Colombo-based diplomats.

Their increasing involvement-some might even say interference or meddling- in Sri Lanka's affairs, particularly the peace process, led many to believe the country's policies were decided in Washington, Tokyo and Oslo and not in Colombo.

The constant trek by diplomats and foreign officials to the Wanni to meet the LTTE leadership, was naturally music to the Tigers. It would have made sense if they went there to read the riot act to the LTTE whenever it broke the pledges given in the Memorandum of Understanding or in the Oslo Declaration.

Chris Patten, the European Union's Commissioner for External Relations, did so when he had talks with Velupillai Prabhakaran last November. He made four points: renounce violence, stop ceasefire violations, accept a federal solution and address the issue of Muslim delegates to the peace talks.

But often as not, the procession of foreign diplomats was more to establish cordial relations and political links than to tell the LTTE to toe the line that had already been drawn.

Could there be anything worse than the British High Commissioner Stephen Evans declaring open the office of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) whose London office was raided by the UK's Charity Commissioner and its record books seized. It was suspected that TRO was transferring funds to the LTTE and some even felt that it was a front organisation of the Tigers.

David Rich who headed the investigations on behalf of the Charity Commissioner had some very negative comments to make about the lack of transparency in TRO's monetary transactions and evidence of possible links to terrorism. Moreover the LTTE is still a banned organisation in the UK under its Terrorism Act 2000.

So when a senior diplomat of a country that still has the LTTE on its books as a terrorist organisation, attends such ceremonies in the Wanni what is the impression created in the minds of the Sri Lankan people? When that act of foolhardiness is added to the growing list of bias and suspicions in the public mind, it is natural to associate the Wickremesinghe government with such dubious diplomatic activity.

The LTTE has over the years gradually established a de facto state. It had not only a large swathe of territory but has more recently set up its own administration, banking and tax systems, courts and police. What it lacked was diplomatic connections. Naturally these could not be formal relations not having a de jure state. But the peace process opened the doors wide for diplomatic links, giving the LTTE some kind of international legitimacy.

It came to the point where the LTTE could ask that international funding for rehabilitation in the north and east be sent directly to their organisation. Is it surprising then that people in the South viewed these developments with growing concern and trepidation?

All this was inevitably associated with the government that, quite rightly, opened negotiations but made too many concessions to the Tigers, who like Oliver Twist, kept asking for more. Little or nothing was done to allay public concerns about the huge number of packages that were allowed to pass without Customs clearance whenever LTTE delegates to peace talks or on international excursions, returned to Colombo.

These were the failings of a government that appeared in the public mind to be bending over backwards to accommodate LTTE demands because it had committed itself totally to the peace process and had nothing else to show.

Even when a controversy arose over LTTE camps in and around Trincomalee that were perceived as a security threat, ministers were condescendingly dismissing such fears as the over-worked imagination of the media and officials.

Public concerns also extended to the Norwegians who were thought, with some justification, to be biased in favour of the LTTE. Remember the major incident involving radio equipment for the LTTE gifted by an over-zealous and unusually benevolent Norwegian Government. That radio equipment which helped the Tigers to raise their voice a few more decibels, was imported by the Norwegian Embassy and cleared as diplomatic goods. Interestingly, the goods had already left Singapore when the Tigers applied for a licence to run a radio station when they already had the clandestine "Voice of the Tiger".

It might also be recalled that Major-General (rtd) Tryggve Tellefsen, the Norwegian head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, once made the outrageous proposal that a separate area of the sea in the north and east be demarcated and the LTTE's naval arm be given control of it. This would be distinct from the territorial sea under the jurisdiction of the Sri Lanka Government and its navy.

The SLMM's role since it was established had also caused concern in some circles, particularly with regard to the passing of information. If we have allowed diplomatic missions to do as they please on our territory, it is because the Wickremesinghe government was seen by many as being servile to the capitalist West.

The ideological basis for this subservience was quite clearly stated by the former Economic Reforms Minister Milinda Moragoda who publicly pleaded for US hegemony and asked that Washington assume the leadership of the world. It was the same Moragoda who told a meeting in Colombo that when the US ambassador summons he does not stop to ask why but obliges immediately.

Such obsequiousness became the foreign policy hallmark of the last government. Not to be out done by his cabinet colleague, the then Consumer Affairs Minister Ravi Karunanayake threw in his lot with Washington at the WTO meeting in Cancun last year breaking ranks with the developing countries.

The truth is that we acted like those banana republics whose authoritarian leaders are propped up by the US until a bloody revolt throws the rascals out. There were many reasons why the public turned against the UNF government. The international community and multilateral organisations such as the IMF with its economic cure-alls, must share a substantial part of the blame.

So must the LTTE.
But most of all the government must accept blame for doing little or nothing to curb corruption, intimidation and thuggery by those who should have known better.

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