Situation Report

The rise and fall of Karuna
It seemed a strange co-incidence that the armed forces chiefs were `closer to the scene when it occurred - Tiger guerrilla leader Velupillai Prabhakaran's swift and devastating pre dawn military offensive on Friday to dislodge his renegade Batticaloa-Amparai district leader, "Col. Karuna."

The trio flew to Trincomalee on Thursday afternoon. That night, Chief of Defence Staff and Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle was the Chief Guest at a passing out parade of 49 mid shipmen and Sub Lieutenants at the Dockyard, home for the Sri Lanka Navy's Eastern Command.

Eastern Area Commander Rear Admiral Upali Ranaweera had lined up a colourful parade. Cocktails and dinner followed. Music from the Navy band kept the guests till late hours.

Thereafter the armed forces chiefs - Lt. Gen. Balagalle, Vice Admiral Sandagiri (Navy) and Air Marshal Donald Perera (Air Force) adjourned to the picturesque Navy House, the pride of Navy's official residences, for coffee. It was long after midnight when Vice Admiral Sandagiri bid good bye to his two colleagues.

Lt. Gen. Balagalle drove to a chalet at the Army's 22 Division Headquarters at Plantain Point. Air Marshal Donald Perera moved over to "Bambara House," the Air Chief's official residence at China Bay. When they retired in their respective official residences Friday had dawned.

The leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Velupillai Prabhakaran, who had remained restless after last March when his eastern leader broke ranks, put into effect what he had been planning for weeks - a military crack down on "Col. Karuna" and his men.

The fact that such a crack down was in the offing since "Col. Karuna" quit was no secret. In fact the defence establishment in Colombo had expected it last week, in the run up to April 2 Parliamentary General Elections, as revealed exclusively in The Sunday Times (Situation Report - March 28).

The report revealed that "there are increasing signs of a violent campaign against him ("Col, Karuna)." It gave details of the build up south of Trincomalee, on the banks of the Verugal River. Cadres loyal to Mr. Prabhakaran had positioned themselves in the villages. They were jamming radio equipment used by "Col. Karuna's" men. Sea Tiger vessels in the Verugal Bay, where the river merges with the Indian Ocean south of Trincomalee, had "sealed off" the area to prevent any movement by renegade eastern leader's troops. There was heavy radio traffic between Sea Tiger bases in the North. In what seemed a bold attempt at countering any offensive, "Col. Karuna" had also moved his men to the banks of Verugal River located in Batticaloa North.

It was just past 1.30 a.m. on Friday when Army and Navy radio operators intercepted guerrilla communications. Mortars and 120 mm artillery were being fired by Mr. Prabhakaran's men on the banks of the Verugal River south of Trincomalee. They were raining in on "Col. Karuna's" troops. Heavy fighting had broken out. It was only the previous day, appeals were made on loud hailers to "Col. Karuna's" men to surrender and thus avoid bloodshed. These repeated appeals had been interspersed with Tamil "patriotic" songs played regularly through loud speakers. An all out war had now begun.

All three armed forces commanders were woken up to be told the news. It was not only the offensive that the Tiger guerrilla leadership had planned meticulously but also the media campaign to go with it. Even before the crack of dawn on Friday, Colombo based media, particularly those representing the foreign media, were tipped off that the Wanni leadership had launched a crack down on "Col. Karuna" and his men. Thereafter, they were fed with regular accounts on the "progress of the war." Some aspects, like in most offensives, were grossly exaggerated.

The three armed forces commanders met for a breakfast of string hoppers at the Navy House on Friday morning. They briefly reviewed the situation before flying down to Colombo. They were being driven to the City in their vehicles from the Ratmalana Airport when their journey was interrupted. A caller on the telephone asked both Lt. Gen. Balagalle and Vice Admiral Sandagiri to fly to Batticaloa. They were orders from the Defence Secretary. Within an hour, they left.

With no Government in place in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, with no Defence Minister, no Deputy Defence Minister, no sessions of the National Security Council to deliberate on how the developments will impact on national security interests, the task of running the show fell solely on the retired Police and intelligence chief. Cyril Herath had assumed office as Defence Secretary only as a stop gap arrangement until a permanent appointment was made. But, there was confirmation yesterday that he will continue in the post.

President Kumaratunga, who is technically the Minister of Defence, has been deeply involved in matters arising out of the outcome of elections on April 2. This is particularly over the formation of a Cabinet and the resultant changes in bureaucracy that had become necessary. Consequently some of the behind-the-scenes developments relating to national security have been packed with comedy of errors, blunders and total inaction where prompt responses were necessary.

Some of them cannot be elaborated on for reasons of national security. Other instances, spelt out below, will illustrate the pathetic state of the defence establishment. "Thank god we are not in a war situation. Otherwise it would have been chaos and disaster," a high ranking armed forces official told The Sunday Times. He wished to remain anonymous for obvious reasons. This is six months after the defence portfolio was vested under her by President Kumaratunga on grounds that the security situation was deteriorating.

Lt. Gen. Balagalle Vice Admiral Sandagiri and Air Marshal Donald Perera who returned from Trincomalee, flew to Batticaloa, together with Security Forces Commander (East), Major General Nanda Mallawaratchchi. The latter was in Colombo on official duty. The team was to make a first hand assessment of the factional fighting that was raging.

Although they were still unable to get a comprehensive account on what had gone on, a clearer picture emerged. Whilst massing his men along the banks of the Verugal River, Mr. Prabhakaran had masterminded a sea borne landing of his cadres on the coast between Verugal Bay and Kathiraveli. As his cadres fired mortar and artillery across the Verugal River, the troops that made the landing along the coast infiltrated the area triggering off the first wave of fighting. So did others who crossed the river.

Initial radio intercepts by Friday morning spoke of 38 of Mr. Prabhakaran's men being killed and over 100 wounded as against 25 of "Col. Karuna" being killed and 75 wounded. Later the casualty figures for Mr. Prabhakaran's cadres rose to 40 killed and over 125 wounded. According to a senior Army official in the Batticaloa district, more than 250 cadres from both sides were dead or wounded. However, he was unable to provide details but added that the dead included at least 15 civilians.

The three armed forces chiefs obtained a first hand assessment of the situation during a meeting with Maj. Gen. Mallawaratchchi and his men at 233 Brigade Headquarters in Batticaloa. Most of them had put together a picture of the battles after closely monitoring radio intercepts and listening to intelligence sources. Vice Admiral Sandagiri was also in touch with the Eastern Naval Area headquarters in Trincomalee to deploy patrols. The concern of the armed forces chiefs was to prevent the clashes spilling over to controlled areas. Another much bigger concern was to prevent either feuding side from using controlled areas to wage war against the other.

The Lt. Gen. Balagalle and Vice Admiral Sandagiri returned to Colombo to brief Defence Secretary Herath. Thereafter the three met President Kumaratunga at the Janadipathi Mandiraya for a lengthy session. Their discussion went on till near midnight. As a result, President Kumaratunga is learnt to have decided to have a meeting with the Norwegian facilitators. She is to apprise them of the situation in the East and how some of the developments have affected the ongoing Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE.

It was decided to issue an official statement in this regard. This is what the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence said: "There have been several armed confrontations between the LTTE cadres in the east during the past few days, reaching a peak from 1.00 a.m. on 09th April 2004.

"This has resulted in several casualties amongst their cadres as well as civilians, and many people have been rendered homeless. The situation remains tense. "Her Excellency, the President directed the Chief of Defence Staff and Service Commanders to visit the area and take all necessary steps to enforce law and order.

"It is intended to inform the Norwegian facilitators to convey to the LTTE that this is a violation of the ceasefire agreement and the Government expects to take up this issue with the LTTE leadership." President Kumaratunga was due to meet the Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar yesterday, soon after the swearing in of the new Cabinet, in this regard.

After a brief session with him attended by the President's Secretary, W.J.S. Karunaratne, Mr. Brattskar was to meet Lt. Gen. Balagalle and Vice Admiral Sandagiri for a briefing on developments in the East. Whilst President Kumaratunga was deliberating with her Defence Secretary and chiefs of Army and Navy, something more dramatic was taking place in Batticaloa. "Col. Karuna's men, who at one time out numbered Mr. Prabhakaran's troops on the banks of the Verugal River, had retreated. Coming under fierce attacks, they abandoned village after village. Some of the areas captured by Mr. Prabhakaran's troops included Verugal, Vakarai, Mankerni and uncontrolled areas surrounding an Army camp at Cadjuwatte.

The immediate outcome of this was the influx of refugees. Over 3,000 villagers are huddled up together in a school in make shift structures south of Mankerni. The Army has been providing them meals but officials say limited resources will prevent them from continuing this. They have asked international humanitarian bodies to take over the task.

Besides Ramesh, whom Mr. Prabhakaran named as new Batticaloa-Amparai leader to succeed "Col. Karuna, the Tiger guerrilla leader had fielded some of his "elite" groups for the offensive. They included "Brigadier Sornam", Nagesh and elements of the "Charles Anthony Brigade." Leading "Col. Karuna's" troops were Jim Kelly, Reggie and Rabert. A significant feature was the involvement of the Batticaloa based Jeyanthan group in favour of Mr. Prabhakaran's men. They joined the assault on "Col. Karuna's cadres."

Some of Col. Karuna's cadres were admitted to the Government Hospital in Batticaloa. At least eight of them died there. In one incident in Vakarai, three female cadres from Wanni who were part of a group that landed by boats were shot dead. In another incident at Panichankerni, two of "Col. Karuna's" men who were travelling in a Double Cab died when a land mine exploded.

The final outcome of Mr. Prabhakaran's Good Friday assault was disastrous for "Col. Karuna" and his men. He had to withdraw from most parts of northern Batticaloa including the banks of the Verugal River. He is now corralled into a vulnerable position south of the Batticaloa district as the map on this page reveals. The surrounding areas are no man's land and only the main highway to Batticaloa and adjoining areas are dominated by the armed forces.

Senior security officials are now pondering over what Mr. Prabhakaran's troops would do. Will he surround the area and cut off all supplies thus starving "Col. Karuna" and his men into submission? Or will he order his troops to launch a crack down before the onset of the Sinhala and Hindu New Year? Most officials say the latter course of action is most likely since Mr. Prabhakaran wants the issue sorted out as early as possible. Moreover, more cadres are said to be moving from Wanni to the East. In the interim, The Sunday Times learnt Wanni leaders have passed down messages to "Col. Karuna" through various channels to give up and thus avoid any more blood letting. One source said a conditional safe passage was also being offered to him but there was no independent confirmation of this report.

This scenario has posed a knotty problem to the armed forces. What would they do in the event of a final assault on "Col. Karuna's" positions? Such a move would see the renegade leader and his cadres being wiped out. One answer brought out by senior armed forces officials in the Batticaloa district is to enforce provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement and prevent any activity in controlled areas by armed guerrillas from either group. These and other related measures are in fact being given active consideration.

But the move seems comical if one is to look at the way in which the Ministry of Defence had been dealing with this issue. At least officially the Ministry took up the position that it would remain fully neutral in the factional feuding in the LTTE. So much so, it only issued mild protests at violations of the Ceasefire Agreement by the Wanni leadership. They continued to infiltrate cadres from the Wanni to the East to make preparations for the offensive although movement of cadres require the express approval of the Ministry of Defence. So were the Sea Tiger movements in the eastern waters. All this was out of fear that raising issue would offend the LTTE leadership.

One glaring example took place days ahead of the April 2 elections. Tiger guerrilla cadres crossed the Omanthai military checkpoint near Vavuniya in groups of two and three. Thereafter, at least 86 of them travelled in two bus loads to Sampur. They were detected by troops from the Army's 22 Division but LTTE Political Wing leader for Trincomalee district, Thilak, took charge of them reportedly on the grounds they would be returned to Wanni. However, the last place where they were known to be located was a farm. From there, they joined other guerrilla cadres who launched the offensive. There have been many such instances where cadres from the Wanni were moved into the East.

If the official position of the Ministry of Defence was that it wanted to remain neutral, there was no strategy at all on their part on how to deal with the LTTE's internal feud in as far as it impacted on national security interests. The lack of professionalism at the Ministry no doubt contributed to this disturbing situation. So much so, this led to strong suspicions in the Wanni that President Kumaratunga was tacitly supporting "Col. Karuna's faction."

And now, with "Col. Karuna" and his group about to become history, for the first time since the internal LTTE tussle, the Ministry of Defence has publicly declared "it is intended to inform the Norwegian facilitators to convey to the LTTE that this is a violation of the Ceasefire Agreement and the Government expects to take up this issue with the LTTE leadership." Why did the Ministry remain silent all this time? Did it become necessary to go public with a statemetn only after "Col. Karuna" found himself in grave danger? Too little too late. Ironically it is coming from the very people who took over the defence portfolio on the grounds that national security interests were at stake. Little wonder national security interests have been allowed to drift without any direction or control in the past six months.

Another area where the current situation has had a direct impact is on the group of Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MPs representing Batticaloa and Amparai districts. There are four from the former district and one from the latter. Last week, "Col. Karuna's" faction made it known that their five MPs would extend their support to the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA).

The five MPs made a written request to the Ministry of Defence for protection to come to Colombo for a meeting of all elected MPs of the TNA. This was being held at the residence of Gajan Ponnambalam, Jaffna district parliamentarian, at Gregory's Road. A large security contingent was assigned to the five member team. They escorted the parliamentarians to Colombo last Wednesday and were to return to their electorates the same day.

But their participation at the TNA meeting saw other developments. Trincomalee parliamentarian R. Sampanthan, now a staunch LTTE ally, telephoned Defence Secretary, Cyril Herath, to suggest that the large security contingent for the group of eastern MPs be pruned down. He received a snub. Some TNA Parliamentarians had been making preparations to transport the five eastern TNA MPs to Wanni to meet the LTTE leadership. In fact they were to be found accommodation overnight in a five star hotel in Colombo. But the security contingent escorted them that very night to Batticaloa and Amparai.

Now that "Col. Karuna's" fortunes are waning, the eastern Parliamentarians are sure to throw their lot with their Northern colleagues. In fact during deliberations with them, the eastern group did not dissent on decisions that were made to fight jointly for the Tamil cause.

Having secured a substantial part of the Batticaloa district, Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is now on the last phase of his hunt on "Col. Karuna." The seizure of terrain "Col. Karuna" held has no doubt helped the LTTE leadership in Wanni to regain control of the Batticaloa and Amparai districts and thus emerge stronger. At most "Col. Karuna" has been reduced to a position of defending himself. In doing so, he could only resort to using his troops to carry out small group attacks. But the question is for how long.

As a new Cabinet took office yesterday, the crucial issue of peace talks with the LTTE will be high priority in their agenda. Mr Prabhakaran, has emerged stronger after his Good Friday assault. He will no doubt find himself in a much stronger bargaining position than before at the peace talks. Militarily he is re-equipped and prepared if an Eelam War 4 is thrust on him. Politically, he has paved the way to unilaterally declare a separate state if peace talks fail.

These are issues a new Government will have to recognise. Allowing matters defence to drift aimlessly, like during the tenure of the United National Front, will be recipe for total disaster.

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