Holding
the state accountable beyond its shores
Decisions of the UN Human Rights Committee in regard to Sri Lanka
This week, this column concludes its three part series on examining
recent Communication of Views by the United Nations Human Rights
Committee in respect of individual communications submitted against
the Sri Lankan State under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
The
concluding analysis examines the views of the Committee in the Singarasa
case (CCPR/C/81/D/1033/2001) delivered on 21st July 2004 at its
eighty-first session in Geneva. Primarily, the communication is
important for the unequivocal direction that it gives the State
to amend sections of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, No 48 of 1979
(as amended), that are incompatible with the guarantees of fair
trial under the Covenant. Particularly, Section 16(2) of the PTA
is brought under inquiry for its imposing of the burden regarding
the proving of the voluntary nature of a confession made to an ASP
of an accused detained under the special provisions law.
Singarasa
had been detained on 16 July, 1993 pursuant to an order by the Minister
of Defence under section 9(1) of the PTA which provides for detention
without charge up to a period of eighteen months (renewable by order
every three months), if the Minister of Defence "has reason
to believe or suspect that any person is connected with or concerned
in any unlawful activity". The detention order was not served
on him and he was not informed of the reasons for his detention.
Thereafter,
he was kept in detention up to August 1993, where he was first brought
before a Magistrate, and then remanded back into police custody.
No bail was given in terms of Section 15(2) of the PTA. Neither
did the Magistrate review the detention order, in terms of Section
10, which states that a detention order under section 9 of the PTA
is final and shall not be called in question before any court.
On
11 December 1993, he was produced before an ASP (who had previously
interrogated him in the capacity of a police constable) and asked
to sign a statement, which had been translated and typed in Sinhala
by another police officer who also acted as an interpreter during
this time. When Singarasa had refused to sign as he could not understand
it, he alleged that the ASP then forcibly put his thumbprint on
the typed statement. He did not have legal representation.
Singarasa's
claim was that he was forced to sign a confession and subsequently
had to prove that it was extracted under duress and was not voluntary
in terms of Section 16(2) which imposed the burden on him. He pleaded
that this was impossible for him to do given that he was compelled
to sign the confession only in the presence of the police officers
concerned by whom he had been tortured.
The
judicial medical report produced at his trial in the high court
confirmed that he displayed scars on his back and a serious injury,
in the form of a corneal scar on his left eye, which resulted in
permanent impairment of vision. The report also stated that "injuries
to the lower part of the left back of the chest and eye were caused
by a blunt weapon while that to the mid back of the chest was probably
due to application of sharp force".
At
a voir dire hearing in the High Court, the Court concluded that
the confession was admissible, pursuant to section 16(1) of the
PTA, which renders admissible any statement made before a police
officer not below the rank of an ASP, provided that it is voluntary.
The confession was admitted despite the Court noting that there
were "injury scars presently visible on the [author's] body"
and acknowledging that these were sequels of injuries "inflicted
before or after this incident."
Further
factors taken against him was that he had failed to complain to
anyone at any time about the beatings, including the Magistrate.
Singarasa was convicted and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment
in 1995 under section 23(a) of the State of Emergency (Miscellaneous
Provisions and Powers) Regulations No. 1 of 1989 with the Public
Security (Amendment) Act No. 28 of 1988, of having conspired by
unlawful means to overthrow the lawfully constituted Government
of Sri Lanka, and (read together with the provisions of the PTA)
of having attacked four army camps with a view to achieving the
said objective.
The
conviction was based solely on the alleged confession. His appeal
to the Court of Appeal was dismissed though his sentence was reduced.
Thereafter, in January 2000, the Supreme Court also refused special
leave to appeal. It was from this refusal that Singarasa appealed
to the Geneva based Committee.
The
primary question was as to whether his rights under Article 14,
paragraph 3 (g) of the Covenant had been violated by his being forced
to sign a confession and subsequently to prove its voluntary nature.
The Committee answered this question in the positive. In so doing,
it pointed out that its jurisprudence had laid down the principle
that no one shall "be compelled to testify against himself
or confess guilt" which must be understood in terms of the
absence of any direct or indirect physical or psychological coercion
from the investigating authorities on the accused with a view to
obtaining a confession of guilt.
It
was considered implicit in this principle that the prosecution prove
that the confession was made without duress. Interestingly, it was
pointed out that even if, as argued by the Sri Lankan State, the
threshold of proof regarding the forced nature of a confession is
"placed very low" and "a mere possibility of involuntariness"
would suffice to sway the court in favour of the accused, it remains
that the burden was on the author, this would not suffice. Its reasoning
was unequivocal.
"The
willingness of the courts at all stages to dismiss the complaints
of torture and ill-treatment on the basis of the inconclusiveness
of the medical certificate (especially one obtained over a year
after the interrogation and ensuing confession) suggests that this
threshold was not complied with. Further, insofar as the courts
were prepared to infer that the author's allegations lacked credibility
by virtue of his failing to complain of ill-treatment before its
magistrate, the Committee finds that inference to be manifestly
unsustainable in the light of his expected return to police detention."
It
was in this context that the Committee found that the State had
violated Article 14, paragraphs 2, and 3(g), read together with
Article 2, paragraph 3, and 7 of the Covenant. The State was put
under an obligation to provide Singarasa with an effective and appropriate
remedy, including release or retrial and compensation.
Importantly,
Sri Lanka was also directed to avoid similar violations in the future
and to ensure that the impugned sections of the PTA are made compatible
with the provisions of the Covenant. It is this latter direction
that is of special account for this country and will have to be
hearkened to by the State if it does not wish to earn the reputation
of a 'pariah state' in international law. |