Where
the duty to investigate is paramount
In the wake of particular developments in the media recently, wherein
investigative journalism in the context of issues relating to the
judiciary in this country has been put in issue, including action
being taken against particular newspapers for contempt of court,
it behoves us to look at the manner in which the media is expected
to perform its role in imparting information, thus enabling the
right to expression and thought to be exercised by individuals in
this country.
In
"Defending Free Speech", an informative publication released
to mark ten years of its work as an international media rights watchdog,
Article 19 refers with some pride to their successful submission
to the European Court of Human Rights (EUCT) in the Open Door Counselling
case, which led to a landmark ruling by the Court as regards the
right to receive information.
The
case itself was somewhat unique. Two Irish counselling clinics had
complained to the EUCT that they were being restrained by the Supreme
Court of Ireland from giving information to their clients as to
the location, identity of and method of communication with abortion
clinics in the United Kingdom. The clinics argued that this interfered
with their right to impart information and the right of women to
receive such information, in the event of being pregnant. Their
argument was upheld and the state was declared to have no right
to withhold information from its citizens about health care facilities,
in this case, abortion.
The
Open Door Counselling judgement, delivered in 1992, dealt with the
right to impart and receive information in general. The rights and
responsibilities of the media, in the specific context of freedom
of information has been however, discussed recently by the EUCT
in a judgement hailed by some of the more avantgarde European newspapers
as "sensational" at that time. The judgements of the EUCT,
though not directly applicable to Sri Lanka, are of high persuasive
value and have been followed by Sri Lankan judges in numerous instances.
In
De Haes and Gijsels V Belgium, the question was whether a published
article accusing four Belgian judges of bias in the handling of
a case was defamatory. In dispute was a mass of articles containing
detailed information about the circumstances in which that particular
decision had been taken. The Antwerp Court of Appeal had upheld
the judges action for defamation but their decision was set aside
by the European Court.
The
EUCT proceeded on an interesting line of questioning. What was the
extent of the right of a journalist to impart information to the
public? To what degree could this be limited to protect the rights
and reputations of others, in this instance, the rights of judges
and the Advocate General who brought proceedings?
Some
basic principles were identified in this regard." The press
plays an essential role in a democratic society. Although, it must
not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the rights
and reputations of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart-in
a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities-information
and ideas in all matters of public interest, including those relating
to the functioning of the judiciary. The courts- the guarantors
of justice, whose role is fundamental in a State based on the rule
of law-must enjoy public confidence. They must accordingly be protected
from unfounded destructive attacks, specially in view of the fact
that judges are subject to a duty of discretion which precludes
them from replying to criticism…."
Having
said this, the EUCT pointed out that the information disclosed by
the journalists was based on thorough research into the allegations
against the accused (Mr X) in the particular case and on the opinions
of experts who had advised disclosure of such facts in the interests
of his children (the victims) That being so, the journalists could
not be accused of having failed in their professional obligations
by publishing what they had learned about the case. Rather, the
EUCT maintained that;
"
………….it is incumbent upon the press to impart
information and ideas of public interest. Not only does the press
have the task of imparting such ideas, the public also has the right
to receive them. This is particularly true in the instant case,
given the seriousness of the allegation which concerned both the
fate of young children and the functioning of the system of justice
in Antwerp"
What
then, of the allegation that, by publishing the articles that were
critical of the judges who sat in the case, the journalists had
committed defamation? The judges and the Advocate General complained
mainly of the personal attacks to which they considered to have
been subjected, of making unproved statements about their private
lives and of having drawn defamatory conclusions that they had not
been careful in their handling of the case. Their claim was not
accepted. The information gathered by the journalists were held
to be in itself, capable of justifying criticism of the decisions
taken by the judges and by the Advocate General.
The
EUCT concluded, in carefully reasoned language, that the opinions
expressed by the journalists regarding the judges were therefore
not excessive to the case." Freedom of expression is applicable
not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received
or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference but also
to those which offend, shock or disturb the State or any section
of the community. Journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse
to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation" the European
Court said.
The
decision in the case is not all that surprising as previous opinions
by the EUCT have inclined in the same direction. Journalists are
given a particular licence to disseminate information, based not
only on views expressed by themselves but also by others, particularly
where there is an overriding public interest factor, as for example,
wide scale governmental corruption or a compelling degree of public
indignation about a particular issue.
The
EUCT has also imposed a duty upon a state not to withhold information
about matters that are of importance in the public interest or to
penalise individuals in government administration who do disclose
such information, based on 'whistleblower protection" clauses
in many freedom of information laws around the world. As far as
Sri Lanka is concerned, painstaking attempts last year to draft
a Freedom of Information Act similar to the Indian and Pakistani
laws, have been suspended for all intents and purposes due to a
palpable lack of political will on the part of the present administration.
This
country is now in an age of peculiar contradictions where the Rule
of Law operates primarily as a facade. Indeed, the media itself
has been found significantly wanting in its failure to communicate
information in a fair and non-political manner on many issues, most
particularly in regard to the significant deterioration of basic
institutions of governance, including the judiciary. For those who
venture out of this failed process, it is an exercise full of dangers.
Yet, it will be only as a result of the ventures of this few that
some order may yet, come out of the chaos. |