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| Solheim
in make or break talks with LTTE He asked whether the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, had issued a "political ultimatum." This was when he declared "…. if the Government of Sri Lanka rejects our urgent appeal and adopts delaying tactics perpetuating the suffering of our people, we have no alternative other than to advance the freedom struggle of our nation………the Tamil people cannot live in a political vacuum without an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA)…" The question, no doubt, was couched in diplomatic language. Bluntly put, it was to ascertain from Mr. Tamilselvan whether his leader's remarks in any way amounted to a notice to call off the 35 month old Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). Article 4.4 of the CFA provides for notice of termination to be given by either party to the Royal Norwegian Government 14 days in advance. Equally diplomatic in his response, Mr. Thamilselvan replied that "the LTTE is fully committed to the CFA." But he added they were only waiting for the Government's response to resume negotiations on the basis of their demand for an ISGA. The Government's response is now known. There will be no negotiations on ISGA alone. Further elaboration came last Monday when Deputy Defence Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake told Parliament that the armed forces were being strengthened to meet any threat. Soon after Mr. Prabhakaran's "Maveerar (Great Heroes) Day" address (on November 27), Norway's special envoy Erik Solheim met with LTTE chief peace negotiator, Anton Balasingham in London on December 1. The latter is learnt to have made clear matters now rested in the hands of Mr. Prabhakaran. The Norwegian Ambassador's meeting in Kilinochchi with Mr. Tamilselvan came the next day, December 2. What next? Formally the LTTE will make its latest reaction known when Mr. Solheim meets Mr. Thamilselvan in Kilinochchi on Wednesday. He arrives in Colombo tomorrow on a four day visit, the most crucial since Norway began its peace facilitation efforts. Will the LTTE now lay down a time frame for a Government response? Will the lack of such a response lead to their giving notice to pull out of the CFA? If one side or the other does not change their stance, the answers may be in the affirmative. Such an eventuality will see the inevitable resumption of hostilities in the New Year 2005. What form could such hostilities take? The LTTE has built a strong military machine during the ceasefire. They have gained considerable international recognition too. Hence, the character of future hostilities is most unlikely to reflect the pattern that existed before February 22, 2002 or when the ceasefire came into effect. Since then, the LTTE has relaxed a number of tight security measures that were in force to prevent an armed forces incursion. They have allowed de-mining in vast extents of land dominated by them, particularly in their heartland, the Wanni. After artillery and mortar, it was the mines that caused the heavy casualties to armed forces. There is considerable development activity there now and civilian lifestyles have improved tremendously. In the light of this, it would be common sense to expect the LTTE to have given deep thought to new threat perceptions for them. This is not only after relaxing security measures in force in areas held by them during "Eelam War Three." Such a step gave the armed forces an advantage if they wanted to penetrate deep. On the other hand, they also took advantage of the security measures withdrawn by the previous United National Front (UNF) Government in the City and other principal towns. The UNF dismantled check-points and called a halt to search operations. This explains why there has been a considerable increase in guerrilla cells in the Greater Colombo area and other principal suburban towns. Could this not be a move to take a future war outside the guerrilla theatre? Could this not be part of preparations to destroy the armed forces' offensive capabilities in their own domain? The guerrillas could thus keep the "infrastructure" they were developing for the civilians in areas dominated by them intact. Additionally they could tie down the armed forces in theatres away from them. That there has been an influx of weapons, suicide cadres, intelligence operatives and pistol gangs into these areas is too well known. Also well known is the fact that neither the armed forces nor the police have been able to bust one such cell or arrest some of their key functionaries. Hence, the authorities may not be fully aware of their newer capabilities, aims and objectives. Not even after a number of military informants and intelligence operatives were killed in broad daylight in the City has any major breakthrough been made. Even if the LTTE does not launch a full frontal offensive for fear of international repercussions, as some senior armed forces officers argue, could they not precipitate a crisis? Could they not use such a crisis to provoke the armed forces or the Police to strike at them and retaliate thereafter? However implausible it may sound, such a move could also give them some cause to carry out attacks on economic targets and VIPs. Similar incidents have taken place after previous ceasefires ended prematurely. But, Mr. Prabhakaran's threat to "advance the freedom struggle" has much broader connotations than the mere resumption of hostilities. Such a "struggle" has been already launched as some of the recent events show. This is notwithstanding Mr. Balasingham's remarks to the Tamil diaspora in London that "Velupillai Prabhakaran is ready and ready for war….." More on that aspect later. Whether these are rhetoric, as formidable sections of Sri Lanka's defence and security establishment still believe, or not, will become clearer by Wednesday. Unlike them, the Norwegian peace facilitators are not taking the LTTE leader's remarks lightly. In fact, soon after Mr Prabhakaran's declaration, Mr. Solheim wanted to arrive in Sri Lanka last week. But the Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat, Jayantha Dhanapala, was away in Finland. He is due in Colombo only today. As a result, Mr. Solheim has been compelled to skip a previously scheduled meeting of representatives of Scandinavian countries who have nominated monitors for the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark on Tuesday will be attended by Ambassador Brattskar who is returning to Oslo on home leave. Mr. Solheim’s journey to Kilinochchi on Wednesday comes under difficult circumstances. The Sri Lanka Air Force will only fly him from Ratmalana to Vavuniya. From there, vehicles of the Norwegian Embassy in Colombo will be on hand to drive him along the Alpha Nine (A-9) highway across the Army check-point at Omanthai. The first time this arrangement was put into practice was when Ambassador Brattskar visited Kilinochchi on December 2. He was airlifted by the SLAF to Vavuniya and had to motor down from there. The last Sri Lanka Air Force flight to "uncleared" areas was to ferry to Kilinochchi Tiger guerrilla military wing leaders Sornam (Trincomalee) and Banu (Batticaloa). The chopper made landings in Karadiyanaru, Sampur and thereafter in Kilinochchi on November 12. The Sri Lanka Air Force has ceased to operate helicopter flights to Tiger guerrilla dominated territory since then. The Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshal Donald Perera took the decision in consultation with the Ministry of Defence. This was after the SLAF failed to seek an assurance three weeks ago from the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) on the safety of their aircraft flying over "uncleared" areas. The monitoring mission, tasked to enforce the ceasefire, has said it could not provide such an assurance. The decision will mean any future request for helicopter transport to Tiger guerrilla cadres, made through the Norwegian Embassy, will not be entertained. This new turn of events comes in the backdrop of disturbing developments over the construction of a 1250 metre runway near the Iranamadu tank in Kilinochchi. Some three months ago, Dr Dhanapala wrote a strong letter of protest to the Norwegian Embassy in Colombo over this move. The letter was also copied to the SLMM. Since then, reports of other developments have reached the Government. A new building north west of the runway resembling a hangar had been constructed. Aerial reconnaissance also shows that runway markings have been completed. The runway headings have been described as 23 diagonal 05. Lights were now being installed along the outer perimeter of the runway. The approaches are being cleared with the cutting down of trees. Though there is no taxiway, intelligence officials say, the preparations clearly show plans were under way to ready the runway for use by aircraft. Such activity, they fear, cannot be detected due to the absence of sophisticated radar. Though state intelligence agencies are yet to come up with reports of any specific plans for resumption of hostilities, there have been accounts of preparations on many fronts. Besides their active armed cadres, civilian groups were being given weapons training. More Black Tiger cadres were also being put through their paces. Nowhere are such measures more reflected than in the East. Balraj has been named "overall commander" for the East. Military wing leaders for Trincomalee (Sornam) and Batticaloa (Banu) have been placed under his charge. In the recent weeks Balraj and his senior guerrilla cadres had been busy visiting areas in the Batticaloa north where cadres have been pouring in from the Wanni. Recruitment including forced conscription is reported to be under way in the Trincomalee district. Some of the female youth who resisted have fled to "controlled areas." In Kuchchaveli and its environs where tourist hotels have become empty after the recent violence, civilians have been advised to be prepared to vacate their homesteads at short notice. Fortification of defences in Sampur, an area that overlooks the Trincomalee harbour, has been stepped up. These and other threats posed by the LTTE were the subjects of discussion yesterday at a conference at the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH) chaired by Chief of Defence Staff and Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri. Some preparations to meet a contingency are under way by the armed forces. The Navy is awaiting the arrival of its latest offshore patrol vessel from the United States whilst the Air Force has run into problems in Russia whilst taking delivery of its two Antonov 32 transport planes sent to Ukraine for overhaul. See box stories on this page for details. This is whilst Army Headquarters has relaxed to some extent restrictions placed on the use of vehicles by their officer cadres. In the Batticaloa district, civilians in two Tamil villages - Aandankulam and Kattamuruvikulam - are fleeing for fear of Tiger guerrilla attacks. These villages are located near Ridipokuna on the border of Polonnaruwa and Batticaloa districts between Welikanda and Punanai. The two villages were said to have been sympathetic to the Karuna faction when they were fighting Wanni cadres. Yesterday two members of the Karuna faction, Kanapathipillai Udayakumar (35) and Muthu Krishnapillai (36) were shot dead in Valachenai reportedly by Tiger guerilla cadres. Now to Mr. Prabhakaran's pledge "to advance the freedom struggle." Such a "struggle," it appears, has got under way even before their leader made this announcement. One such aspect is the hardening of the attitude of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) on issues before Parliament. So much so, other political parties are calling for amendments to Standing Orders to prevent statements that contravene the Constitution from being made. Moves for constitutional amendments or other related legislation will most likely see a stepped up agitation. Another is the campaign in "cleared" areas to periodically disrupt the Government's writ from running there and to consolidate public support for their agitation. Two recent reports reaching the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH) after last week’s Hartals tell the story. They are: "02
DECEMBER 2004; GENERAL AREA MANNAR TOWN "02
DECEMBER 2004: GENERAL AREA VAVUNIYA "At the Police station, one of them had escaped. The two others were identified as V. Sudaharan and T. Karthigesu, two students of Jaffna University who stated that they had come to Vavuniya town to ensure that the Hartal was being conducted successfully. Tyres had been burnt at 2nd Cross Street, Railway Station Road, Opposite Bank of Ceylon and Kuruwankadu junction. The LTTE was seen instigating the public and students to provoke the security and police personnel. On 02 December 2004 LTTE had closed Omantai Road block. Transport on A-9 road up to Jaffna had come to a standstill. The area is being patrolled." These two Hartals show the dilemma of the armed forces and the police. Either they were unable to ensure the smoother functioning of public utilities in a "cleared" area or were reluctant to do so for fear of triggering off a crisis and thus offending the public. What if they continue such Hartals in the future too? Is there an action plan to deal with such situations? Poor and faulty intelligence, like what I wrote last week, has denied the UPFA leadership a correct and detailed appraisal of threats from Tiger guerrillas. As a result, in crisis situations that follow a ceasefire, they have been forced to yield to demands for greater militarization - more tanks, more artillery, more weaponry, personnel and so on - to meet security threats to wage a conventional war. They are even unaware of the fate of elite units like the Long Range Reconnaisance Patrols (LRRPs) that once infused great fear in the LTTE. With no national plan or strategy in place so far, little wonder there will be panic and more panic. Until then the carnival will go on.
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