Do
we need the draft 18th amendment to the constitution?
The proposed 18th Amendment to the Constitution by which the appellate
courts are sought to be taken to the provinces and the numbers of
appellate judges are sought to be increased has been shrugged off
as populist by some and lauded as people friendly by others.
The
latter argue that easier access to the appellate courts would be
provided thereby for the thousands of provincial litigants who would
otherwise be compelled to travel to Colombo and brave the elite
portals of Hulftsdorp along with the tremendously increased litigation
costs that such a process would undoubtedly involve.
It
is suggested therefore that the amendment would do much to decrease
laws delays that are now an entrenched and detested part of the
legal process in the country. In the abstract, this is a problem
acknowledged by the judges themselves. The “chronic delay
and frustration” in a typical civil litigation was succinctly
summed up by a onetime President of the Court of Appeal when, after
analysing the case flow statistics, he pointed out that the system
reflects “excessive judicial passivity in an adversarial,
undisciplined legal procedure with limited availability of versatile
alternatives to a protracted trial………where the
institutions of civil appeals far outnumber the disposals.”
(see address of Justice Ameer Ismail at the ceremonial sitting on
his assumption as President, Court of Appeal, The Daily News, Tuesday,
August 25, 1998)
Law’s
delays has also been focussed upon as a primary concern facing the
legal profession in the country by visiting teams of observers from
international missions, including the International Commission of
Jurists in 1997. (see for example, ‘Judicial Independence
in Sri Lanka, Report of a Mission,’ 14-23 September, 1993,
pp 54-55)
However,
whether the proposed 18th Amendment would, by itself, serve as a
panacea for this chronically aggravated problem is another matter
altogether. If the amendment does go through, care ought to be taken
to ensure that court processes in the respective appeal courts in
the provinces are also streamlined with court registries functioning
properly and transparently.
It
is relevant in this regard that two recent studies on the judiciary
had found substantial lack of confidence evidenced among court users
in relation to the existing court system, including allegations
of corruption against court officers. If existing dysfunctional
court structures are replicated in the new appeal courts that will
be set up, then what we would end up with is not an improved system
but rather a continuation of the miseries of the litigant and yet
another way for provincial lawyers, this time, to increase the power
of their respective purses.
In
a different context, one amendment to the 18th Amendment put forward
by the United National Front (UNF) and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
(SLMC) proposes that the provincial appeal courts be granted the
power to determine questions of fundamental rights presently within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
In
principle, a strong argument could be made out, both in theoretical
and practical terms as to why the conferring of jurisdiction to
hear fundamental rights cases should not be confined to the Supreme
Court only. The enforcement of the rights is one of the most important
remedies afforded to citizens. The availability of such remedies
in the provinces that would take the hearing of such complaints
out of the rarified atmosphere of the highest court in the land
and bring rights closer to those marginalised victims most in need
of such a remedy, has much to recommend it.
Though
in a very different constitutional context, the Indian Constitution,
for example, has successfully merged the concept of writ jurisdiction
and fundamental rights and granted both the Supreme Court and the
High Court to hear questions of violations of rights and issue writ
accordingly. The right to a remedy to a High Court in India arises
if the cause of action has arisen wholly or in part within the High
Court’s jurisdiction or if the seat of the person in authority
who is alleged to have been responsible for the violation rests
within that court’s jurisdiction.
However,
in contrast, the writ remedy and the fundamental rights remedy,
(though the latter has been influenced in its expansion by the former),
has been kept constitutionally separate in Sri Lanka with the writ
jurisdiction lying with the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court
exercising its exclusive powers to determine rights violations.
With the institution of the provincial High Courts, these courts
were given the power to hear writ applications in respect of matters
arising within their jurisdictions. In that regard, the impact that
the conferring of fundamental rights jurisdiction in the provincial
courts of appeal set up in terms of the 18th Amendment will inevitably
have on the existing appellate courts needs to be thought through
adequately to ensure minimal confusion in the existing court hierarchy
and the conferring of jurisdiction thereby. That the draft 18th
Amendment might be referred to a select committee of parliament
is perhaps a relief in that sense.
As
already pointed out in this column, whatever form that the 18th
Amendment takes, it will have little effect if existing court processes
are not streamlined. Other issues remain unresolved, not the least
of which concerns legal assistance. Even if the appeal courts are
taken to the provinces, vast numbers of individuals will still be
unable to afford the costs of litigation where current schemes of
legal aid have an income related cut-off point to qualify for aid
which bypasses individuals whose income may be marginally higher
than the cut-off point but are still not high enough to absorb costs
of actual litigation. Unavailability of legal aid continues to be
one of the most pressing questions affecting access to justice.
In
sum, the present travails affecting Sri Lanka’s legal system
cannot be miraculously addressed by an 18th Amendment to the Constitution
setting up provincial courts of appeal or even by granting such
courts the authority to hear rights applications. Rejuvenation of
the country’s legal system is a far more difficult task, commencing
from the resolution of core questions affecting the independence
of the institution of the judiciary that have been bedeviling us
for the past several years, thereafter followed by carefully thought
out reform of the existing system. This process is yet a long way
off from our currently confused thinking dominated by the respectively
opportunistic political agendas of the government and opposition
parties.
|