Sri Lankan peace-keeping troops in Haiti. A soldier handcuffs
a former Army de Haiti (FadH) soldier while colleagues look
on.
Sri Lankan soldiers
pay tribute to their two dead colleagues before their bodies
we flown from Haiti to Sri Lanka.
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Why
are we fighting for Haiti?
Further delays in Govt. - LTTE joint mechanism?
It was three hours to dawn when Sri Lankan Airlines
flight UL 546 from Zurich touched down at the Bandaranaike International
Airport last Monday.
An
official of the Peace Secretariat, a Norwegian diplomat and armed
guards were waiting for a Business Class passenger to disembark.
The red carpet and the Kandyan dancers were, however, not there.
When he did set foot on the tarmac and came into the terminal building,
they guided him through arrival formalities. Though it was not a
VIP welcome sans all checks, officials were on hand to watch him
clear Immigration and Customs formalities. With that over, armed
Air Force men who were responsible for his security inside the airport
handed the visitor to Army commandos.
He
was a former constable in the Sri Lanka Police, Balasingham Nadesan.
He is now the "Police Chief" of the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The man who is in touch with LTTE leader,
Velupillai Prabhakaran almost every day, heads a LTTE "Police"
over 600 strong. It was only last week 90 more recruits passed out
as "policemen" at a ceremony in Mankulam. Known to be
very media friendly, Mr. Nadesan had cut short a world tour by a
LTTE delegation and was returning to Wanni.
This
delegation was led by LTTE Political Wing leader S.P. Thamilselvan.
Not even the Sri Lanka Government dignitaries had undertaken such
a world tour in recent years encompassing that many countries. The
LTTE had covered Ireland, Switzerland, Italy, Germany, Netherlands,
Norway, Finland, Sweden and Austria.
Even
before he boarded a flight from Zurich, the LTTE had made a request
to the Government, through the Norwegian Embassy in Colombo for
a helicopter. This was to travel from the airport to Kilinochchi.
The Peace Secretariat forwarded the request to the Ministry of Defence.
The latter had turned it down on the grounds that he was not entitled
to one. The Ministry policy, it has been explained, was to allow
such helicopter flights only to political and military wing leaders
of the LTTE. This is despite an MoD bureaucrat clamping down a ban
on Air Force flights over guerrilla controlled areas - a decision
that was later over-ruled by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga.
The
MoD, however, offered armed escort for Mr. Nadesan to travel from
Colombo to Vavuniya, up to the Omanthai Army check-point. A team
of heavily armed commandos were ready to move him soon after Air
Force guards handed Mr Nadesan over to them at the airport. But
there was a hitch. The commandos were kicking their heels for Mr.
Nadesan was not ready to move out.
It
turned out that he had too much baggage when he checked in at Zurich
airport. Hence he had asked a known fellow passenger in the same
flight to hand carry a package for him. The package had contained
cholesterol-free and sugar-free Swiss chocolates.
The
passenger had agreed. When Mr. Nadesan arrived, he had seen the
passenger waiting to clear his baggage from the belt driven conveyor.
He was not to be seen thereafter. After some 45 minutes of waiting,
the commando escorts were worried. They told Mr. Nadesan they could
not wait any longer and thus jeopardise his security. So he decided
to move out without the Swiss chocolates.
But
Mr. Nadesan had more important cargo he could not part with. That
was the draft text of the Joint Mechanism the LTTE is to sign with
the UPFA Government. This draft had been delivered to Mr. Thamilselvan
by the Norwegian Embassy in Vienna. That day the same text was handed
over in Colombo to the acting Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat,
John Gunaratne.
In
Vienna, the text became the subject of study by the LTTE delegation.
Displeased by some of the contents, it was their view that the Government
had gone back on some of the matters earlier agreed. Hence they
felt it was not acceptable. But the delegation did not want to formally
reject it from foreign soil. Hence they took up the official position
that a response would come after their return to the Wanni. Ahead
of that move, Mr. Nadesan was travelling with the draft to consult
Mr. Prabhakaran.
With
peace talks stalled, the Norwegian peace facilitators have focused
on establishing the Joint Mechanism to build a bridge between the
Government and the LTTE. Such a move, they felt, would come as a
good precursor to the resumption of peace talks. For the Government,
it would have been salutary to persuade the donor co-chairs to loosen
up their purse strings and provide aid. To the LTTE, such a mechanism
would have not only resulted in a flood of money for post-tsunami
recovery efforts, but seen the birth of some infrastructure for
development activity. Even if that was not in the form of an Interim
Self Governing Authority (ISGA), the Joint Mechanism still provided
a via media.
In
the recent weeks, a deal to conclude an agreement for the setting
up of the Joint Mechanism was so close. So much so, Norway's Ambassador
Hans Brattskar confidently told some diplomatic colleagues in Colombo
it could be wrapped up in a week. But the process, it is now clear,
is so close but yet so far. Some of the thorny issues have become
thornier. If the Government has played cautious in the wording of
the text in order not to confer any "legitimacy" on the
LTTE, the guerrillas have been emphatic on some of the key issues.
One such case is the establishment of a buffer zone where the Government
and the LTTE views are at odds.
In
this backdrop, the growing need to forge unity within the UPFA ranks
may see a possible slowing down of the process to establish a Joint
Mechanism. According to one Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) source,
President Kumaratunga is determined not to allow opposition parties
to exploit the fissures within the constituent parties of the UPFA.
This,
no doubt, is influenced by a number of factors including the upcoming
Presidential elections. Towards this end, she has made clear she
will consult them on contentious issues. This has seen a thaw in
relations. Taking a cue from this, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)
leader Somawansa Amerasinghe has already declared that his party
would not quit the UPFA and thus cause delight to the opposition
United National Party. Despite bouts of anger from President Kumaratunga,
this is how the JVP has won the day on two contentious issues -
the restructuring of the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) and the
inclusion of India's Bharat Petroleum as the third player with the
Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC). At present the Indian Oil Corporation
is already holding a third of the CPC's fuel distribution points.
Our Political Editor deals with these aspects on the opposite page.
These
developments naturally turn the focus on the LTTE leadership in
the Wanni. Almost four months after the Boxing Day tsunami catastrophe,
will their prolonged inability to reach accord with the Government
on a Joint Mechanism draw a hostile response? Or will the LTTE leadership
choose to continue the protracted dialogue through Norwegian facilitators
until they reach accord?
One
of the main thrusts of the world tour by the Thamilselvan delegation,
besides raising funds, has been to point out what the LTTE calls
the Government's intransigence to share equitably the aid received
for tsunami recovery. Thus they perceive they have set the mood
right in the international community. The decision now rests with
Mr. Prabhakaran.
A
hostile response, perhaps more political than military, the LTTE
knows, can lever results. The latest instance is how the killing
of Ilayathamby Lingarajah alias Kaushalyan, the LTTE Political Wing
leader for Batticaloa-Ampara jolted the Government into appointing
a Presidential Commission of Inquiry. It came in the backdrop of
hectic diplomatic activity where Norway's Special Envoy, Erik Solheim
averted a crisis. This saw the birth of the Presidential Commission
of Inquiry.
Here
is another instance that explains why Tiger guerrilla leader Mr.
Prabhakarn has been strengthening his military machine during the
ceasefire. Even if there was no immediate need for war, such a move
correspondingly increased his bargaining power in the peace process.
It began with enhanced recruitment of cadres, induction of more
sophisticated military hardware and now the acquisition of air capability.
Developments relating to the latter have been exclusively revealed
in The Sunday Times over the weeks.
In
some opposition political quarters, such revelations have caused
considerable confusion. Sections of the United National Party (UNP)
believed that the LTTE has had an "air force" (as revealed
by the media including The Sunday Times since 1993) and therefore
had an air capability since then. Hence, they contend, this was
not a development that had taken place during the ceasefire.
The
fact that the LTTE had a so called "air force" since the
early 1990s is indisputable. The "assets" of such an "air
force" only constituted some surface to air missiles and ultra
light aircraft, ones that are used for sports purposes or amateur
flying. Such micro lights could have taken off from a small patch
of land like a school playground or a small road. In fact this acquisition
did trigger some concern and led to precautionary measures in the
South. However, it did not constitute a serious threat. This was
in view of its limited endurance and low flying capability that
made it easy to engage them even from the ground.
During
the near two decades of war not one ultra light was engaged in any
combat or attempted attack on any target. The fact that the LTTE
possessed these elements did not in any way confer on the LTTE an
air capability. Such an air capability was only acquired after the
LTTE built a 1.2 kilometre runway and acquired two light aircraft.
The United States Government has helped in the identification of
one such aircraft.
As
exclusively revealed in The Sunday Times (Situation Report) construction
work on the new airstrip began only after the ceasefire came into
effect during the tenure of the previous United National Front (UNF)
Government. In fact metal meant for the paving of the Alpha (A-9)
Nine highway was siphoned off for this construction work despite
concerns expressed by Army top brass during this period.
The
clearing of a jungle patch was confirmed in a "top secret"
Air Force report parts of which were revealed in these columns last
week. The report confirmed that the Air Force had rendered unusable
a previously constructed runway. It was thereafter that a new clearing
had been made and a new runway was built. However, such an airstrip
was commissioned only after President Kumaratunga took over the
defence portfolio (together with Interior and Mass Communication)
from the former United National Front Government. It is even thereafter,
during the tenure of the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA)
it came to light that the LTTE had acquired two light aircraft.
By
the Sri Laka Air Force's own admission, the construction work was
still under way on the runway when a UAV mission flew over the area
on February 16, 2004. The report further confirms that on September
30, 2004, another UAV mission confirmed that the airstrip had been
paved, threshold and centre line markings added. This was a period
during the tenure of the UPFA Government.
If
the United National Front (UNF) Government failed to take action
to prevent the construction of the runway, the UPFA Government failed
equally to prevent its completion and commissioning thereafter.
In the case of the UPFA, the matter assumes greater significance
since the defence portfolio was taken over on November 3, 2003 on
grounds that national security was deteriorating.
The
Government has meanwhile received acknowledgements from several
foreign countries that were apprised of LTTE's acquisition of air
capability. In their replies, whilst some acknowledged receipt of
Government's documents including an aide memoire, others had expressed
deep concern over the developments. The moves saw further Governmental
action this week. However, for obvious reasons they cannot be spelt
out.
The
measures came as foreign intelligence agencies spoke of moves by
LTTE's main procurement man, Kumaran Pathmanathan alias KP being
present in a South East Asian country to procure air defence systems.
He heads the so-called KP Department of the LTTE - the division
that is tasked with military procurements for Tiger guerrillas.
KP is said to operate under a number of passports and has under
his charge a team to assist him.
As
against these developments, the security establishment has been
busy working its own counter measures. As revealed in these columns,
a military committee tasked with formulating a strategic plan has
addressed some of the threats they have been forced to cope with
since the ceasefire. However, they are also caught up in policy
issues.
When
the previous UNF Government mooted the idea of sending troops on
UN peace keeping assignments, it was the present UPFA leaders who
did not favour the move. The UNF's efforts were based on the assumption
that peace had arrived with the ceasefire and there would be no
more war. But UPFA leaders contended it was a situation of no war
and no peace.
Yet,
President Kumaratunga signed a decree allowing Sri Lankan troops
to take part in UN peace keeping operations. The arrangement, costing
over a billion rupees to the Government, was finalised with the
UN by the country's then Permanent representative, Bernard Gunatilleke.
The
first contingent - a battalion from the Sri Lanka Light Infantry
- moved to Haiti - a country half the size of Sri Lanka with a population
of over eight million. They are part of a 7,400 strong UN force
now fighting to quell a rebellion by former soldiers. Since June
2004, UN international peace-keeping force began deployment to the
island nation, following months of civil unrest, floods and a list
of humanitarian crises faced by the inhabitants. The United Nations
Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (or its French acronym MINUSTAH),
is working with the interim government. French and Creole are the
official languages in that country.
The
peacekeepers relieved the Multi National Interim Force Haiti (MIFH)
made up of US Marines, Canadian and Chilean troops who enforced
curfews and began to restore civil order after Prime Minister Jean-Bertrand
Aristide was deposed.
Trouble
for Sri Lankan troops began when they launched an operation to capture
former Army de Haiti (FAdH) base at Petit Goave, 60 kilometres from
the capital Port Au Prince. Days earlier, the former soldiers had
attacked the neighbouring Grand Goave Police station and seized
weapons. They had also attacked the Miragone Police Station located
close to where the Sri Lankan troops are billeted.
Sri
Lankan troops moved in to help Haitian National Police (HNP) and
secured the area. This was to prevent FadH infiltration after they
had instigated civilians to launch protests against Sri Lankan troops.
At dawn on March 20 Sri Lankan troops conducted an operation on
a FAdH base in Petit Goave. Lance Corporal H.M. Wijesinghe was killed.
Three other soldiers - Sergeant K.T.J.S.L. Wijethilaka, Lance Corporal
Udaya Kumara and Corporal M.G.A. Pemsiri - were injured.
The
next day, Private R.P.C.S. Rajapakse was on duty at a sentry point
on the sea coast at Killik near Petit Goave. His view was obstructed
and he called for help from Corporal A.L. Seneviratne and Lance
Corporal J.B.A.J. Jayasinghe to identify a suspicious movement at
sea. The two soldiers entered an abandoned building to observe the
boat movement. Just then the concrete structure collapsed. A pile
of concrete fell on Corporal Jayasinghe's head and it took more
than 30 minutes to rescue him. He died at the Argentina Level II
hospital in Pap a day later. However, Corporal Seneviratne only
sustained minor injures.
The
funeral of Lance Corporal Wijesinghe took place with full military
honours in Badulla yesterday. The funeral of Lance Corporal Jayasinghe
will take place with full military honours in Beliatte today. They
are the first two Sri Lankan soldiers to die for a cause that is
not related to their country.
A
battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry was the first to go on
a UN peace keeping assignment and will return to Sri Lanka next
month. Following them to Haiti will be a battalion from the Sinha
Regiment. They are to be followed by battalions from the Gemunu
Watch, Gajaba and Wijeba regiments.
Contractual
commitments have compelled the Army to honour their commitments
for peace keeping in Haiti. However, they declined a request to
send a contingent of peacekeeping troops to Sudan. Instead only
a group of logistics officers will take part in this UN peace keeping
effort.
Sri
Lankan soldiers were trained at tremendous cost to contain a separatist
insurgency in Sri Lanka. As senior security forces officials make
strategic assessments, it is becoming increasingly clear that shortage
of manpower to meet a contingency situation is a serious problem.
The
only motivating factor for sending troops on UN peace keeping missions
abroad is to earn foreign exchange. For this, already two soldiers
have lost their lives and four have been injured. More of the crack
units are being trained to be sent abroad for the same purpose.
This
is whilst the LTTE has strengthened its military machine and continues
to do so. If the lack of troops was to cause a threat to Sri Lanka's
national security interests, endanger the lives of soldiers deployed
to face such a threat and cause hardships to the public, those who
were lured by the greed for foreign exchange will no doubt find
it weighing heavily in their conscience. After all, here was a decision
that came without proper study or even a Cabinet approval. Earning
foreign exchange seems to outweigh national security interests.
That is only in Sri Lanka |