Failed
diplomacy and other happenings
Incredible as it might seem the LTTE is running rings round the
Sri Lanka government on the international stage. Not many in the
South of the country, that arbitrary line that is said to separate
the majority Sinhala community from the Tamil minority, would publicly
admit it because of embarrassment or chauvinistic pride.
But
it is true and no amount burying one's head in the sand like an
ostrich is going to obscure the truth. It would be reasonable to
assume that a sovereign nation with a legitimately elected government
would be able to command more influence internationally than an
organisation with a history of armed violence, terrorism and the
violation of international conventions including one on the recruitment
of child soldiers.
That
should be the case unless, of course, it is a country that is seen
internationally as a pariah state like Myanmar because of the illegitimacy
of its ruling military junta. Sri Lanka is not Myanmar, though if
it continues the way it does it might end up being called a failed
state.
But
right now what should concern Sri Lanka's southern political establishment
is not whether it might be labelled a failed state but the state
of its failing diplomacy. In recent times LTTE delegations have
taken to the air, criss-crossing the globe and meeting ministers
of foreign governments. At times they have met even more senior
politicians.
Take
the recent visit by a four-member LTTE delegation led by the leader
of its political committee, S.Thamilselvan. It visited several European
countries and also South Africa.
Now
that the genie has been let out of the bottle, thanks to the craftily
drafted Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that the Norwegians foisted
on a group of woolly-heads or over- zealous simpletons in the previous
administration, the LTTE has been able to traverse the globe saying
how eager it is to learn about devolution, federalism and conflict
management.
That
exercise, conducted in between rounds of peace talks, was not just
to gather air miles and learn all about power sharing and democratic
governance as some foolishly believed. Some promoted these so-called
"educational tours" because it nicely suited their own
agendas as facilitators or peaceniks.
Before
the MoU and the peace process, Colombo's diplomatic efforts were
directed at bringing the criminal activities of the LTTE to the
attention of foreign governments in the hope that they would crack
down on the Tigers and their supporters in the international Tamil
Diaspora, particularly in the West.
As
long as the LTTE remained politically and diplomatically isolated
and its leadership restricted to the Wanni, it had to depend largely
on its supporters in the Tamil diaspora and foreign sympathisers
abroad to espouse the LTTE cause.
The
diplomatic task therefore was much easier- demonise the LTTE in
the eyes of foreign governments, a task made simpler by the Tigers'
irascible actions and condemnatory conduct.
But
the Ranil Wickremesinghe government changed all that. In the name
of peace, the administration accepted most things the Norwegians
laid on the table and agreed to allow the hitherto isolated LTTE
to leap frog into the international scene, deceitfully helped by
the Norwegians who had their own prospectus for creating a lackey
in this part of the world. This is not surprising given the Norway's
historical background and traditions.
The
ceasefire and the MoU allowed the LTTE to roam around the country
in the name of doing political work and also travel abroad freely
with the Sri Lanka Government playing nursemaid and escorting them
to and from the Katunayake airport.
The
stalled peace talks did not in anyway constrain the LTTE from foreign
excursions, now that it had broken through the cadjan curtain of
diplomatic isolation.
Now
LTTE leaders could talk directly to officials of foreign government
not just in the Wanni but in their very capitals and meet with their
political leaders. Having officially sanctioned this diplomatic
breakthrough, Colombo was left with little room to manoeuvre, particularly
with India deciding to watch from the sidelines instead of being
on the field.
Whereas
previously the Sri Lanka government had launched a diplomatic offensive
against the LTTE, now the Tigers have turned the tables on Colombo.
They
are taking the offensive telling the world that while they are ready
to talk peace, it is the divided Sinhala south and even more importantly,
a fractious ruling coalition, that are blocking the resumption of
talks.
Colombo
thought it had many friends in the international community. Ranil
Wickremesinghe built a so-called "safety net" of powerful
states to keep the LTTE corralled. But that was penetrated by the
Tigers who are now meeting high-level foreign government representatives.
Colombo's
reaction has been to appeal to its so-called friends in the international
community to keep official contact with the LTTE not higher than
deputy minister level, preferably at the level of officials.
Proof
of the failure of those diplomatic efforts is the meetings the LTTE
delegation led by its political leader S.Thamilselvan had during
the recent visit to Europe and South Africa.
It
is to be expected that the LTTE would meet Norway's foreign minister.
But in many other European countries the Tiger delegation visited,
it had discussions with ministers.
In
Ireland the LTTE met with the same minister of state who it had
met previously. But here too, it was Norwegian pressure on the Dublin
government that brought about this meeting.
It
is proof enough that Norway is not the independent, objective facilitator
that both President Kumaratunga and later Ranil Wickremesinghe believed
it would be. Both were too naïve to see through the duplicitous
nature of Oslo's involvement. That self-inflicted wound that is
still oozing blood.
It
was the Norwegian-drafted MoU, which Wickremesinghe and his advisers
blithely accepted, that created the vital opening for the LTTE to
launch its international bid for respectability, if not acceptance.
It is Norway that is speaking to governments near and far to arrange
high-level meetings for the LTTE.
In
this game of winning friends and influencing governments Colombo
is no match for Oslo and the money to do so, backed by a Scandinavian
community that would generally go along with it as long as their
interests are not compromised.
But
the biggest setback to Sri Lanka's diplomatic clout came when South
Africa's deputy president Jacob Zuma met the LTTE. The African National
Congress (ANC) led South African Government suffers from amnesia.
Sri Lanka was consistently a strong critic of South Africa's apartheid
regime and supported the dismantling of that obnoxious system.
There
are reasons why the ANC government is taking this line. But had
the efforts I made in the early 1990s while working in Hong Kong
to facilitate contacts between Colombo and South Africa at a time
that majority rule was clearly on the cards, had been taken more
seriously by the Foreign Ministry and Colombo, Sri Lanka might not
have found itself in this situation. That story would have to be
told another time. |