Nuclear
terrorism treaty: Bridging the split
Guest Column By Dr. Rohan Perera
Legal Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Chairman, United Nations Ad-hoc Committee on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism
The United Nations General Assembly, adopted by consensus on 13
April 2005, the International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, prepared by the UN Ad-hoc Committee on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. UN Secretary General,
Kofi Annan characterized the Nuclear Terrorism Convention as one
which would strengthen the international legal framework against
one of the world's most urgent threats. "The Convention would
help prevent terrorists from gaining access to the most lethal weapons
known to humanity. It will also strengthen the international legal
framework against terrorism which included 12 existing universal
Conventions and Protocols," he added.
The
Ad-hoc Committee which was established by the General Assembly in
1996, was mandated to elaborate, as a matter of priority, an International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, addressing
specifically the need to counter indiscriminate use of bombs and
explosives targeting public buildings and facilities, including
public transportation systems. This initiative was launched by the
G8 countries, against a backdrop of a series of bomb explosions,
which occurred across the globe at the time, including in Sri Lanka,
notably the Central Bank bomb, causing untold devastation and misery
to large number of innocent civilians. The Terrorist Bombings Convention
was successfully negotiated and adopted by the General Assembly
on 15th December 1997.
The
United Nations Ad-hoc Committee then negotiated and finalised the
International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism,
an initiative by France, to which the international community attached
the highest priority for the purpose of addressing the vital issue
of fund raising by terrorist groups, both directly, and indirectly
through front organisations. Sri Lanka was in the forefront among
the group of countries which called for a global ban on fund-raising
by terrorist groups that sustained their campaign of terror. This
Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on 15th July, 2000.
The
Ad-hoc Committee was also mandated by the General Assembly to negotiate
a Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, on
the basis of a proposal made by the Russian Federation. The alarming
scenario that could emerge, if nuclear weapons or material should
fall into terrorist hands, had preoccupied both experts and layman
alike in recent times, particularly after the disintegration of
the former Soviet Union. These anxieties were heightened amidst
reports that there is a great deal of enriched fissionable material
unaccounted for, mainly from the former Soviet Union which are being
smuggled freely across international borders in Central Asia. A
former National Security Chief of the Russian Federation is reported
to have stated in a US television interview, that there were about
100 suitcase sized nuclear weapons missing and unaccounted for.
The
negotiations on the draft nuclear terrorism Convention commenced
in the UN Ad-hoc Committee in 1998. The draft Convention, which
is based on precedent sectoral Conventions on suppression of international
terrorism, such as the anti-hijacking Conventions, the hostage-taking
Convention, the terrorist bombings Convention, etc. provides for
an "extradite or prosecute regime" imposing obligations
on states, either to extradite or to prosecute a person who commits
an offence under the Convention. The underlying rationale of this
regime is that no terrorist offender, who commits an act of nuclear
terrorism as defined in the Convention, should find safe haven in
the territory of any State.
Recognising
the grave nature of an act of nuclear terrorism, the defence normally
available in extradition proceedings, namely that a particular act
was committed in furtherance of a political objective or inspired
by political motives, i.e. the "political offences exception"
is denied to an offender, in terms of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention.
Scope
of offences
Article 2 of the Convention defines in precise terms the
scope of offences covered under the Convention. The possession or
use of radioactive material or device, with intent to cause death
or serious bodily injury or with intent to cause substantial damage
to property or the environment, is made an offence under the Convention.
It is also an offence to cause damage to a nuclear facility in a
manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material,
when such act is committed with intent to cause death or serious
bodily injury or with intent to cause substantial damage to property
or the environment or with intent to compel a natural or legal person
or an international organization or state to do or refrain from
doing any act. Any person also commits an offence, if that person
threatens under circumstances which indicate the credibility of
the threat or demands unlawfully and intentionally, radioactive
material, a device or a nuclear facility by threat, under circumstances
which indicate the credibility of the threat or by use of force.
Attempts to commit any of the offences under the Convention, participation
as an accomplice or the organisation or directing others to commit
these offences and conspiracy to commit any of the offences by a
group of persons acting with a common purpose, also constitute offences
under the Convention. Each State Party is obliged under Article
5, to establish as criminal offences under its national law, the
offences set forth in Article 2 and to make these offences punishable
by appropriate penalties, which take into account the grave nature
of the offences.
Unique
nature of the Convention
The Nuclear Terrorism Convention is, in a sense, unique
when compared to the existing sectoral Conventions on the suppression
of international terrorism.
These
precedent Conventions were formulated to address specific forms
and manifestations of terrorism that had already arisen in the global
scene. The spate of hijackings which took place in the middle east
in the 1970s led to the international initiative by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which resulted in the Tokyo,
Hague and Montreal Conventions against hijacking of aircraft. The
horrendous Munich massacre at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972 led
to the German initiative in the United Nations General Assembly,
to negotiate the Convention against Hostage Taking. The increasing
attacks on shipping highlighted by the hijacking of the luxury cruise
liner "Achille Lauro" in the Mediterranean, led to the
initiative by the Inter-governmental Maritime Organization (IMO)
in 1988 to negotiate the International Convention for the Safety
of Maritime Navigation. Similarly the spate of bombings ranging
from Manchester, to Riyadh, Sri Lanka to Dar-es-Salam and Nairobi
in the 1990s led to the G-8 initiative for the Convention on the
Suppression of Acts of Terrorist Bombings.
In
the case of the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism, on the other hand,
it anticipates a possible scenario that could arise where nuclear
material falls into unlawful hands such as terrorist groups, rather
than responding to such situation ex post facto. Towards this end,
the Convention provides for an international cooperative regime,
whereby state parties are obliged, inter-alia, to take legislative,
administrative and technical measures to ensure the protection of
nuclear material, nuclear fuel, radioactive substances within their
territory.
In
comparison to existing Conventions which contain very broad and
general provisions on rendering of mutual assistance, the Nuclear
Terrorism Convention contains very specific provision on such co-operative
measures. It requires State Parties to exchange accurate and verified
information, to detect, prevent, suppress and investigate the offences
set out in the Convention. In particular, state parties are required
to take appropriate measures in order to inform without delay, other
concerned states in respect of the commission of any of the offences
under the Convention, as well as to furnish any information on preparations
to commit such offences about which it has learnt and also where
appropriate to inform the concerned international organisations
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These core
obligations constitute the preventive measures States Parties are
obliged to adopt.
Dealing
with crisis situations
The Convention, in Article 18, sets out the specific modalities
for assistance to be extended by one state party to another in a
crisis situation, involving nuclear material in the possession of
terrorists. It also contains provision requiring a state party to
take necessary measures to render assistance to another during a
post crisis situation.
Article
18 of the Convention requires that upon completion of proceedings
connected with an offence, any radioactive material, device or nuclear
facility shall be returned after consultations with the State Parties
concerned, in particular regarding modalities of return and storage,
to the State Party to which it belonged or to a state party of which
the natural or legal person owning such material, device or facility
is a national or a resident, to the state party from whose territory
it was stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained. These provisions
are designed to ensure the safe and orderly return of nuclear material
to lawful custody, in accordance with international minimum standards.
The
provisions of Article 18 on crisis and post-crisis situations acquire
particular significance in the context of acts of nuclear terrorism.
This is for the reason that in such a scenario of nuclear material
falling into the possession of terrorist groups which commit an
offence under the Convention, it is not every state which may be
in a position to render assistance to the victim State. A non-nuclear
state, for instance, may not have the technical capacity or the
know-how to deal with such situation or crisis. In all probability,
the victim State would have to seek assistance from those states
which have necessary capability to deal with such crisis situations
involving nuclear material.
The
Convention further provides that, for the purposes of rendering
assistance in crisis situations, the State Party in possession of
the radioactive material, device or nuclear facility may request
the assistance and cooperation of other State Parties and international
organisations, in particular, the International Atomic Energy Agency.
State
Parties and international organisations are encouraged to provide
assistance, when such requests are made, to the maximum extent possible.
Thus
the Convention provides a solid legal basis for mutual assistance
and cooperation to deal with extraordinary situations that could
arise in the context of acts of nuclear terrorism. From Sri Lanka's
perspective, being situated in a region where there are a considerable
number of nuclear reactors, the possibility of such situations arising
cannot be overlooked.
Key
negotiating issues
The negotiations on the Nuclear Terrorism Convention in
the Ad-hoc Committee were stalled for a number of years owing to
substantial differences which arose with regard to the scope of
the draft Convention. These differences were dictated more by political
considerations rather than by legal considerations. Some countries,
particularly those belonging to the Non-Aligned Group (NAM), took
up the position that since nuclear material, nuclear reactors etc
are in the possession or control of States, unless the question
of state responsibility for use of nuclear weapons or material is
adequately addressed, the Convention would be lacking an important
element which should form a core provision of the proposed legal
regime. The West European Group, however, pointed out that this
approach tended to overlook the fact that in the field of devising
anti terrorism Conventions, the focus has always been the question
of individual responsibility for terrorist activity, in this instance,
the need to address the question of nuclear material in the possession
of unlawful hands.
It
was argued that a law enforcement treaty, providing for the extradition
or prosecution of individuals for acts of terrorism, must of necessity,
deal with this core aspect of individual criminal responsibility.
Therefore the introduction of the nuclear disarmament element into
the work of the Ad hoc Committee on international terrorism resulted
in prolonged political debates and a shift away from the anti terrorism
focus of the Convention.
The
legal regime provided by the existing sectoral Conventions on suppression
of terrorism has consistently focussed on the question of individual
criminal responsibility, carefully excluding any questions of state
responsibility which are regulated by other treaties in the field
of disarmament, and also by general principles of international
law.
The
draft Nuclear Terrorism Convention was no exception. The debate
on this issue of State Responsibility focussed on draft article
4 of the Convention which is essentially an "exclusion clause"
or a "savings clause" which determines what is excluded
by the Convention. It provides that :
"Nothing
in the Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities
of states and individuals under international law, in particular
the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
and international humanitarian law".
It
also clarifies that activities of armed forces during an armed conflict
are governed by international humanitarian law and that activities
of military forces of a State inasmuch as they are governed by other
rules of international law and are not governed by the Convention.
This was to make clear that the scope of the nuclear terrorism Convention
is limited to acts of individuals and that acts of State actors
continue to be governed by other applicable branches of international
law.
»However,
there was no agreement for a number of years on this until the emergence
of a compromise proposal to bridge the gap the between the different
approaches which had surfaced in the deliberations. The Mexican
delegation formally proposed, an additional provision to article
4, to the effect that:
"This
Convention does not address nor can it be interpreted as addressing
in any way, the issue of the legality of the use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons by states."
This
proposal was clearly intended to delineate the sphere of application
of the Convention. Number of delegations welcomed the Mexican proposal
and took the view that this proposal went a long way in trying to
bridge the differences on Article 4. However final agreement on
the scope of the Convention remained elusive until, as a compromise
text, the Bureau of the Ad-hoc Committee re-introduced the draft
negotiated text, along with the Mexican text, as a revised composite
text of the draft Nuclear Terrorism Convention.
When
the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United Nations met during the
59th Session of the UNGA in October 2004, there appeared to be a
momentum being generated towards the adoption of the Convention
based on the Bureau text. This text gradually attracted a broad
degree of support among delegations as the basis for a possible
compromise on the Convention. Further the improving political situation
in the Middle East also appeared to facilitate the movement towards
a consensus, devoid of political rhetoric, which had brought about
sharp divisions within the Committee. Although the Sixth Committee
was on the verge of finalising the text of the Convention, some
delegations sought time to further consult with their capitals and
took the view that the meeting of the Ad-hoc Committee on Terrorism
scheduled to meet in March/April this year, would provide a good
opportunity to finalise the text, after adequate reflection during
the intervening inter-sessional period.
UN
Ad-hoc Committee Sessions - March -April 2005 Preceding the Convening
of the March-April 2005 Session of the UN Ad-hoc Committee, there
were several crucial developments in the global scene which created
a fresh momentum towards a consensus and had a positive impact on
the negotiations in the Committee. In February 2005, US.
President,
George W. Bush and Russian President Vladmir Putin, in a Joint Statement
on Nuclear Security Cooperation called for the early adoption of
Nuclear Terrorism Convention. The Report of the UN Secretary-General's
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the Secretary-General's
Report of 21 March 2005, entitled "In Larger Freedom: towards
development, security and human rights for all" asserting that
terrorism attacked the very values enshrined in the United Nations
Charter, re-iterated the urgent need to conclude the Comprehensive
Convention on Terrorism being negotiated in the Ad-hoc Committee,
before the end of the Sixtieth Session of the General Assembly and
to complete without delay, the draft Convention on the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
When
the UN Ad-hoc Committee met on 28th March 2005 one of the positive
elements which had emerged was that delegations were no longer negotiating
on the basis of the operative provisions of the Convention, in particular
Article 4 determining the scope of application of the Convention
which had hitherto been the major irritant, but instead were focussing
their attention on the preambular part of the Convention. Although
the preamble of a treaty constitute a non-binding part of the Convention
which set out the background to the negotiations and the underlying
rationale for its conclusion, often as a compromise, contentious
proposals which do not find their way into the operative part are
incorporated in the preamble.
Some
of the proposals which were tabled at the March 2005 Session of
the Ad-hoc Committee sought to inject into the negotiations certain
elements which were politically sensitive and could have reopened
a debate on disarmament issues, even though outside the operative
part of the Convention. There was, for instance, a proposal re-iterating
that the peaceful use of nuclear energy shall not be used as a cover
for proliferation of nuclear weapons, which give rise to a counter
proposal emphasising the right of States under the Nuclear non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) to benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This
was the delicate situation which confronted the Ad-hoc Committee
at its recent session, which could have disturbed the careful balance
that was sought to be achieved.
It
is to the credit of all delegations that after intensive consultations
among the sponsor delegations, all of them, after consulting capitals
withdrew their respective proposals as a package, in favour of the
Bureau Text of the Convention to enable the text of the Nuclear
Terrorism Convention to be adopted by the Ad-hoc Committee on 1st
April, 2005 after seven long years of negotiations. It was thereafter
adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday
13th April 2005 and will open for signature on 14th September 2005
at the high level summit, during the 60th Anniversary Session of
the United Nations General Assembly. |