Are
we shrugging off obligations in international law?
During recent times, certain misleading views in relation to the
right to lodge individual communications before the Geneva based
UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in terms of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its first Optional Protocol
have surfaced in national discussions.
It
is not my intention to engage in discussion of the specific communications
of views delivered by the Committee against Sri Lanka in this column.
However, some general clarifications in relation to the consideration
of individual communications by the Committee may not be out of
order given the above misconceptions.
Assuredly,
the viewpoint advanced by some probably well meaning but misguided
souls that the UNHRC reprimands only the lesser developed countries
such as Sri Lanka is far from the actual truth as any international
human rights student even in this most rapidly deteriorating educational
system, should be well aware. Suffice to say that certain of the
Committee's most jurisprudentially advanced decisions have been
made in relation to countries such as the Netherlands, Canada and
France.
One
case in point was a communication brought against Canada concerning
the applicant's loss of rights and status as an Indian when she
married a non-Indian as opposed to an Indian man who married a non-Indian
woman (see Lovelace vs Canada, Decisions of the UNHRC, Doc A/36/40,
p166). The Committee found a violation of ICCPR, Article 27 which
protects the rights of linguistic, religious or ethnic minorities.
More
recently, the Committee has conceded (in the Finnish reindeer cases)
that protection of "culture" within the meaning of ICCPR
article 27 includes protection of the traditional means of livelihood
for national minorities, in so far as they are essential to the
culture and necessary for its survival. In EHP vs Canada, (Communication
No. 67/1980, EHP v. Canada, 2 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights
Committee (1990), 20), the right to life in ICCPR Article 6 was
held to include the right to live without life threatening impacts
from the environment.
Similarly,
in cases brought against the Netherlands, Dutch social security
laws were found to be unreasonable and discriminatory on the basis
of sex thereby violating ICCPR, Article 26(see Broeks vs Netherlands
and Zwaan- de Vries vs Netherlands Decisions of the UNHRC, Doc A/42/40,
at p139 and p160 respectively). In one decision in respect of Mauritius
(the Mauritian Women Case) the country took action thereafter to
change its laws in order to bring them into conformity with the
Covenant. In other cases against France, the Committee found a violation
of ICCPR, article 26 resulting from a denial of pension benefits
due to subsequent change in nationality. Administrative convenience
was held not to justify the actions of the state party (see Guye
and others vs France, Decisions of the UNHRC Doc A/44/40, p189).
While
these are some of the earlier decisions of the Committee, its more
recent jurisprudence has included several interventions into protection
of life and liberty rights. This is well illustrated by the five
Communications of Views against Sri Lanka delivered in response
to pleas filed by individuals as diverse as a politician, a father
whose son 'disappeared' in army custody, a newspaper editor, a detainee
under the Prevention for terrorism Act and a lay litigant committed
for contempt of court.
Some
of these decisions and their impact on Sri Lanka's legal and judicial
system have been commented upon in past issues of this column as
well as elsewhere.
It
is important to note that the Committee is not a 'trigger happy'
body of foreign legal personalities operating from beyond the shores
of the country. It constitutes jurists who have earned a well-deserved
reputation of erudition and integrity in their home countries. The
Committee responds to clear and egregious violations of Covenant
rights as opposed to jurisprudentially unsound applications. In
one instance, for example, it dismissed a communication lodged against
Sri Lanka in respect of judicial action on the basis that it did
not disclose an adequately substantiated grievance. (see Wanakuwatte
vs Sri Lanka, CCPR/C/78/D/1091/2002.
(Jurisprudence.
Insofar as the five adverse communication of views are concerned,
the Sri Lankan State has been necessarily guarded in its response,
despite comments by quite naturally 'unnamed' sources of information
(who appear not to be familiar with the most rudimentary norms of
international legal obligations), that the government would not
comply with the views of the Committee. Such a response has not
been advanced from an official department, ministry or official.
The reasons for this are not hard to find. At the very least, such
defiance would make Sri Lanka look notably ridiculous. At its most
dangerous level, it would reduce the country to the level of an
outlawed state in the international legal arena as a consequence
of shrugging off obligations that itself willingly incurred upon
accession to, not only the ICCPR but also its Optional Protocol.
This
is distinguished from India, for example which has intentionally
refrained from acceding to the Optional Protocol thus denying to
individuals within its jurisdiction, the right to go before the
Committee.
This
country however, out of an excess of good will and buoyant self-confidence,
acceded to the Protocol in October 1997, which thereafter entered
into force on 3 January 1998. Sri Lanka also made a declaration
according to which it specifically recognised the competence of
the Human Rights Committee to determine individual communications.
In
the light of these specific actions on the part of the State in
international law, it would be an act of veritably fiendish Houdinistic
ingenuity for government authorities to extricate themselves from
implementing decisions of the Committee purely because they call
the government or its judicial branch to account. Whether it would,
in fact, court the consequences of such disobedience needs obviously,
to be closely monitored.
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