Situation Report

LTTE building another airstrip in Trinco?
In appearance the duo looked like most other fellow Sri Lankan passengers. But they seemed in a hurry. Soon after their flight landed at the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA) some three weeks ago, they rushed to clear immigration formalities.

An officer at the immigration desk on the first floor of BIA's arrival area stamped their passports. Each received a month long visa to enter Sri Lanka. It was then that the identities of the two former Sri Lankans became clear.

Gnanaratnam was now a United States passport holder. His friend Sujintharan held a Swiss passport. The Sunday Times is in possession of their full names and other particulars. Having cleared formalities at the airport, the duo hurriedly boarded a waiting coach. Several hours later they crossed the Army checkpoint at Omanthai and were in Kilinochchi.

The near two decades of separatist war in Sri Lanka forced more than 500,000 civilians in the north to flee their homes. Some have successfully sought asylum and gainful employment in European countries and elsewhere. Others have claimed refugee status. Since the three year long ceasefire, large numbers have been returning to Sri Lanka to visit their relatives and friends. Hence, one would have thought there was nothing unusual in the visit of Gnanaratnam and Sujinthiran.

But their mission was different. When it came to the attention of the authorities it was too late. They had ended their stay within two weeks and left Sri Lanka. Gnanaratnam was attached to the engineering division of a leading American airline. Sujintharan worked in a similar capacity with a Swiss airline. Both spent time helping the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in their new venture - the ongoing process of setting up a guerrilla "air force."

The Sunday Times (Situation Report) has from time to time revealed exclusively how the LTTE constructed a 1.2 kilometre long runway south east of the Iranamadu irrigation tank. Official confirmation of its existence came from the acting Head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, Hagrup Haukland. He told a meeting of the Foreign Correspondents Association on May 26, "we have seen the airstrip" whilst flying in a Sri Lanka Air Force helicopter. This remark formally endorsed the Government's complaint of the existence of an airstrip and is the first from a non Government quarter.

The Sunday Times (Situation Report) also revealed that Sri Lanka Air Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) reconnaissance flights had confirmed the existence of two light aircraft in guerrilla hands. One of them has been identified with the help of United States authorities as a Czech-built Zlin Z-143 light aircraft. With a range of 630 nautical miles this two-seater plane is capable of carrying an ordinance load of 240 kilogrammes.

In the past weeks state intelligence agencies have confirmed reports that training activity is continuing from the new airstrip area. New recruits are being trained as pilots. Candidates for the job had been selected after a local recruitment campaign in guerrilla-held areas carried out through billboards and loud hailers. Engineering and maintenance facilities had been established at the airstrip site. There is also confirmation that the guerrillas have now installed an air defence system at the location to counter aerial attacks.

The non-serviceability of UAVs for a short period prevented the Air Force from conducting regular reconnaissance flights but the situation has now been rectified. However, following recent exposures, it is known that the guerrillas had moved their air assets to secure locations and placed them under camouflage nets or foliage.

A wealthy businessman, now resident in Australia, The Sunday Times learnt, is one of the main conduits in putting together "foreign expertise" to help enhance Tiger guerrilla air capability. Both Gnanaratnam and Sujintharan had arrived in Colombo and travelled to the Wanni only after he had made the arrangements. This businessman is well known for his close links with leaders of both UPFA Government and the Opposition United National Party.

In revealing these developments, one of the vagaries for investigative journalists in Sri Lanka is how politicians look at their exposures when in opposition and whilst in power. If in the opposition they are branded heroes, ensconced in power they are dubbed as villains. Paradoxical enough, the two titles come from one and the same party.

An example to illustrate the case is the Tiger guerrilla construction of military camps in the Trincomalee district. At least 13 of them were constructed after the ceasefire. Together with others that existed before, they could have been used during a hostile situation to encircle the Trincomalee harbour.

Following The Sunday Times (Situation Report August 3, 2003) exclusive revelations on this issue, then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe ordered an investigation. Then Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, drove to Army Headquarters to personally ascertain whether any of the Army maps had been used by this newspaper to support the revelations. He found it was not so.

The Sunday Times map had been its own and showed LTTE military camps in the Trincomalee district established after the ceasefire. These camps including the controversial one at Manirasakulam (or Kurankupaanchan Kulam which bore the LTTE radio call sign Zero Zero) were listed.

Worries over the Tiger guerrilla military build up in the district gathered momentum. In its wake came other issues - the former UNF Government offering duty free diplomatic privileges to the LTTE to import radio broadcast equipment and the treacherous raid on the Army's forward intelligence cell or "Safe House" at Athurugiriya to mention two of the many instances. The People's Alliance, then in the opposition, raised issue complaining that the then UNF was endangering national security. Neighbouring India was apprised of the disturbing situation.

These events culminated in President Kumaratunga taking over the portfolio of defence (together with mass communication and interior) from the UNF Government on November 4, 2003. In a broadcast to the nation explaining the move two days later, President Kumaratunga declared,"the sovereignty of Sri Lanka, its territorial integrity and the security of the Nation have been placed in grave danger by acts of wilful commission and other acts of careless omission by some members of the Government."

She added: "It is the President who will some day be held exclusively responsible for all acts of commissions and omissions, the successes and failures of defence and national security policy…"

A month ahead of the takeover of portfolios, President Kumaratunga wrote a strongly worded ten-page letter to then Premier Wickremasinghe. She said, "I make it clear that the Trincomalee Harbour and the Naval Base are in serious danger, based on a report of the US PACOM (United States Pacific Command) Assessment Team and of the Commanders of the Sri Lanka Army and Navy, as well as on several briefings given to you by the Security Forces…."

She asked Mr Wickremesinghe, "Do you believe, Mr. Prime Minister, that the removal of one small camp in Sampur in 1995, is the real cause for the LTTE to establish seventeen camps encircling the Trincomalee Naval Base and Harbour in 2002/2003?..."

Five months after the takeover of the defence portfolio came Parliamentary elections in April 2004. A United National Front Government that made the LTTE much stronger than it was before February 22, 2002, the day the Ceasefire Agreement was signed, was unceremoniously voted out of office. It had held power for just over a year. An expanded People's Alliance in the form of a United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) formed a Government. It has remained in office now for just over a year.

What of the crucial national security issues on which UPFA promised action when voted to power? On the question of Tiger guerrilla camps in the Trincomalee district, particularly the one at Manirasakulam, there was a different story. President Kumaratunga told a meeting of the National Security Council on August 17, 2004 that except for some activity at Sampur, reports about LTTE camps in the Trincomalee district were not true. She declared there were no such camps and reports of their existence were being spread by those who wanted to see a resumption of war, as revealed in The Sunday Times (Situation Report - August 22, 2004).

As for the import of powerful radio broadcast equipment, the UPFA Government has not been able to persuade the LTTE to at least end the episode by paying the duty. If that is bad enough, the fears expressed when UPFA leaders were in the opposition have now come true. From the Wanni, broadcasts by the Voice of Tigers (VoT) using the equipment imported duty free has now extended to the East. The UPFA leadership has not been able to curb this expansion of coverage. It is now feared that the LTTE would further expand its coverage to south.

In the case of the Police raid on the "Safe House" at Athurugiriya, the UPFA Government ordered legal action against the Police officer who was allegedly responsible. ASP Kulasiri Udugampola who was then in the Kandy Police Division is indicted in the High Court in Kandy for allegedly carrying out the raid.

However, despite a wider investigation into who ordered the raid that led to a gross national betrayal and sparked off a killing spree of informants and operatives by Tiger guerrillas, the case has gone into the limbo of forgotten things. Whilst the alleged executor of the act is being charged, those reportedly responsible for ordering it and thus causing serious damage to national security have gone scot-free. At least so far.

It is in this backdrop that the UPFA Government has been forced to raise issue over a critical matter concerning national security - the development of air capability by the LTTE. If the construction of the airstrip in Kilinochchi began during the tenure of the former UNF Government, it was completed during the present term of the UPFA. It has become such a serious issue that the Government provided aide memoire to several countries including the United States, Britain, France, India, Russia, China and Indonesia setting out the dangers to the entire region.

But the UPFA strategy misfired. They hoped the foreign Governments would condemn the LTTE for violating the Ceasefire Agreement and posing a security threat to the South Asian region. Thereafter, the Government hoped to come out with a strong condemnation of its own. No foreign Government responded except for remarks made during a newspaper interview by India's Foreign Minister, Kanwar Natwar Singh. He told the Chennai-based The Hindu newspaper India was concerned about the information that guerrillas had built an airstrip and acquired aircraft.

Yet, UPFA leaders were blowing hot and cold over this issue. A VIP who chaired a top-level meeting of military top brass and defence officials weeks ago wanted to know whether newspaper disclosures about LTTE air capability were initiated by arms dealers or local agents to promote their wares. That such a statement was made long after foreign governments were told of the threat is bad enough. Much worse is the illogical argument that arms dealers would bribe journalists to say there were air threats. They only reported what the Air Force had discovered.

An extension of that argument would mean the arms dealers also influenced the Air Force to have their UAV's produce pictures of the guerrilla runway in Kilinochchi and two of their aircraft. Equally, they have succeeded in even influencing the Head of SLMM, Hagrup Haukland to say he saw such an airstrip whilst flying in an Air Force helicopter. How absurd or ludicrous could things become when people in responsibility make such wild accusations? That again is on issues of national security that affects an entire nation, or the South Asian region, as the Government's aide memoire says?

Are such statements purely erratic or a manifestation of one's refusal to accept reality? Paying glorious tribute to the media whilst in opposition and pouring venomous scorn over them whilst in power is now a popular pastime among politicians in Sri Lanka.

This new form of media bashing is not confined to politicians alone. There are others who are getting equally upset but for different reasons. After more than a year in office, it has now dawned on the Government that there is a very urgent need to ensure a high degree of military preparedness. This is after an appreciation of recent threats posed by Tiger guerrillas since they built a stronger military machine during the three years of ceasefire. With this in mind, several important steps are being taken. One such move weeks ago was the conclusion of an unprecedented landmark military deal with Iran involving over US $ 140 million.

In the wake of these new procurement drives, many a supplier, both from foreign Governments and the private sector, are busy trying to persuade the security forces to buy their surplus assets or products. They range from huge vessels to small hand guns. At least one top military officer was irked by The Sunday Times disclosures over proposed billion dollar procurements he eagerly wanted to execute. He berated the author and the newspaper at a closed door conference at the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH). The exposure appears to have put paid to a gigantic deal.

The Tiger guerrilla military build up in Trincomalee, though disclaimed belatedly, was a compelling factor in President Kumaratunga taking over the defence portfolio from the former UNF Government. Ignoring national security concerns was no doubt one of the causes for the defeat of that party at the April 2004 parliamentary elections.

And now, the Trincomalee district is turning out to be the nemesis for the UPFA Government. Having virtually gained full political and military control in the Batticaloa district, Tiger guerrillas, as recent events have shown, begun causing serious security concerns for the Government in the Trincomalee district. On Friday they staged a Hartal in the north-east and more measures to exert pressure on the Government to withdraw newly inducted troops to Trincomalee is under way.

Amidst this new threat, a state intelligence agency gave a grim warning to the Government late last month. A report said an area of around 25 acres of land around Thakarawadi, Trincomalee South, has been declared out of bounds to the public. This area is located south of Sampur that overlooks the Trincomalee harbour. Large stocks of cement are being moved to this area where clearing is taking place. It is speculated that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is planning to establish an airbase, this intelligence agency said.

Defence authorities have not yet conclusively established that an airstrip is under construction. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle sorties carried out by the Air Force has only confirmed some clearing work going on. The absence of a full picture has prevented the authorities from raising issue with the Norwegian peace facilitators or the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).

But The Sunday Times learns evidence strongly suggest the construction of an airstrip. Residents living close to the cordoned off area say clearing work is being carried out by groups of guerrillas. Some have seen the transport of lorry loads of cement and steel. According to one source, metal suppliers from nearby quarry sites have received orders to supply hundreds of truck loads of crushed metal. Residents in the area have been warned not to divulge any information.

Reports of a suspected Tiger guerrilla airstrip south of Trincomalee, if confirmed, further fortifies LTTE military preparations in this strategic port city. It is Trincomalee that the LTTE wants to declare as the capital city of its separate state of Tamil Eelam. Early this year, Tiger guerrillas strengthened security preparations in Sampur, an area that directly overlooks the mouth of the Trincomalee harbour.

As exclusively revealed in The Sunday Times (Situation Report - July 25, 2004) Tiger guerrillas have positioned bunkers along the coast stretching from Sampur to Foul Point. Artillery and mortars have been placed in the direction of the harbour. These could be used to immobilise Naval and merchant vessels entering or leaving the harbour during hostile conditions.

And now, if reports of an airstrip in Trincomalee are proved correct, Tiger guerrillas could have access by air from the Wanni to Trincomalee - an air bridge from the north to the east. This will further complicate security concerns for the UPFA Government. The question here again will be whether a serious effort would be made to check on reports and take prompt action. Or will they blame it on the previous government, journalists and arms dealers?

Some of the Tiger guerrilla military preparations in the Trincomalee district, ironic enough, have been with the tacit support of the state. This has been through the grant of theatre-to-theatre transfer of guerrilla military and intelligence cadres in Air Force helicopters. This is not to blame the Air Force for they are only carrying out Government's political directives.

But now, Defence Secretary Maj. Gen. (retd.) Asoka Jayawardena has taken a tough stand. He has called a halt to this until the security situation in the East improves. Recently he turned down a request for the return to Trincomalee of the district's military and intelligence leaders. They flew in an Air Force helicopter from Sampur to Kilinochchi on May 2 and stuck there. The team was led by Soosaipillai Anthonydas alias Sornam, military leader and four others. Similarly, the military wing leader for Batticaloa, Banu, Janarthan, leader of "Jeyanthan Brigade," Keerthi, intelligence wing leader and Ram, a military cadre are also stuck in Kilinochchi after they were airlifted there.

Hartals and other violent incidents in the north-east highlight a clear pattern. Tiger guerrillas who have strengthened themselves both politically and militarily have clearly begun flexing their muscles. Last Thursday they allegedly killed Major (promoted posthumously to Lt. Col.) Tuan Nizam Muthaliff, an experienced officer with the Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence. See box story on below.

After a killing spree of operatives, informants and helpers following the Police raid on the Athurugiriya safe house, last week they extended it to officers of the Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence. No corrective action has been taken so far by the Government to stall this campaign designed to make an important State intelligence arm ineffective. Is that not to deny the Government its eyes and ears during a hostile situation?

The granting of a Joint Mechanism, or a post tsunami operational (P-TOMS) management structure, is sure to lead to a break up of the UPFA Government. On the opposite page our Political Editor gives the reasons. The question now is whether granting such a mechanism will persuade the LTTE to call a halt to the Hartals and killings. Why worry about the consequences when everyone else can be blamed.

The Slain Muthaliff: His silent and secret successes

The Janaza of Lt. Col. Tuan Nizam Muthaliff took place with full military honours at the Muslim burial grounds in Dehiwela. Photo: Gemunu Wellage

When a young man in civvies walked into a decrepit building inside a military camp somewhere near Wanni, only a handful took note. That again was a group of men trained toughly to work and live under cover of strict secrecy. Others were blissfully unaware.

After digesting his briefs, reading the maps and sketches he provided, the men would pick their weapons, ration packs and sneak into enemy territory. That was to conduct reconnaissance based on what they learnt. Very often they confirmed the young man was dead on with the information he provided. There were of course a few minor corrections occasionally, like two roads instead of one or a location was being far away than described.

On one occasion, the men armed themselves with ration packs for survival for several days. They had carefully reconnoitred an area deep inside Tiger guerrilla held Mullaitivu. Heavily armed they moved in during a pre-dawn incursion. They maintained complete radio silence. They were headed to take on the top most target in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) - their leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. The young man had provided them the information. The group had confirmed it to be correct.

They positioned claymore mines at a point facing the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road one morning in October 2001. As a Double Cab drove past the spot, one in the group triggered off the mines. There was a huge explosion. From a distance, the men saw the Double Cab reduce to pulp.

There was elation. The men believed they had got one of the world's renowned guerrilla leaders. It was only days later when they trekked into their base camp did they learn that the target they were looking for did not travel that day. It is still not known why. Instead they had killed one of his most trusted aides, Vaithyalingam Sornalingam better known by his nom de guerre, Shankar. Yet, Shankar was a prize target.

This former aeronautical engineer from Air Canada had joined the LTTE soon after the ethnic violence in July 1983. Then 53 years old, Shanker was the founder and first head of LTTE's sea going arm, the Sea Tigers. Having served Mr. Prabhakaran as his personal bodyguard, he had taken over later as head of the newly set up "Air Wing." This unit was in its infancy and had no air assets. He was on temporary assignment to his leader as an English translator when death occurred.

The young man who gave the briefing and made this happen was then a Captain in the Sri Lanka Army, Tuan Nizam Muthaliff. The group of men who heard him were members of the Army's crack Special Forces (SF). These SF teams played the role of Long Range Reconnaisance Patrols (LRRPs) in the north, much the same way troops under Military Intelligence (MI) did the same in the East.

The operations of the LRRPs, was a top State secret. The LTTE was unaware. So much so, after Shankar's killing, his wife accused Tiger military leaders Balraj and Soosai of plotting the killing of her husband. She said they were jealous because her husband was too close to Mr. Prabhakaran.

The well-kept secrets were treacherously betrayed after the Police raid on a MI "safe house" or forward intelligence cell in Athurugiriya in January 2002. This came under the reign of the previous United National Front Government. The LRRP operations were so dreaded by the LTTE that it sought and obtained an assurance from the UNF leadership to stop its activities. This was through the Ceasefire Agreement of February 22, 2002 which called for a total cessation of all military action, among others, by "deep penetration units."

The saga of Shanker's killing was just one among many missions the Special Forces LRRPs carried out on the basis of intelligence provided by then Captain Muthaliff. He was based in Vavuniya and had built up a wide circle of contacts to receive intelligence. Jealousy is a trait that afflicts any intelligence community. So he had his detractors but was not deterred. After being promoted Major and serving there for a while, then Commander of the Army Lt. Gen. (retd.) Lionel Balagalle ordered his transfer to Colombo. This was after reports that his life was in danger.

In the more recent weeks there had been warnings of a possible Tiger guerrilla attack. This was not only on him but also on a number of seniors in the Directorate of Military Intelligence. So much so, he was asked not to report to work on a daily basis and do his chores from his home as Commanding Officer of the Military Intelligence Corps (MIC).

With time on his hand, he had enrolled himself for a short computer course at the Kotelawala Defence Academy. Confident nothing would happen, last Tuesday Major Muthaliff chose to travel only with his driver and give his armed escorts a rest. But, an alleged LTTE gunman who came on a motorcycle ridden by a colleague shot him dead. The incident occurred in broad daylight at a colour lights junction near Polhengoda along the Kirillapone-Borella highway (Elvitigala Mawatha). He was posthumously promoted Lieutenant Colonel.

Why did the LTTE step up its campaign to murder DMI seniors when it had not done so even after January 2002 Police raid on the Athurugiriya "safe house?" That raid which unleashed guerrilla violence led to the deaths of more than 45 DMI operatives, informants and helpers.

The answer came from a high ranking intelligence source. Speaking strictly on grounds of anonymity, the source said "for the killing of journalist Dharmaratnam Sivaram and the disappearance of Thamotherampillai Sivakumar alias Newton they are blaming Military Intelligence. They say the MI killed Sivaram and abducted Newton, both claims that are untrue. But we do know they are furious over both and don't believe we have no hand in these incidents." Police have made a significant breakthrough in Mr. Sivaram's murder and the details are likely to become public soon.

Quite clearly the defence and security establishment has failed to react formally to these accusations. Some one in authority should have publicly disclaimed the accusations and dissociated the Government or any of its agencies from being involved. That is if the Government wanted to respond to accusations. The source admits that "the absence of any such official rebuttal only went to confirm the LTTE suspicions further." Fresh guerrilla cadres have infiltrated the city whilst some have been recalled to Wanni for fear of being identified and arrested, the high ranking intelligence source said.

Since the three year ceasefire, Tiger guerrillas have had unimpeded movement in the city and suburbs. This has not only helped them to set up more cells but bring in more weapons. In the past three years, the existence of such cells has not been bared nor any weapons caches unearthed. This has only enabled the guerrillas to carry out attacks and hide only to return later for more attacks.

This, no doubt, has caused serious concerns in the minds of senior security officials. They fear that the LTTE is continuing to violate the ceasefire agreement with no action being taken to curb the free movement of armed cadres in the city. "The killing of Lt. Col. Muthaliff has made many others in the intelligence community vulnerable with guerrilla hit groups prowling," warns an Army officer responsible for security in Colombo and suburbs. He laments they are helpless, for any retaliatory response would put them on the dock for ceasefire violations.

Lt. Col. Muthaliff's contributions to LRRPs were many. Besides Shanker, it was his briefing to an LRRP team that led to the attack on the deputy leader of Sea Tigers, Kangai Amaran in June 2001. He was killed in the Wanni.

In 1992 when LTTE held all areas north of Vavuniya up to Jaffna (barring military installations in the peninsula), one of Lt. Col. Muthaliff's major feat was the intelligence he offered on two guerrilla camps, one in Ooriyan and in Omanthai. This led to troops infiltrating, attacking and destroying these two camps.

Lt. Col. Muthaliff had dodged death on many an occasion. In 1996, after a string of military operations code named "Riviresa," Tiger guerrillas targeted him. Having had prior information that he was travelling to Eluthumaduval (north of Elephant Pass) along the Alpha Nine (A-9) highway, they laid a trap. When a Double Cab he was known to travel approached the area, the guerrillas detonated a mine. It tore the vehicle into pieces but another Army officer died. Lt. Col. Muthaliff had decided not to travel at the last moment.

Having saved his life on that occasion, Lt. Col. Muthaliff did his country and the Sri Lanka Army proud. But last Tuesday, he was not so lucky and fell victim to a killer. This is only for having faithfully served the national cause in silence and secrecy.

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