The remains of one of the 13 Navy sailors killed in Friday's incident in Mannar moves out of the Police morgue at Borella yesterday. Photo: Ishara S. Kodikara

LTTE setting stage for Eelam War IV
The outboard motors of the two fibreglass dinghies (FGDs) cut through the waters of the Gulf of Mannar shortly after dawn last Thursday. Only some 50 metres separated one from the other. On board each dinghy were three Navy sailors.

They were from the Naval Sub Unit (NSU) at Pallimunai, a fishing village north east of the Mannar Island. Adjoining this NSU lay a Police Post.
The FGDs were some half a kilometre from the coast and were on a routine patrol. In the one ahead, sailors carried T-56 assault rifles. Those in the one that followed were also armed with the same weapons. In addition, mounted on that FGD was a General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG).

It was around 7.40 a.m. the naval patrol was passing a cluster of fishing boats. That was nothing unusual. South Indian fishermen as well as their Sri Lankan counterparts were busy harvesting prawns in this lucrative fishing ground. Suddenly the scenario changed. Five fishing boats, all painted blue, peeled off from the rest. Only one person was visible in each boat controlling the outboard motor.

In a lightening move, two of the boats moved towards the first FGD. Three others surrounded the second. Tiger guerrillas, at least six of them in each boat, carrying assault rifles rose from crouching positions to pour gunfire at the two Navy FGDs. A fire fight ensued. Some of the guerrilla bullets hit the machine gun (GPMG) immobilising it.

The guerrilla fire was so intense a sailor in the second FGD was seriously injured. Under heavy attack they were forced to back out. The lead FGD had by then come under unceasing gunfire.

Personnel at the NSU and the Police Post who watched the shoot out directed fire at the guerrilla boats. But within ten minutes the battle was over. Both FGDs had bullet holes all-round. The intensity of the gun battles could be gauged by eight bullets that had pierced a helmet.

When the encounter ended, there was a mystery. The fate of the three navy sailors on the first FGD was unknown. Did they get caught up in the gunfire and die? There were no signs of any bodies floating or any other evidence to suggest this. Were they taken hostage by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)? The move seemed a remote possibility. But the guerrillas had an entirely different story to relate. That was after they withdrew to the nearby Sea Tiger base at Viduthaltivu.

They told the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) that their cadres had returned fire in self defence and accused the Navy of attacking them. They claimed two sailors were found dead inside the boat and a third who was wounded was rescued by the guerrillas. However, he had died later when their own boat capsized, the guerrillas had claimed. A bizarre aspect of this LTTE attack was the fact that it was videoed by their cameramen. Surprising enough it was shown by a Colombo based television network.

The news of the incident came as shock to the defence and security establishment. Two Mi-24 helicopter gun ships took off from the Sri Lanka Air Force base in Hingurakgoda but found there was nothing to engage. Such engagements were provided for in the Ceasefire Agreement. It allowed the armed forces to continue to "perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE." In this instance, an Air Force official explained, "We were trying to save the lives of three sailors by playing a defensive role."

Later in the day, the Commander of the Navy Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda flew to Mannar to make an on-the-spot assessment. He decided to open additional Naval Sub Units to prevent his men from coming under more attacks. Later, he took part in a discussion at the Bishop's House where members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) were present. Also taking part was the Bishop of Mannar, Rt. Rev. Rayappu Joseph.

An angry Vice Admiral Karannagoda blamed some fishermen for providing cover to the guerrilla attackers. He warned he would not hesitate to declare a curfew in the seas off Mannar and deal with them sternly. That would mean the end of their fishing activity that provided cover to the guerrillas. Members of the SLMM appealed to him for restraint.

Barely 24 hours later, the Tiger guerrillas hit back. A bus and truck were carrying Navy sailors returning to Talaimannar after leave. There were 17 sailors on board the bus that travelled ahead whilst 27 sailors were on board the truck that followed. Near the village of Nadukuda, close to Geval Seeya (or Hundred Houses project) a claymore mine explosion hit the bus. It was engulfed in a huge fireball. Guerrillas who took cover on the left side of the road, fired Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) at the truck. However, sailors on the truck managed to escape with injuries.

They rushed towards the bus to pull out 13 charred bodies. Four others had managed to escape but one is critically injured and is warded at the Anuradhapura Hospital.

A so-called "Pongi Elum Makkal Padai" (Upsurging People’s Force) claimed responsibility for the incident. The IBC, the Tamil radio broadcasting station in London, said the group had congratulated its Vavuniya wing for carrying out the attack though the Jaffna unit had planned to do so. It claimed it was in retaliation for the rape of a woman in Kayts Island. The LTTE has alleged that the rape was carried out by Navy sailors, a charge that is hotly denied by Navy Headquarters. State intelligence agencies said the purported claim of responsibility for the attack on the Navy convoy is nothing but a sham to hide the hand of Tiger guerrillas. "At most, they are nothing but an arm of the LTTE. This is a crude attempt to mislead the international community," a high ranking official said.

Incensed by the developments, Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake summoned a meeting of envoys representing the Donor Co-chairs on Friday night. Associated with him was Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera and Foreign Secretary, H.M.G.S. Palihakkara. The diplomatic team comprised Head of EU delegation to Sri Lanka Julian Wilson, High Commissioner for UK in Sri Lanka Stephen Evans, Ambassador for Japan Akio Suda and Norway's Acting Ambassador to Sri Lanka Oddvar Laegreid. A United States Embassy representative was not present.

Premier Wickremanayake wanted the envoys to use their good offices to ascertain from the LTTE whether they were still committed to the Ceasefire Agreement. If their position was affirmative, he appealed to them to obtain a specific date by which the Government could commence talks with the Tiger guerrillas. In a strong speech he made clear the Government could not continue to tolerate the ceasefire violations forever. Envoys of the Donor Co-chairs praised the Government for its restraint in the wake of a string of attacks on the armed forces and the police.

Since the Sri Lanka Air Force said they were not in a position any more to fly helicopters to the Wanni, the envoys boarded a helicopter to Vavuniya. From there arrangements were made for them to travel in vehicles belonging to the SLMM. They met LTTE Political Wing leader S. P. Thamilselvam in Kilinochchi.

Since LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran's "Maveerar (Great Heroes) Day" Address on November 27, more than 50 armed forces and police personnel have been killed in the escalating violence. It comes in the backdrop of a daily increase in incidents in the Jaffna peninsula. A few among the many instances gives one an idea of not only the rising intensity but also goes on to further confirm how Tiger guerrilla preparations have been going on during the past four years of ceasefire. If political leaders of successive governments nonchalantly dismissed such revelations in The Sunday Times over these four years, the incidents now occurring are grim reminders of their omissions, commissions, their gross ineptitude and crass negligence. A sampling of the many incidents in the Jaffna peninsula:

December 20:

  • An unruly mob attacked a Police mobile patrol near Atchuveli injuring one officer. The vehicle was damaged.
  • A protest was launched by three wheeler scooter drivers at the main bus stand in Jaffna town. Police dispersed the crowd that gathered.
  • An unidentified group lobbed a hand grenade at a bunker in the Jaffna town. However, it did not explode.
  • An unidentified group lobbed a grenade and directed assault rifle fire at a bunker near Meesalai.
    December 21:
  • An unidentified group opened fire at the EPDP office in the Jaffna town. Troops carried out a search operation. When they were returning to camp they were fired upon by another group. One soldier was killed.
  • An unidentified person fired three rounds of small arms fire into a bunker in the Jaffna town. In another incident, another group hurled a grenade into a bunker injuring two soldiers.
  • An unidentified person lobbed a grenade at a bunker near Chunnakam but it did not explode. Another group fired into a bunker wounding a soldier.
  • An unidentified person lobbed a grenade at a bunker near Chunnakam. In the same area troops recovered two claymore mines weighing eight kilogrammes each.
  • A group lobbed three grenades and opened fire at a military vehicle. It was carrying two officers and four soldiers along Kachchai-Kodikamam Road. One soldier was killed and the rest were wounded.
    December 22:
  • Unidentified gunmen shot dead an agent for state run Thinakaran Tamil newspaper.
  • In the Jaffna town area, an unidentified person lobbed a grenade at a road block. An Army Sergeant, a Police Sergeant and two civilians were injured.
  • Unidentified persons directed assault rifle fire at the Army "liberty" bus belonging to 51 Division. No one was hurt.
  • An unidentified person lobbed a grenade at the Police Station. A Sub Inspector and three Constables were injured.
  • An unidentified group opened fire at a bunker in Nallur. One soldier was injured.
  • In Nunavil a soldier was shot with a pistol when he was trying to check a suspect at a check-point.
  • Unidentified persons hurled a grenade at the Kodikamam Police Station. A cordon and search operation was conducted in Miriyankadu (Kachchai). A motorcycle lay abandoned. A hand grenade and two swords were found. A civilian was taken into custody.
    December 23
  • An Army detachment in the Jaffna town was fired upon. No one was hurt. At a picket point, a hand grenade was hurled by unidentified persons.

The Chavakachcheri Police post came under grenade attack and rifle fire.
A fire fight broke out last evening between a Tiger guerrilla group and men from the Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) in Main Street, Jaffna town. Major T.A. Amith and a soldier from the DMI were injured. They were air lifted to Colombo for medical treatment. Army officials said four bodies of guerrilla cadres were later found at the scene. Army officials said a 40 mm grenade launcher,and a micro pistol was among the items found at the scene. Two soldiers were also injured when grenades were hurled at them in Irupalai.

The "unidentified persons" referred to in incident reports put out by the military, quite clearly, were civilian front organisations of the LTTE. During the near four years of ceasefire, the LTTE had not only put into action plans to mobilise their services but ensured they were provided with arms and grenades. That is in the Government controlled Jaffna peninsula. Similarly such arms and grenades have also entered the City of Colombo after security preparations were relaxed with the advent of the ceasefire.

That such enormous preparations have been going on is clearly demonstrated now by the recent developments. Yet, the armed forces and the police find themselves in a helpless situation with no counter measures in place. It is only now that such measures are being formulated and the troops being told to execute them.

Former Army Commander, Gen. Shantha Kottegoda, who held reins during a significant phase of these LTTE preparations claimed in his farewell speech last month that troops were now better prepared. Contrary to his boastful claim which embarrassed the defence establishment, the task of ensuring such preparedness has now fallen on the Government of President Mahinda Rajapakse. He had directed the armed forces Commanders and the police chief to buckle down to the task of maintaining law and order leaving other political issues to him. As a result the chiefs have been visiting military and police establishments in the troubled North and East personally supervising the measures to be taken. Last Thursday troops and Police in Trincomalee were ordered to commence cordon-and-search operations among other measures.

In another significant development, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka has banned his troops from having any dialogue with either the LTTE or the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission without the prior approval of Army Headquarters. A message sent on his behalf by the Directorate of Operations to Security Forces Commanders and Division Commanders says:

"DIALOGUE WITH SLMM - LTTE
"No dialogue to be made with LTTE without this headquarters sanctioning. "Any dialogue / interaction with SLMM to be limited to reporting of violation of the Ceasefire Agreement. All SF Commanders to ensure that all under command field commanders are update with this for strict compliance."
In the backdrop of mounting incidents in the Jaffna peninsula, there have been reports of other preparations. S. Ilampirathi, Political Wing leader for Jaffna peninsula, has issued a "decree" on behalf of the LTTE calling upon all Government departments and institutions to close from tomorrow (December 26).

Senior Government officials serving in the Jaffna peninsula were also invited for a meeting in Kilinochchi with LTTE Political Wing leader, S.P. Thamilselvan on Friday. He also told them that all their offices should remain closed from tomorrow until further notice. He warned them of serious consequences if the order was not obeyed. This is said to be part of preparations for a prolonged Civil disobedience campaign in the peninsula.

There have been reports of large crates being unloaded on the defence lines that divide Tiger guerrilla and security forces positions in the Nagerkovil area. In addition these reports speak of artillery and mortar positions being set up in this area where there has been increased military activity. A guerrilla cadre identified by his nom de guerre "Kohulan," said to be an LTTE explosive expert, is known to have entered the peninsula with a large quantity of explosives.

These and other guerrilla preparations figured at a meeting of the National Security Council on Friday night. It was chaired by President Mahinda Rajapakse. Soon after the meeting, senior security forces officials who were in Colombo both on leave and on official engagements were ordered to immediately return to their posts in the North and East. Special Air Force flights were placed at their disposal.

Navy Commander Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda yesterday ordered all operational craft out at sea and cancelled leave for personnel.
The unfolding events seem to make clear the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, wants to give effect to his warning earlier than expected. He said then in his "Maveerar Day" address "if the new Government rejects our urgent appeal, we will, next year, in solidarity with our people, intensify our struggle for self-determination, our struggle for national liberation to establish self government in our homeland." The urgent appeal was for a "reasonable political framework that will satisfy the aspirations of the Tamil people."

He seems to be setting the stage to commence that "struggle" beginning next week - from day one of the New Year. Besides other reasons, he does not want to give President Rajapakse's administration any time to become militarily stronger with what he perceives as staunch support from a friendly foreign country. For an unprepared security establishment, with no cohesive national strategy still in place, a daunting task lies ahead.

An Eelam War Four is sure to be different from the previous three. The colossal blunders of successive Governments that ignored national security interests have made this possible. The instability, loss of valuable lives, destruction of property and the harmful effects on the economy, should all tell on the conscience of those great heroes and heroines who gave leadership.

Karuna Camp: The secret probe
Two high ranking officers in the country's security establishment, The Sunday Times can reveal today, carried out a "TOP SECRET" operation in March, this year, to probe a matter of serious concern for Tiger guerrillas - attacks on them by the renegade Karuna group purportedly in collusion with the Sri Lanka Army.

Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) then Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri (also then Commander of the Navy) and former Commander of the Army, then Lt. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda were acting on a report in a Sunday newspaper. The report in March, this year, had revealed that the Karuna group operated a camp in Thivuchchenai in the Polonnaruwa district.

This revelation, however, was first probed by Army Headquarters. Thereafter, writing on behalf of the Commander of the Army, Brigadier J. Jayasuriya sent a report to Chief of Defence Staff, then Vice Admiral Sandagiri. In this report dated March 30, 2005 he said investigations revealed that the bunker referred to in the report was located in the Muthugala village (Grid Reference: 435090 -Vakaneri Map).

The report said: "Security Forces have abandoned this bunker. Commanding Officer has investigated the bunker 231 and taken photographs. These photographs were given to us. This bunker has not been used by Karuna cadres for any reasons."

"This newspaper article is wrong and gives the wrong impression to people. This kind of newspaper article can create problems to the peace process. There can be disputes between the Government and the LTTE." the report added. Based on this report, then Military Spokesman was directed to issue a denial which he did.

But the matter did not stop there. Admiral Sandagiri and Lt. Gen. Kottegoda detailed Brigadier Milinda Pieris, then Director Operations at the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH) to carry out what was officially termed a "fact finding mission." What is not clear is whether this secret "mission" was initiated on their own or on the orders of any higher political authority and why it merited such high priority. But, Brigadier Pieris who was later posted as Defence Attache in the Sri Lanka Embassy in Washington D.C. has now been re-called to Colombo.

The reason given by Admiral Sandagiri for the secret fact finding mission was a report the Head of Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Hagrup Haukland had sent Jayantha Dhanapala, then Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat. This report had followed a meeting Mr. Haukland has had with Mr. Dhanapala's then deputy, John Gooneratne on March 24. It had also related to SLMM internal special reports received by Mr. Haukland.

A copy of Mr Haukland's report dated March 30, 2005 was obtained by The Sunday Times. This is what it says:

"Monitors from SLMM District Office 5 in Batticaloa (DO 5) visited the alleged Karuna Group Camp in Thivuchchenai / Diwulsena on 26 March at approximately 0900 hours.

"The Karuna Group Camp is located on the northern side of the road and fenced with barbed wire. The size of the camp is approximately 50X30 metres with fire positions in the corners. The Camp has a mix of accommodations (sic) and more structures.

"There are check points (CPs) on both sides of the camp. The eastern one (nearest the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) position) is unmanned but the one on the other side was manned by 9 males. When SLMM monitors approached the camp the cadres were seen hiding a T-56 assault rifle (AK 47) (sic)
"The SLMM monitors met the second in command (2ic) of the camp at the Western CP and the atmosphere was very relaxed and friendly. "He openly admitted that he and his comrades are Karuna cadres and that they came to this jungle area North of Senapura in September 2004.

The first camps were established in the jungle north of Thivuchchena/Diwulsena village but in December 2004 the Karuna faction established a camp in the village itself. Initially the camp was located closer to the tarmac road before SLA told them to move. The camp was then moved to its present location. According to the 2ic, today's total strength of this Karuna group is 140 combatants. The main Karuna camps are now in the jungle North of Thivuchchenai/Diwulsena.

"Until 16 March 05 the Karuna Faction used this camp without any interference from SLA. This day an SLA uniformed officer came to the camp and told that cadres carrying weapons would have to pull back to the jungle and that armed cadres seen inside the village would be arrested by the SLA.

"According to the 2ic, SLA is patrolling through the village regularly and at least once a day. The patrols pass alongside the camp, continuing some hundred metres before returning the same way they came. When SLA patrols approach, the Karuna cadres hide their weapons. "Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission will follow up this case and continue our inquiry."

Nine days before Mr. Haukland's report to the Peace Secretariat, the SLMM District Office had also sent its headquarters in Colombo a report. Dated March 21, this report referred to the Karuna camp in the village of Thivuchchenai. It also referred to a report made to the District Office by then GOC of the Army's 23 Division at Welikanda, then Brigadier Vajira Wijegunawardena. He had referred to a shooting incident near the village.
This is what the office of SLMM's District 5 in Batticaloa said in its report to its own headquarters in Colombo:

"Along A 11 Road on the way from Valaichchenai to Manampiriya, DO 5 (District Office 5) could observe an increased number of SLA checkpoints (approx 6, compared to normally 2). DO5 further followed the road from Sewanapitiya junction through Muttugala to Thivuchchenai approx. 7km north, where we stopped and asked villagers at five different places about the location of the alleged Karuna camp. They all acknowledged the presence of the camp, located in the Thivuchchenai, besides giving the location of a SLA army post in the village.

"Approx. 300m before the alleged Karuna camp, we asked at the said SLA army post (3 soldiers) about the location of the Karuna camp, and were informed that the camp was just around the corner.

"As DO5 continued a few hundred meters, passing through one unmanned checkpoint, a total of 20 men partly in civilian and military looking outfits (on both sides of the road), approx. five (5) with arms and one (1) armed man (45-50 years old) in full combat gear could be observed. Upon returning, another unmanned checkpoint was seen at the end of the village.

"When leaving the area, two men on a motorbike (passenger in military trousers/bike no. 363990) is following the DO5 vehicle, stopping at the nearest SLA army post, approaching the soldiers. Upon seeing our vehicle stopping next to the same SLA soldiers, they quickly move to the nearby shop. It was obvious that they did not want to be seen with the SLA.

Approx. 2km away from the alleged Karuna camp, DO5 met with a high speeding dark red Nissan van with the SLA Army marking in the front window, heading to the direction of Thivuchechenai (approx. 10:00am)
"When returning to DO5 office, HOD (Head of District) was contacted by somebody presenting himself from the "Army HQ", asking where we have been and what we have seen. No detailed information was given."
Brigadier Peiris submitted a report on April 12 to then Vice Admiral Sandagiri. Among his findings:

  • Substantial evidence indicated the existence of the camp. However, the said camp was found abandoned.
  • People in the area confirmed that the presence of cadres in civilian/military looking outfits is common. Some carried weapons. Mostly the cadres operated during dark hours.
  • After detection of the camp by SLMM, the villagers said that two foreign nationals had come and warned the cadres to vacate the camp.
  • There is no evidence to confirm an Army officer visited the camp or asked cadres to pull back.
  • Sri Lanka National Guard troops present in the area were not patrolling the areas that surrounded the camp.
  • There were signs of electricity being tapped illegally. There were also signs of cooking being carried out. Used military type uniforms, boots and shoes were lying in some semi permanent huts.
  • According to civilians, there had been a camp of Karuna cadres at Thivuchchenai. However, period when Karuna cadres abandoned camp cannot be confirmed. It is presumed it came after March 21.
  • The assumption that military operating with Karuna group can be ruled out as no evidence whatsoever is available.

Vice Admiral Sandagiri has since been promoted Admiral and continues to head the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH). In this capacity, he is responsible for co-ordinating all military operations against Tiger guerrillas.
Lt. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda has been promoted to the rank of a four star General upon his retirement. He is to be given a diplomatic assignment abroad.


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