Kadirgamar
killing: Does anybody care?
By Col. R. Hariharan (retd.)
The late Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar would have been 74
on April 12 (Wednesday) had he not been assassinated eight months
ago. The investigations into his murder is still in progress.
The
assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on August
12 last year – an outspoken critic of the LTTE – was
ascribed to the Tigers almost unanimously. Based upon the LTTE's
past record this suspicion was well founded because the LTTE had
always called Mr. Kadirgamar a 'traitor' who had forsaken his Tamil
roots and 'defected' to the ranks of Sinhala chauvinists.
The
LTTE's stiff opposition to Mr. Kadirgamar came from the latter's
concept of federalism. According to the late Foreign Minister, "The
type of federalism suitable for Sri Lanka is a matter for national
discussion, not a matter for agreement only between the ruling party
and the LTTE".
Mr.
Kadirgamar firmly believed that "a durable peace based on a
constitutional arrangement acceptable to all the communities, reflected
in a major amendment to the present constitution, passed by a two
thirds majority in Parliament, and endorsed by a national referendum,
can only be achieved if a number of important rights are enshrined
in the amended constitution - human rights, parliamentary democracy
including multi-party participation in democratic elections, the
rule of law etc. None of these concepts is consistent with a "power
sharing arrangement with the LTTE". This went against the grain
of LTTE's self-proclaimed role as the sole arbiter of Tamils, which
would have the final say on what was good for Tamils.
Moreover,
Mr. Kadirgamar had not endeared himself to anti-Sinhala sections
of Tamils because he was considered close to the JVP, the erstwhile
Sinhala Leftist partner of the ruling UPFA coalition at that time.
The JVP had favoured him as a prime ministerial candidate instead
of Mahinda Rajapakse, when the coalition came to power under Chandrika
Kumaratunga.
Mr.
Kadirgamar was believed to be topping the LTTE's hit list. Pro-LTTE
sections of the Tamil Diaspora penned poems on the Internet celebrating
Mr. Kadirgamar's heinous killing to reinforce the suspicion. To
the warped Tamil extremist reasoning, Mr. Kadirgamar was probably
the most lucrative target in a no-war no-peace scenario. His killing
undoubtedly sent a warning to other Tamils who have achieved eminence
in the national mainstream, not to be hypercritical of the LTTE.
In
Sri Lanka, political assassinations by terrorists or political antagonists
are not uncommon. The services of former members of not-so-militant
organisations are dime a dozen to work as contract killers. A few
hundred thousand unlicensed arms ranging from mini-pistols to automatic
rifles of various types floating in the country make such 'contract'
assignments easy.
More
than thirty years of unbridled violence and terrorism and at times
state sponsored counter-terrorism and 'mass liquidation', have undermined
the rule of law in the country. And the police have not crowned
themselves with glory in most of the investigations of political
assassinations. Barring the killing of Prime Minister SWRD Bandaranaike,
in almost all cases of assassinations, columnists and political
leaders had cast serious doubts on the police line of investigations.
Progressive
politicisation of the government machinery and lack of transparency
in conduct of investigations have helped the growth of such seeds
of doubt in the minds of public over the years. Given the ethnic
confrontation that had been going on between Sinhalese and Tamils,
political parties and the community leaders had not hesitated to
use such slack investigations to denigrate each other. So it is
not surprising that the Kadirgamar-killing had also given rise to
a lot of finger pointing which could colour impartial investigation
and affect the credibility of the administration of justice.
Moreover,
Tamils always have nursed a grievance that the Sri Lankan administration
dominated by Sinhala majority does not bother much when Tamils kill
Tamils. In their perception, the killing of Mr. Kadirgamar as a
Tamil also falls under this category. The tardy course of police
investigations into the killing appears to underscore this grievance
of Tamils. The police investigation was taken up in right earnest
and President Kumaratunga imposed a state of emergency to facilitate
the investigation. The parliament approved it, despite some objections
from some of the Tamil parliament members. In the death of Mr. Kadirgamar
the ruling coalition found a handy martyr for the presidential poll
that followed. It became a campaign issue with a Deputy Minister
Police
made a few arrests and gathered a lot of circumstantial evidence.
They rounded up a number of Tamil suspects and a few Sinhalese also
during the course of investigation. Perhaps due to the pressure
on the police to show results, Tamil areas of Colombo were scoured
and a few hundred detained causing a lot of heart burning and distress
among the Tamil community. It sent a not so subtle warning that
Sinhala chauvinism was not dead. Things came to a boil when the
Police arrested Charles Gnanakone, an elderly Sri Lankan Tamil expatriate
and an Australian citizen. The arrest was made after a cloak and
dagger kind of raid following an intelligence tip and attendant
publicity.
Gnanakones were said to be family friends of the Kadirgamars and
Charles apparently knew Lakshman Kadirgamar quite well, just as
he knew the UNP presidential nominee Ranil Wickremesinghe.
The
police said Mr. Gnanakone's suspected links with the LTTE were already
under investigation. After a lot of publicity surrounding the arrest
both in the national and global media that apparently helped the
cause of the presidential election in some way, an ailing Charles
Gnanakone was released after his month long ordeal in the prison.
Nothing further has been heard of in his involvement in the assassination.
Five
other suspects, Thamil Iniyam, Rengam Vinagam, Aiyar Rajkumar, Ishothor
Arokkyanathan and Mutthiah Sahadevan were taken into custody and
remanded in connection with the Kadirgamar assassination were not
produced in court for "security reasons."At every step,
the findings of police investigation have been shrouded in doubts
giving rise to rumours and unconfirmed stories.
There
were also doubts raised about the veracity of the initial report
that a sniper gun was used for the killing. In fact, ballistics
had found that a .45-calibre weapon was used. Analysts argued that
snipers do not normally use this heavy calibre weapon for their
shots. Considering three shots found their mark the heavy calibre
weapon was probably fired from a close range. The conduct of Kadirgamar's
security staff and police has also been questioned. While they rendered
first aid to the victim, police established no roadblocks to trap
the killers. After all the smoke and fire, it is clear that there
has been no worthwhile result as to who killed Kadirgamar. If at
all police investigation into the murder served any purpose it was
that of police ineptitude. Kadirgamar's family hurt by the lack
of progress had to approach President Rajapaksa to prod the police
to produce some results.
Was
the whole investigation skewed from its objective of finding the
killers to garnering political advantage for the ruling UPFA coalition
in run up to the Presidential poll? This question raised in sections
of the media found echoes in the writings of columnists who could
never be considered pro-LTTE. Two important political developments
that followed gave further credence to this doubt. First, the extension
of the Emergency for a further period of six months during which
the presidential poll was on.
The
second: a systematic attempt by sections of the ruling coalition
to tarnish the name of Ranil Wickremesinghe – the UNP aspirant
and one of the main contenders for the presidency – for alleged
links with LTTE and some of those arrested in connection with the
Kadirgamar killing. The ruling coalition campaigners made full use
of alleged connection between Charles Gnanakone and Ranil Wickremesinghe
through innuendoes. As police never questioned Mr. Wickremesinghe,
it was clear that the allegations were more to score political brownie
points to character assassinate the presidential contender.
Who
killed Kadirgamar? This question still remains unanswered. Perhaps
it is unfashionable to raise a question on the subject that is no
more topical for the media, as more killings in larger numbers (though
of less important 'targets') had followed. The assassinated foreign
minister Kadirgamar, hailed as a national hero and a potential president
when he was alive, appears to have faded from public memory. One
cannot blame them as it is conditioned by the visual and print media
operating on a real time basis. But the question raises important
issues in the context of counter insurgency operations conducted
in Sri Lanka and South Asia.
As
mentioned earlier, this is not the first assassination in Sri Lanka
where the perpetrators were never pin pointed. But when a nation
is fighting insurgents, assassination of high security targets and
its aftermath provide valuable insights for improvement from the
counter insurgency point of view. These also impinge upon aspects
of governance and conduct of government on the one hand and structural
and systemic weaknesses of existing systems.
Systemic weaknesses seen in this case include the following:
Follow
through of investigations: This is an important tool to restore
public confidence in the administration in an insurgency scene.
The credibility of the citizen in the government can be eroded when
he sees lack of progress in pinpointing the assassins particularly
of high security targets.
Accountability:
Failure to improve systems of criminal investigation and crime control
particularly when they involve public personalities reflects poorly
on the accountability of not only the police and law enforcing agencies
but on also of those in power. [Sri Lanka is not the only country
with this weakness. In India, the failure of the police to effectively
pursue the case of murder of Jessica Lal who was shot dead in the
presence of a few hundred people is a very good example.]
Lack
of professional competency: In the case of Kadirgamar killing, the
assassins have shown the government machinery as incompetent to
protect a well-known, and high security target in the top echelon
of power. This can only be redeemed when the police and law enforcers
remove procedural and leadership weaknesses. Unless this is done,
the insurgents who might be involved will gain a psychological advantage.
And that makes the work of those fighting insurgency a little more
difficult.
Some of the aspects of governance that impact on this case are as
follows:
Rule
of Law: Rule of Law is essential for grievance redress when the
public faces emergency regulations imposed in a counter insurgency
scenario. Rule of Law also reflects upon the confidence of the government
in winning the war against insurgents but also that it has an effective
system where the common man can get justice. When a crime is committed
with impunity, particularly when high security conditions are said
to be in place, this confidence in government gets affected.
Transparency:
In an atmosphere of suspicion clouded with rumours and media guesses,
transparency of systems provides clear-cut expectations. Regular
dissemination of progress and proposed actions, if they do not compromise
security, produce greater confidence than use of sensational knee-jerk
inputs as a ploy to ward off the media. This aspect is also related
to the right to information. This is not only from the point of
basic human rights. Availability of correct and timely information
becomes imperative when emergency security measures are enforced
affecting civil population during a counter insurgency operation.
Mass search operations and arrest of large number of security violators
and suspects increases the feeling of public insecurity. And transparency
of procedures reduces such build up of public stress. However, to
introduce this in practice, down the line both in government and
bureaucracy require undergoing a cultural change.
Politicisation
of crime and criminal investigation. Apart from the encouragement
politicisation affords to crime in normal circumstances, it cuts
at the root of efficiency in counter insurgency operations. Important
clues and findings tend to be glossed over and get brushed under
the carpet. This could prove detrimental to intelligence and security
operations as well as preventive aspects of security.
These
aspects hold true not only to Sri Lanka but also to the whole of
South Asia, where for political reasons incompetent official machinery
is not only tolerated but also pampered. They tend to be used to
lock up political skeletons rather than trace perpetrators of crimes.
While
such conduct undermines the rule of law in ordinary circumstances,
in counter insurgency war, it undermines the operation. Even as
this article is completed, there is yet another political killing.
Vanniasingham Vigneswaran, president of the Trincomalee District
Tamil People's Forum and believed to be a supporter of the LTTE
has been shot dead on April 7, 2006, out side the Bank of Ceylon,
Trincomalee where he worked. It is significant that Vigneswaran
was in the forefront of the agitation to remove the Buddha statue,
which has been installed in the heart of Tamil area of Trincomalee.
Is this killing also going to meet the same fate as score of other
killings, joining the long list of such 'mysterious' killings?
Within
a short time in office, President Rajapaksa has shown himself as
a man of sound commonsense and pragmatism. The least he can do is
to come out with a detailed report, if not a white paper, on the
assassination of Mr. Kadirgamar and the investigation that followed.
Otherwise, not only the Tamils but also other Sri Lankans might
wonder, "Who cares for Kadirgamar?"
Col. R. Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist in
counter-insurgency, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in
Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence
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