Telescope

The assassination of the LTTE's political wing leader, S. P. Thamilselvan, led to an outpouring of sentiment ranging from unbridled triumph to outrage. The wise, such as the international community, maintained a stoic silence, which was perhaps more revealing than all the cacophony. The assassination of rebel leadership is an important component in counterinsurgency strategy. In wars between rebels - especially those waging a guerrilla war - and state forces, the latter place great stock on debilitating or annihilating guerrilla leaders. This is because the clandestine nature of irregular warfare results in a comparatively narrow decision-making base, leading counterinsurgency forces to believe that selective assassinations can strike devastating blows on rebel decision-making, thereby crippling the guerrilla movement.

There is, however, no consensus on whether the assassinations of top-level guerrilla leaderships result in the collapse in such organisations. A Rand study in 2002 suggested that the assassination of top-level leaderships among Palestinian armed groups had not produced the desired results since mid-level leadership had stepped in to fill the vacuum. On the other hand, the elimination of mid-level leaderships is seen as more beneficial because while it facilitates eliminating potential top-level leaders, it also disrupts "the control, communication and operations up and down the chain of command." (Fathom from Rand Review Summer 2002) However, other theorists differ.

It appears that a tip-off, coupled with surveillance by the remaining drones of the air force, were instrumental in hitting the target with pinpoint accuracy. Thamilselvan was lodged in the living quarters adjacent to the LTTE Peace Secretariat (PS) and his movements would have been apparent even to civilians in that area, say sources from the Wanni.

The security forces were desperate for success of this magnitude to regain parity in the military equilibrium between the two warring parties. The state believed it needed to offset losses it had suffered in a series of confrontations with the Tigers, of which only attacks on the Anuradhapura air base and Yala have become issues because concealing them was impossible.

On October 15, the LTTE overran a mini camp of the army at Thalagasmankande in Yala where seven military personnel were killed. Later a wildlife department vehicle was also damaged by a landmine. On its heels was the attack on the air force base on October 22 that left 26 aircraft either destroyed or damaged. These passages of arms appear to have made the government desperate for a 'victory,' leading it to target the LTTE's political leadership in Kilinochchi.

The media carried a number of reports about Thamilselvan changing locations frequently for security reasons and deciding to spend the night at a place adjacent to the LTTE peace secretariat. The area around the PS seems to have been an unfortified. There were no reports of resistance by anti-aircraft fire at the aircraft that precision-bombed the building and the bunker. The question is "why?" Was it that the LTTE was sure the government would not attack it because it was the seat of government? If so, it was utterly misplaced confidence. Or, was it unpardonable carelessness?

It appears that, wiser after the incident, the LTTE is now moving anti-aircraft guns into Kilinochchi to ward off future air strikes. Following Thamilselvan's assassination, fierce confrontation erupted near the Giant's Tank on the Vavuniya-Mannar Road on October 31. The army overran Tiger FDLs beyond the tank's bund that was around 600m from the government lines. However, the LTTE took it back. The Daily Mirror report (02/Nov/07) claims around 10 soldiers had sustained injuries. The rebels put the casualties much higher.

There have been skirmishes in this sector on almost a daily basis with the army trying to break into the LTTE-occupied areas. It is interesting that most of these operations including the one to capture FDLs beyond Giant’s Tank, are described as 'pocket operations' involving only 200 to 250 military personnel, unlike in the past where an attempted breakout would have consisted of much larger formations.

Meanwhile, in the Jaffna Peninsula, the security forces tried to advance from their FDLs between Muhamalai and Kilali on November 7. They are reported to have used artillery, MBRLs and helicopter gun-ships for 'softening up' operations to which the LTTE had retaliated. This was followed by another attempt on Friday (9), in which the Daily Mirror reported in its website edition that 11 soldiers were killed and 41 injured, while 52 Tiger cadres were also killed.

Meanwhile, the overrunning of the army camp at Talagasmankande and the incidents in Tissamaharama have led to security being beefed up in the Yala area. The army, said to be of brigade strength and supplemented by the police, are deployed there.
Taken together, these incidents demonstrate the security forces taking significant battlefield strains and at the same time compelled to be deployed in areas that were earlier deemed 'safe,' so as to provide security to the civilian population. This diverts their attention from advancing into the Wanni, the capture of which, the government says is its objective. By having to react to the LTTE's agenda, the army cannot carry out its own programme with optimal capacity.

A section of the Colombo establishment believes the government assassinated a man who was head of the rebels' political wing and its chief negotiator because it was hard pressed for a 'victory' in the face of having to pass the budget, with the JVP threatening to support the opposition UNP to defeat it.

One way of securing the JVP's support was by delivering a devastating blow on the Tigers. And in the face of drawbacks on military fronts elsewhere, the government could only strike a soft target - a political leader staying in a relatively under-secured area near the peace secretariat.

If so, it was another strike using the military at the behest of the country's political leadership in pursuit of partisan interests. The Tigers take the killing of their political wing leader very seriously and have wowed to retaliate. It appears the government too believes so because soon after the attack, President Mahinda Rajapaksa told parliamentarians to be conscious of their security.

If the government striking a political target in a desperate attempt to score a 'victory' for the budget to be passed results in southern political leaders and parliamentarians becoming vulnerable to attack, it would be, once again, the country paying the price for a small coterie of government leaders laying at risk the lives of all politicians to gain petty partisan advantage.

A killing clouded by petty politics