Abrogating CFA wins Rajapaksa popular backing

By Neville de Silva

When the Chinese New Year dawns early next month they will be wishing each other Kung Hey Fat Choy. The coming year will be the year of the rat. The Chinese distinguish each year not only by numerals but also by some animal species, be it a dog, pig or even a snake.

Will 2008 be our year of the Tiger? The signing of the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) brokered by the Norwegians and entered into by the Ranil Wickremesinghe government was hailed by the world-mainly the western community- as an essential step in the evolution of a negotiated peace settlement. Attempts at a political settlement earlier, starting with the Thimpu talks during the JR Jayewardene administration, had failed and the country was heading inexorably to war though to have termed what subsequently occurred as a civil war seemed hyperbolic. It was against this background that the CFA was accepted with hosannas, particularly by the West encouraged no doubt by the trumpet blowing by Norway which had previously failed to bring peace to Africa as well as an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It is well to recall that the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the consequent US-led war on terror was very much a motivating factor in pushing the LTTE towards a unilateral ceasefire and then the CFA. It is important to place the CFA in the context of domestic and more importantly international political developments, to understand why the LTTE and the Sri Lanka government entered into this deal. The fact that the CFA was seriously flawed did not seem to have concerned the Sri Lanka government at the time as long as it had an agreement that appeared to bring the fighting to an end.

One of the serious flaws which I pointed out years ago, is that it involved only two parties, albeit the principal parties, to the armed conflict. It left out of the equation other stakeholders, to use that horrible word that has now entered the civil society lexicon, to the overall issue such as other Tamil groups who were either opposed to the LTTE or had nothing to do with, and the Muslim community which had a major presence in the disputed northeast and in the north from where some 100,000 of them had been forcibly evicted several years ago in perhaps Sri Lanka’s single biggest ethnic cleansing operation, according to Muslim leaders. Besides this elimination of some principal players in the issue from the subsequent rounds of talks that followed creating frustration among these significant groups, the Wickremesinghe government kept Sri Lanka’s head of state who, as Wickremesinghe should know having served in the JR Jayewardene administration, had considerable executive power, out of the loop. Thus, President Kumaratunga was blissfully unaware of the terms of an agreement that the Norwegians were trying to foist on the country in their own pitiful effort to carve for themselves a niche on the international stage.

It is true that the CFA brought to an end the kind of formal military conflict that was occurring though there might not have been major battles. To the public this provided a respite from the cycle of violence that had been experienced previously. But, it is also fairly clearly established that the ceasefire period allowed the LTTE to strengthen itself politically and militarily with some help from the Sri Lanka government or some elements in it-politicians and officials alike-much to chagrin of the Sri Lankan people and surely the military itself. Politically, the LTTE strengthened its position in the East not to mention internationally, using the several rounds of talks abroad as occasions to make and strengthen contacts and militarily to purchase and smuggle in modern sophisticated arms to expand its arsenal .It did one thing more. The free movement of people in either direction helped the LTTE infiltrate Colombo, establish sleeper cells and keep track of important figures who the Tigers thought were enemies or impeded their cause.

The assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar and later, the attempts on the lives of army commander Sarath Fonseka and defence secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa while the CFA was still technically operating are cases in point. It might also be useful to remind international critics of the decision to withdraw from the CFA that the vast majority of the violations of the pact were by the Tigers and relatively few by the armed services according to the SLMM reports. There was little doubt that sooner or later, President Rajapaksa was going to dump the CFA and take on the LTTE in a more formidable manner. That resolve was obviously hardened by Gotabhaya Rajapaksa and Gen Sarath Fonseka who were the targets of suicide bombers and who would like to see the noose tightened round the Tigers.

All the information I have received both from my own contacts in Sri Lanka and others who have returned from Colombo a few days back indicate that there is popular backing for President Rajapaksa’s decision to take the tiger by the neck because people have had enough of this .If a solution could not be achieved by peaceful negotiations as some in the country and in the world outside advocate strongly as the only option, then the people seem to be ready to allow him other alternatives .Let’s leave aside for the moment implications of this for domestic politics.

Now that the deed is done, as Macbeth might have said, it must be done well. Two things are bound to happen. One already sees the first signs of international criticism at the decision to dump the CFA and take a more aggressive military stance against the LTTE. In the months to come there will be sustained criticism not least from Norway which would try to keep out of it because it still wants to have a foot in the door for a possible return as broker. But it will orchestrate international criticism and it has the resources to do so. This will be done through friendly governments, especially in Europe, which have praised Norwegian peace efforts and offered it bouquets, through international organisations both multilateral and INGOs particularly human rights groups and through western media outlets including professional bodies. The critical question is whether the government having chosen the path it has, has the resources to meet this obvious challenge which will be the main issue in the international arena as far as Sri Lanka is concerned .Does the government have the experience and expertise to deal with this situation?

One cannot ignore the fact that the LTTE has its own media outlets to try and convince the Tamil diaspora and others of the need to support it morally and financially in the coming months. The LTTE and its supporters/sympathisers also have contacts with key elements in government, political circles and international organisations in western countries as well as in Asia. If the government wishes to justify its chosen course of action it need not only to win the war on the ground, if such a war is winnable, but also the propaganda war which will be a sustained campaign surely.

While the propaganda war will obviously have to be fought on several battlefields abroad, there is at least one important factor that needs to be uppermost in the minds of those who lead the battle at home. Every effort should be made to respect human rights and preserve the sanctity of people whatever ethnic group they belong to. No doubt the decision to dump the CFA would worry the minorities, particularly the Tamils. That worry should not be allowed to turn into fear and then hate by officials and action that fuel that fear. Rightly or wrongly today’s world concerns itself with how the state treats its own people. In the pursuit of the Rajapaksa government’s goal let it not be said that whatever victory it perceives was not attained over the lives of ordinary citizens who only wish to continue to live peacefully, hardships and all.

Sri Lanka is on shaky ground on human rights. The government must make sure it does not create a landslide of condemnation.