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The APRC handed over its interim proposals to President Mahinda Rajapaksa in late January. The preamble to these proposals stated that the APRC was in the process of finalising a document “that would be the basis for a solution to the national question.”

The APRC said its proposals in the final document might need public approval at a referendum. However the interim proposals, offered “maximum devolution” within the present constitutional structure. They were proposed by the APRC because they could be implemented immediately without complex procedures such as referenda.

One need not be a rocket scientist to figure out that the APRC actually came up with a modified 13th Amendment to the Constitution as its interim proposals because it (APRC) has become a handmaiden of the president. Assailed, however, by such unkind epithets, members of the APRC and its apologists, who consider themselves moderates, presented an interesting defence.

The defence put forward constitutional change as gradual and the implementation of the 13th Amendment as the first step in that process. If the 13th Amendment proved inadequate, other constitutional models for power sharing could be experimented with, until an acceptable compromise was reached. The models suggested were the PA’s 2000 draft constitution, proposals in the Mangala Moonesinghe PSC report and even the final document of the APRC when its authors were ready to release it.

It has to be said, however, that if we believe the 13th Amendment is only a first step on the road to drafting a constitution acceptable by all communities, then the president’s blunt statement on Independence Day has to be disregarded. He said that experiments in constitution-making have to be confined to what can be realistically implemented.

A reality of Sri Lankan politics is that agitation by the Sinhalese for power sharing through devolution has been very limited. That is devolution defined as devolving power and not decentralising administrative functions of government. Except for a small group that believes de-concentration of power is a necessity for democracy, agitation against centralisation has found few champions among Sri Lanka’s majority community.

The dynamic for devolving power to the periphery (as well as sharing power at the centre) has been provided principally by the Tamils, who have been agitating to change the present unitary form of government that concentrates power in a Sinhala-dominated parliament and a Sinhala-Buddhist president. Of late, they have been supported by the Muslims, but Muslim agitation for devolution is more for protection in a Tamil-dominated North and East, rather than for devolution in Sri Lanka as a whole.

This means that unless the system of devolution satisfies the basic aspirations of the Tamils, it would be of little use. And the response of all Tamil political parties, except the EPDP (which has a single seat in parliament) to implementing the 13th Amendment as an interim measure has been negative. They feel it is too little, too late.

If the Tamils want meaningful devolution, their aspirations have to be expressed by their political representatives with sufficient persuasion that it is able to counter the opinions of reactionary parties like the JVP, JHU and others entertaining similar views on the ethnic conflict. However, the question is whether southern Sri Lankan politics offers space for the expression of these aspirations. On the one hand, the TNA that articulates a distinct set of ideas on the subject has been kept out of the APRC. On the other, the adversarial nature of parliament though lending itself to airing issues, is unsuitable for sober reflection and the exploration of ideas.

Even if one were to concede that finding a forum is comparatively easy if there is political will for compromise and negotiation, the bigger problem is Sri Lanka’s political culture. Whether we like it or not, we have to admit that the parameters within which the debate on power-sharing and devolution is conducted are set by extremist parties like the JVP and JHU that are able to exert an influence much greater than their numerical strength warrants.

Conversely, within the SLFP, there is a fairly significant section that believes the only realistic solution to the ethnic conflict is federalism going much beyond the 13th Amendment. But they are silent because the president and his brothers have hijacked the debate within the party and transformed it to support their militarist agenda.

These forces that define the parameters of the devolution debate have ensured there is no space for Tamil aspirations to be articulated democratically and guaranteed nothing more than devolution within a unitary state is even discussed. To deviate slightly from the topic under discussion, the only other possibility for a wider discussion on power sharing is for an alternative government supporting extensive devolution being elected. To this writer that too will not help because the UNP is hoping to attract Sinhala voters by projecting a pro-Sinhala image. After using such a strategy to be elected, even if it hopes to modify its stance and offer a genuine federal alternative, it will not work.

This is because (a) UNP governments of the future like those of the past will be held captive by extremist forces in the country and (b) if the UNP hopes to appease Sinhala voters to come to power, the party will not be able to find a meaningful political solution that satisfies the Tamils – the question of means and ends.

So how do the apologists for the APRC hope to experiment with different constitutional models when the agenda for debate is being set by Sinhala extremists, while even the international community, personified here by India, is willing to stand placidly by?

Don’t the apologists know that even if the APRC was to make public its final draft in which it is supposed to discuss genuine power sharing, to debate (let alone implement) any form of devolution that goes beyond the confines of a unitary form of government, is unrealistic?

While masquerading as champions of gradual political change, the APRC apologists, who tell the world they are moderates, pin their hopes on the government’s success in smoking the LTTE out of its hive in the Wanni. They believe, shorn of politico-military backing, the Tamils’ bargaining power for power sharing would be diluted and any thought of meeting their aspirations could be safely dropped.

Today, everyone in the ruling party circus – the wolves and wolves in sheep clothing – have put all their eggs in one basket, that of military conquest, with scarcely a thought of what will happen if these plans go awry.

The APRC sham and devolution of power through military means